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FOREWORD
The ECWS Prebreathe Eliminrtion Study identifies changes to the Space Trans-
portation System required if prebreathing with pure 0 2 prior to EVA is to
be eliminated during operational flights.
This study has been perfo-. med under contract by Hamilton Standard for the
National Aeronautics and ;,pace Administration, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center,
over the period from NovE^,ber 1981 to August 1981.
Questions regarding this study should be directed to.
Mr. Wayne Buckley BC73
Contract Specialist
NASA/Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
or
Mr. Alfred 0. Brouillet 1A-2-06
ECWS Study Manager
Hamilton Standard Division
United Technologies Corporp:ion
Windsor Locks, Connecticut 06096
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ABSTRACT
L Y
	Prebreathe Elimination Study examines impacts of changing Orbiter cabin pres-
sure and EMIT EVA pressure to eliminate pure 0 prebreathing prior to EVA. The
investigation defines circumscribing physioloiical boundaries and identifies
changes required within Orbiter to reduce cabin pressure. The study also
identifies payload impacts, payload flight assignment constraints, and impacts
s	 upon EMU resulting from raising EVA pressure. The study presents the trade-off
which optimizes the choice of reduced cabin pressure and increased EVA pressure.
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INTRODUCTION
EVA planning for supporting STS flights calls for conducting EVA at 4.0 psia
from a 14.7 psis cabin. To preclude "the bends", a painful and patentially
dangerous physiological condition resulting from bubble formation when dissolved
gasses in body tissues are driven out of solution by exposure to reduced ambient
pressure during EVA, STS crmmembers prebreathe pure 0 2
 for 3 to 4 hours to
purge body tissues of dissolved N 2 , the prime constituent of bends bubbles.
Holrever, prebreathing has beveral drawbacks: the crew considers the Portable
Oxygen System (POS) to restrict IVA prior to donning the EMU, and denitrogenation
can be significantly reduced durinq EMIT donning by inadvertently taking just one
or two breaths of air, increasing likelihood of bends considerably unless
specific (and cumbersome) procedures are followed rigorously.
Planning for OFT side-steps prebreathing by requiring reduction of cabin pres-
sure to 9 psis for approximately 12 hours prior to EVA, which promotes suffi-
cient washout of dissolved gasses from tissues to minimize likelihood of bends.
This is not a permanent solution, because it does not address many Orbiter,
payload, operational, and EVA issues rr:levant to operational STS flights.
The objective of the Prebreathe Elimination Study is to define physiologically
safe EVA and cabin pressure levels while achieving an acceptable compromise
between conflicting Orbiter, payload, operational and EVA issues; 311 at an
acceptably low technical risk. This study addresses issues of physiology,
Pre-EVA procedures, payloads, Orbiter vehicle impacts and EMIT impacts. The study
also presents a trade study to select the optimum combination of reduced cabin
pressure and increased EVA pressure, and identifies new technology areas to
facilitate implementation.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Summary of MaJor Conclusions
The executive summary highlights major study conclusions, summarizes issues
affected by Orbiter cabin pressure, and lists impacts to EMU required to
support EVA without prebreathe.
•	 The recommended optimum EVA pressure is 5.75 +
.
0.1 psis.
Fecommenaed cabin pressure for operational flights with EVA is 11.8 +
0.2 psia,
-	 The recommended combination of EVA and cabin pressure eliminates prebreathe
prior to EVA. However, the crewmembers bodies must be in approximate
equilibration JE cabin N2 levels prior to EVA. This requires a one-
time denitrogenation, taking 1.1 hours on pure 02, to support the 7 rst
TWWithin several hours of launch; or reducing cabin pressure to 11.8
psia for 12 hours prior to the first EVA. Subsequent EVA's can be per-
formed without additional denitrogenation from an 11.8 psia cabin using
existing EMU donning and checkout procedures verified for STS-1.
The recommended cabin pressure meets existing maximum and minimum 02
levels, based on hypoxia and materials considerations.
The Orbiter vehicle requires automatic cabin pressure control at 11.8
psis. This requires adding one total pressure regulator and shut-off
valve to each of two parallel cabin pressurization subsystems.
Payload flight assignment planning should continue to avoid inclusion of
experiments that are sensitive to subatmospheric cabin pressure to flights
with either planned EVA or where backup EVA is a possibility.
Approximately 82% of EMU components require no change to support EVA at
5.78 psia.
-	 Significant EMU modifications consist of new gloves, enlar,ed SOP, reworked
suit joints, increased battery capacity and reset 0 regulators. Minor
modifications include revising flow restrictors, relief valves and C&W
set points, and strengthening select structural elements.
-	 the accompanying chart shows cabin conditions approved for OFT only.
Modification of the EMU will permit improving cabin conditions for
operational flights.
5
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EMU CONFIGURATION
IMPACT SUMMARY COMPARISON
EMU Configuration
Use
Acceptable for OPS Flights
PCABIN - Psia
PE.VA - Psia
Minimum Cabin PP02 - psia
Maximum Cabin % 02
CABIN Pressure Control
Avionics Power Down - KW
EMU Mod's Required
Q
Approved for OFT Only
and not acceptable
for operational flights
Present	 No Prebree!the
OFT w/o
	
OPS Flights
prebreathe
No Yes
9.0 11.8
4.1 5.78
2.46 266
E 25.9
Manual Automatic
.... 4 n.2
No	 Yes
6
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ALLOWABLE CABIN PRESSURE RANGE
Investigation of relevant study issues defines a window for locating the
optimum reduced cabin pressure and increased EVA pressure. The window permits
significant improvement in cabin conditions over those approved for OFT EVA
support. Significant limits defining the window are shown on the accompanying
chart.
Physiology
When equilibrated with the cabin a crewmember may perform EVA without prebreathe,
if EVA pressures are not less than those shown for corresponding cabin pressures.
Oxygen partial pressure must be above the 4,000 feet alveolar equivalent shown
to avoid the first measureable effects of hyooxia, which is night blindness.
EVA pressure must be less than 6.0 psia nominal to avoid the requirement for
hyperbaric chamber first aid treatment in case of explosive decompression
during sea level manned testing.
Avionics Cooling
Cabin pressure can be reduced to approximately 11.6 psia in a thermally benign
environment without exceeding avionics temperatures defined by outlet air tem-
perature specification limits, if the crew does not exceed four people and one
of two GPC's in Avionics Bay 1 is powered down.
For more demanding thermal conditions both cabin fans can be run and some
cabin electronics shutduwn per Priority Powerdowns 1 through 3.
All load management results in maintaining sea level avionics box temperatures,
thus incurr;ng no degradation of performance or life.
Payloads
Certain life science and carry-on experiments may be sensitive to subatmospheric
cabin pressure. NASA should continue to screen experiments for pressure
sensitivity, and those that are pressure sensitive should be assigned to
flights without planned or backup payload support EVA.
Material s
Present Orbiter cabin materials are rated for 25.9% maximum 02 concentrations.
Cabin Pressure Control
The new 1.5% PP02 sensor (which was installed
ind the existing 02/112 controller will support
:otal band of 0.33 psi, including C&W and dead
the existing total pressure regulator controls cabin pressure to within +0.2
)sia.
in OV-102 just prior to STS-1),
controlling PP02 to within a
bands.
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The above limits define the following window:
Minimum	 Maximum
K ABIN Total + 0.2 psia
	 11.8	 12.35
PP02 - psia	 2.66	 3.0 @ 11.6 psia
%	 N/A	 25.9
PEVA + 0.1 psia	 5.66	 5.9
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UEMU IMPACTS
The EMU consists of 22 CEI's comprising 117 components. Of these components
only 21 require change (18X) to support EVA at 5.78 psia.
Significant changes are required to the items shown in the accompanying chart.
These changes require evaluation to minimize their impact, and redesign
requires development evaluation.
Minor changes are required in select areas. These are straightforward
engineering modifications and do not require development evaluation.
Special test equipment at Hdmilton Standard, ILC and JSC requires only minor
modifications to support EVA at 5.78 psia. Changes include resetting relief
valves in test rigs and interface adaptors and instrument recalibration.
Handling fixtures may require modification, depending on extent of SOP change.
The United States Manned Space Program has developed a 4 psi EVA capability.
The ( * ) items are new technology initiatives recommended to support implemen-
tation at 5.78 psia, to minimize hardware impacts, to assure understanding of
issues and to verify procedures at the higher EVA pressure.
9
*	 New Technology
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EMU IMPACTS
No Change - 82% of EMU Components
Significant Changes -
*	 SOP 02
 Capacity up 41%. May Impact:
-	 AAP
-	 Airlock Wall
-	 MMU
Battery Capacity up 8%
	
!3
*	 Joint Torque up 9 to 32%
*	 New Glove Likely
Modify 02 Regulators
Minor Changes -
-	 Strengthen Select Structure
-	 Reset Select Flow Restrictors and Relief Valves
-	 Reset C&W Set Points
STE - Minor Changes Only
*	 Integrated Testing Recommended
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PHYSI OLOGY
A complete discussion of the physiology issues is contained in the appendix
to this report. The issues were developed with cooperation from people at
NASA JSC CB and SD3 and Brooks AFB SAM. The discussion is also based on
previously published test data and position papers from CB and SD3, and
reference material in the literature.
Physiological issues are grouped for presentation convenience into steady-
state and transient limits. Steady-state limits are shown on the accompanying
chart. Transient limits are discussed in the following six charts.
Hy2oxia
Hypoxia, or lack of oxygen, results when oxygen partial pressure in the lung
falls below minimum threshold values. Symptoms become more pronouned as
alveolar 0 levels decline. The onset of hypoxia can be identified as a
measureabli decrease in night vision acuity. This threshold occurs at the
4,000 feet altitude equivalent. JSC SD3 sets this as the minimum 0 2
 partial
pressure for normal STS activity on operational flights.
At 8,000 feet altitude alveolar equivalent the threshold of loss of ability to
learn new tasks can be measured. SD3 sets this as the minimum 0 2 partial pres-
sure for emergency STS activity.
Oxygen Toxicity
3.8 psia has been accepted as a safe, conservative, long term limit for cabin
0 partial pressure based on hematology changes, which are the threshold effects
n 02
 toxicity.
8.0 psia has been accepted as the maximum limit for EVA 0 partial pressure for
three EVA's from Shuttle. However, limited test data indicates that inter-
mittent exposure to pure 0 at 8 psi for more than three EVA's may be harmful.
This would be of concern ;i r EVA support from a space platform, but does not
impact EVA from the Orbiter.
EbulIism
0.91 psia is the vapor pressure of water at body temperature. Body fluid will
boil if pressure surrounding the body falls below this level.
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TRANSIENT PHYSIOLOGICAL LIMITS
Transient limits define acceptable envelopes for limiting effects of explosive
decompression and the "bends".
Explosive Decompression
A sudden loss of suit integrity, such as loss of a glove or boot, would dump suit
pressure in less than one second. If this occurs during sea level testing, some
lung rupturing is a likely result at suit pressures over 6 psig. The rupture
releases air into the pleural cavity, presenting an immediate danger of lung
collapse and air embolism. A first aid treatment in controlling these effects
is to repressurize the test subject in a hyperbaric facility at up to w eral
atmospheres within several minutes of the mishap. NASA JSC safety policy
requires rapid access to a hyperbaric facility at all sites where human testing
in excess of 6 psig is conducted.
Cause of the "Bends"
Body tissues contain dissolved gas in equiiibrium with ambient pressure. When
ambient pressure is reduced, bubbles form or expand from everpresent micronuclei.
If the drop in pressure is not too great or too fast, bubbles evolve in the
tissues and are carried in orderly fashion to the lungs by the bloodstream.
The lungs act as gas separators, dumping evolved gas overboard.
Bends, or limb joint pain, can arise when the orderly evolution and transport
of gas bubbles is impeded. "Bends" appears to be caused by gasses attempting
to escape from poorly vascularized body tissues such as fat and sc!r tissue.
Cold, stress, age and injuries, all of which inhibit micro circulation in these
tissues, inhibit gas release and increase an individual's susceptability to
bends. Individuals who release gas into the bloodstream as a bubble shower of
sufficient intensity to mask the heart beat (as detected by doppler ultrasound)
also appear to be bends-prone, developing symptoms in 15 to 20 minutes.
Concern About "Bends"
Bends are of concern for three reasons. First, limb bends can be sufficiently
painful to disable a crewmember, thus preventing one from taking other steps to
help oneself. Second, a bubble shower of sufficient intensity can temporarily
exceed the lungs capacity to degas the pulminary circulation completely, allow-
ing bubbles to pass beyond the lungs into the "left side" circulation, where
they may be pumped to other organs including the brain, causing severe and
unpredictable reactions. Third, recent evidence suggests that blood platelets,
which are responsible for starting the clotting process by detecting vascular
injuries, may react to gas bubbles as though they were vascular injuries.
Platelets disintegrate in the clotting process, releasing materials which both
promote clotting, and enter into the clot itself. Tests indicate that bubbles
breaking through blood vessel walls actually dislodge epethelial cells frow the
blood vessel walls. The concern is that bubbles could cause clotting, resulting
in pulmonary thrombosis (blood clots in the lung) which is potentially very
dangerous.
15
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PHYSIOLOGICAL LIMITS - TRANSIENT
a
Explosive Decompression
> 6 psig Requires Hyperbaric Decompression
"Bends" Limits
-	 EVA Normal
-	 N2 Washout (Denitrogenation)
-	 EVA Emergency
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Transient Physiological Limits (Contirwed)
Conservatism and Prediction
Bends susceptibility appears to be progressive within a given flight. An
individual may experience some limb pain with the first decompression, but
remain functional. Repressurization will relieve the pain. However, bubble
micronuclei will remain in the tissues for up to 48 hours, causing more gas
release during subsequent depressurizations. In the absence of a hyperbaric
facility aboard the Oribiter it is necessary to eliminate bends during EVA by
developing safe procedures for dissolved gas washout, establishing conserva-
tive R values (ratio of cabin N2
 pressure to EVA pressure), and ultimately to
screen EVA candidates for bends tolerance.
Current USAF test experience shows that R values and gas washout equations
cannot guarantee bends-free EVA for all individuals. R values are useful for
identifying and evaluating candidatItgas washout procedures. However, gas
washout equations using a single a	 term model human tissues which are well
perfused with blood vessels. In reality, the problem tissues are poorly
vascularized and depend on gas diffusion through the tissues to the blood
vessels, a process not well represented by these equations. Owing to variations
between individuals in degree of vascularization of these tissues and in
amounts of such tissues in the body, candidate gas washout procedures must be
verified with human testing.
Normal EVA Bends Limit
The accompanying chart shows the relationship between cabin pressure and EVA
pressure at the accepted bends limit. The curve produces the same ratio
between cabin N level and EVA total pressure (1.6) as the standard USAF rapid
decompression f2rom sea level to 18,000 feet (1.58).
This c, ;rve is based on the assumption that the body is in equilibrium with the
cabin N2
 level prior to EVA. The curve is from maximum cabin pressure to
minimum EVA pressure. Applying tolerances definestie ranges of interest to be:
PCABIN - 9.3 to 14.7 + 0.2 psia
PEVA = 4.1 to 7.4 + 0.1 psia
M.0
7.0
4.0
i
W
a '
 5.0Z
x
4.0
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N2 WASHOUT (DENITROGFNATION)
To perform N2 washout calculations phiologists consider body tissues to h,ve
a "1/2 time". which is the time required to lose the one-half the dissolved N2
in an exponential decay process. The body is considered to consist of three
types of tissues:
Fast -	 Half ti ye is 180 mi outes
-	 Intermediate - Half time is 240 minutes
-	 Slow -	 Half tine is 360 minutes
Experience has shown that washout procedures produce an acceptably low
incidence of bends (less than 5%) if the tissue dissolved gas (PTDG) level
resulting from the procedure is less than or equal to the following ratios
with respect to EVA total pressure:
-	 PTDG240 - 1.6 x PEVA (Intermediate tissues)
-	 PTDG360 - 1.8 x PEVA (Slow tissues)
Evaluating tissues dissolved gas levels resulting from breathing a mixture of
cabin 02/N2 follows the following exponential decay equations:
PTDG - PIoN2 + (PIN2 - PIoN2) (I -e-kt)
where:	 PIoN2 is the inspired N 2 level to which the body tissues are
initially equilibrated.
PIN2 is the inspired N2 level at reduced cabin pressure.
k is a constant which includes tissue one-half time.
When breathing pure 02 the PIN2 term goes to zero, causing the equation to
simplify to:
PTDG - PIoN2 - (PIoN2) (e-kt)
19
DENITROGENATION
-	 3-Tissue Model
a
-	 360 Minute 112 Time "SLOW" Tissues
240 Minute 112 Time "IN1ERMEDIATE" Tissw!s
-	 Washout Procedures OK if...
PTDG360 	 1.8 x PEVA
PTDG,240 t 1.6 x PEVA
-	 Breathing Cabin Gas
PTDG - PIoN2 ± (PIN2 - PIoN2) ( I -e-kt)
-	 Breathing Pure 02
PTDG - PIoN2 - (PIoN2) (e-kt)
20
N2
 WASHOUT CURVES
The accompanying chart is a plot of the two denitrogenation equations at four
cabin pressures selected for this study for the slow and intermediate tissues.
The curves are based on breathing cabin gas at the 4.000 feet altitude alveolar
equivalent which yields the highest PIN and hence the slowest N washout.
The carats (.1)  in the right hand margi g represent PIN at each Cabin pressure.
Tissues become equilibrated with inspired N 2 at t n i^ifinity.
21
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NEED FOR INITIAL DENITROGENATION
The accompanying chart shows the need for a one-time denitrogenation to bring
body tissues close to equilibrium with reduced cabin N22 pressure levels. The
chart shows that breathing cabin gas alone will not prDduce low enough tissue
dissolved gas levels to support EVA at PTDG/1.6 levels.
The major problem is that the denitrogenation equation expresses an exponential
decay. The intended washout uses the differential between PTDG and PIN to
drive PTDG toward PIN2 . However, PTDG will never reach PIN2
 because thi driving
force approaches zero as the differential approaches zero.
The second problem is that the cabin is N2 rich, resulting from using PP0 2
 at
the 4,000 feet altitude alveolar level.
Solving the first problem requires driving PTDG down to PIN prior to the first
EVA, and doing it quickly to support mission objectives. Tissues will renitro-
genate to PIN22 levels after the first EVA, but will not exceed these levels.
Thus the washout is a one-time requirement 
I 
and will not be required for
subsequent	 s. The next section of	 s report considers three candidate
Pre-EVA pry oche ur'es for achieving this initial dissolved gas washout.
The second problem is solved by retaining the STS-1 EVA pre-egress procedure of
checking out the EMU in the airlock after donning while breathing pure 0 from
the SCU for 20 minutes. This appears sufficient to offset the effect o?the
N2
-rich cabin, and is included in all three candidate Pre-EVA procedures.
23
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NEED FOR ONE-TIME DENITROGENATION
MAX(2)MAX. MAX. MIN.
PCAB PIN PEVA PTDG TIME
14.7 11.60 7,25 11.60 0
13.5 10.88 6.50 10.40 NEVER
12.0 9.34 5.56 8.90 NEVER
10.5 7.81 4.63 7.40 NEVER
9.5 6.79 4.00 6.40 NEVER
(1) Minimum O2 W PPO2 Alveolar equivalent - PTDG @ T = 00
(2) 1.6 x PEVA
24
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EVA EMERGENCY
Initial EMU planning calls for 3 to 4 hours of pure 02 prebreathing to protect
against decompression effects in going from a 14.7 psia cabin to 4.1 psis EVA
pressure. This results in an R value of approximately 1.6 in the 240 minute
tissues. The EMU SOP will maintain pressure at 3.35 psia, resulting in a 240
minute R value of approximately 1.9. If an emergency extends beyond 15 to 20
minutes, the risk of experiencing bends exists.
Use of the SOP at higher EVA pressures should not entail higher risk than the
present EMU. Accordingly, the accompanying chart shows the relationship
between normal and emergency EVA pressures to retain PEVA emergency > PTDG/1.9.
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SIGNIFICANT PHYSIOLOGICAL LIMITS
The accompanying chart shows the three physiological limits that are signifi-
cant in setting cabin and EVA pressure levels. They are:
•	 Hypoxia Limit	 4,000 feet altitude equivalent alveolar PP02
for normal STS operations.
Bends Limit	 PEVA is greater than or equal to the sea level
cabin N2 level/1.6 as shown by the ticks of
EVA pressure at given cabin pressure values.
i
Explosive Decompression 6.0 si	^ -	 p g (nominal) for sea level manned testing.
This curve format will be used to summarize significant limits developed in
subsequent sections of this report in order to define the window of acceptable
operating conditions.
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PRE-EVA PROCEDURES
A complete discussion of EVA procedure issues is contained in the appendix to
this report. These issues were developed with cooperation from people at NASA
JSC SD3, CB and CG3. This section considers candidate procedures for achieving
initial tissue dissolved gas washot:t. R values are useful for evaluating
candidate procedures. Recent USAF human testing has verified that some wash-
out procedures are safe, i.e., incur acceptably low incidence of bends.
Analysis of these procedures shows resulting R values of approximately 1.8 in
360 minute tissues and between 1.45 and 1.58 in 240 minute tissues. Hence, this
study considers candidate tissue dissolved gas washout procedures to be viable
if chey produce maximum R values of 1.8 in 360 minute tissues and 1.6 in 240
minute tissues. All these procedures address initial reduction of PTDG to
support EVA at s factor of 1.6 below sea level PIN 2*
R values are used only to define and evaluate candidate washout procedures.
Viable candidate procedures should be verified by human testing before they
become operational. Human testing is necessary, because individuals vary
widely in their susceptibility to bends, owing to such factors as age, physical
condition, amount of body fat, and presence of scar tissue. In addition,
temperature, activity level, and time since last decompression affect a par-
ticular individual's susceptibility to bends. Moreover, published literature
indicates that women may be rrore bends-prone than men.
Three candidate tissue dissolved gas washout procedures are presented which
appear to be safe for supporting EVA. All procedures accelerate tissue dissolved
gas washout towards equilibrium with the cabin, so that the suit can be donned with
crewmembers breathing gust cabin atmosphere. These crocedures eliminate r uire-
ments to breathe pure 0 during donning, thus significantly simplifying suit
donning. The tree pro a ure candidates differ from one another in time to first
EVA.
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r
Eliminate POS ese During EMU Donning (Significant
Safety and Operational Problem with Prebreathe)
-	 Based on FOD Input and STS EVA Planning
-	 Use Physiological Limits Evaluation
-	 Consist of...
-	 Three procedures for one-time N2
-	 Washout for "Launch Day" and "Next Day" EVA's
-	 Intermediate airlock pressure for
significant prebreathe reduction
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"LAUNCH DAY" PROCEDURE
The purpose of the "launch day" procedure is to washout tissue dissolved gas
quickly so that EVA can be performed shortly after orbit insertion. The pro-
cedure calls first for breathing pure 0 for a prescribed time to drive tissue
dissolved gas level from sea level tows;d cabin inspired N2 levels, the pre-
scribed time being a function of cabin pressure on-orbit. The cabin pressure
is reduced to on-orbit level during this time. Next, the crewmember breathes
cabin gas for one hour while completing Pre-EVA activity, preparing EVA equip-
ment, entering the airlock, and donning the suit. The last step is to purge
the suit with pure 0j using the OPA, spending approximately 20 minutes while
checking out the sui^ prior to dumping the airlock to vacuum. These steps and
durations are consistent with STS-1 EVA operations planning.
The procedure can be performed two ways, depending on how soon EVA is planned
after initial orbit insertion. If EVA is to occur almost immediately, crew-
members can begin washout during prelaunch and launch using the Launch-Entry
Helmet (LEH). If EVA is planned for later in "launch day", crewmembers can
start washout after post-orbit insertion tasks are complete, using the Portable
Oxygen System (POS).
The POS is flight-ready to support tissue dissolved gas washout. The LEH is
expected to require modification for closed loop operation. At present, the LEH
operates open loop to support launch and entry, but could cause excessive cabin
0 enrichment if used by both pilot and mission specialist for washout,
especially at low cabin pressure. Bulkiness of 02 hoses, required for closed
loop operation, could encumber the pilot.
The accompanying chart contains an analysis of "launch day" EVA procedures in
terms of resulting R values for 360 and 240 minute tissues. The table shows
the following:
-	 Washout durations range from zero to 3.7 hours, depending upon on-orbit
cabin pressure and associated EVA pressure.
-	 No pure 0 washout is required prior to donning for sea level cabin pres-
sure to s4port EVA down to 7.25 psia. Twenty minutes in pure 0 2
 prior to
dumping the airlock to vacuum appears to provide adequate margin to accom-
modate a slightly N2-rich atmosphere which could result from controlling
PP02
 to the minimum (4,000 feet alveolar equivalent).
-	 240 minute tissues (R 1.6) set washout duration requirements down to cabin
pressures of 12 psia.
-	 360 minute tissues (R 1.8) set washout duration at cabin pressures between
10.5 and 9.5 psia.
It should be noted that body fast tissues will renitrogenate quickly to PIN2
levels of the reduced pressure cabin during suit donning. For this reason
whole body gas washout will not be as complete as if pure 0 were breathed
continuously up to suit purge. The 9 and 10.5 psia cases rflect this for
240 minute tissues for which R is approximately 1.60. Without renitrogena-
tion, R would be approximately 1.56 and 1.36, respectively.
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LAUNCH DAY TISSUE DISSOLVED GAS WASHOUT PROCEDURE
Procedure consists of:
- Washout with pure 0	 for prescribed duration while
on-orbit lehl.
reducing
PCab to
- Breathe cabin atmosphere for one hour. Perform EVA equipment
preparation and suit donning.
- Purge suit with pure 0	 and spend 20 minutes performing EVA
checkout prior to dumping the airlock to vacuum.
4k' Resulting R Values
Max. Equiv. Min. Pure 0
Washou?
360 Min. 240 Min.
PCab PP02_ PEVA R - PTDG, R - PPTTDDGG
psia psia time. hours
14.7 2.63 7.25 0 1.60 1.57
13.5 2.64 6.5 0.3 1.65 1.60
12.0 2.66 5.56 1.2 1.73 1.60
10.5 2.69 4.63 2.4 1.80 1.59
9.5 2.71 4.0 3.7 1.80 1.60
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"NEXT DAY" PROCEDURES
The purpose of the two "next day" procedures is to assist tissue dissolved gas
washout by breathing cabin gas at reduced pressure. This minimizes the require-
ment to use any pre-donning equipment. The procedure calls for reducing cabin
pressure shortly after orbit insertion. The crew then eats, sleeps, and per-
forms normal IV tasks until the next day. Following EVA equipment preparation
and suit donning, the EVA crewmember purges the suit with pure 0 and spends
approximately 20 minutes performing EVA checkout prior to dumpinj the airlock
to vacuum.
The procedure can be performed two ways, depending on how soon EVA is planned
after reducing cabin pressure. The first approach is to reduce cabin pressure
approximately 24 hours prior to EVA. The second approach is to shorten that
time to 12 hours, which is consistent with STS-1 mission planning, followed by
a brief washout using pure 0 (up to one-half hour) to acceierate equilibration
of body tissues with the cabin atmosphere.
The accompanying chart shows an analysis of the "next day" procedure performed
after 24 hours at reduced cabin pressure. The table shows resulting R values
calculated for 360 and 240 minute tissues. As expected, the chart shows
resulting R's for all cabin pressures which are significantly below limiting
values of 1.8 for 360 minute tissues. However, resulting R's for 240 minute
tissues slightly exceed 1.6 for cabin pressures below 10.5 psia. JSC Medical's
position is that these resulting R's are expected to be acceptable, pending
verification by manned testing. This procedure eliminates all requirements for
tissue dissolved gas washout using pure U.
—
prior to suit donning.
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NEXT DAY TISSUE DISSOLVED GAS WASHOUT PROCEDURE
(24 HOURS PRIOR TO EVA)
Procedure consists of:
- Reduce cabin pressure for 24 hours prior to EVA checkout.
- Breathe cabin ga r. for 24 hours.	 Completi EVA preparation and
suit donning.
- Purge suit with pure 0	 and spend 20 minutes performing EVA
checkout prior to dumping the airlock to vacuum.
0' Cabin Resulting R Values
Max. Equiv. Min. Depressurization 360 Min.	 240 Min.
PCab PPOP— PEVA Duration R • PT
WU
DG	 R s P^TDGG
psia psia hours
14.7 2.63 7.25 24 1.60	 1.57
13.5 2.64 6.5 24 1.62	 1.58
12.0 2.66 5.56 24 1.64	 1.59
10.5 2.69 4.63 24 1.67	 1.60
9.5 2.72 4.0 24 1.71	 1.62
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"NEXT DAY" PROCEDURES (Continued)
ThE accanpanying chart shows analysis of an alternative "next day" procedure
which uses 12 hours of reduced cabin pressure prior to suit purge. The chart
shows the following:
-	 A short tissue dissolved gas washout prior to suit donning using pure 02
is required for cabin pressures below 13.5 psia to support bends-limit
EVA. Washout durations using pure 0 range up to 0.5 hours, depending
on cabin pressures and associated EVA pressure.
-	 Zero duration is required to support bends-limit EVA from cabin pressures
down to 13.5 psia. Spending 20 minutes in pure 02 during EVA checkout
appears to provide adequate protection.
-	 240 minute tissues (R < 1.6) set duration of pure 0 purge prior to suit
donning for cabin pressures below 14.7 psia. ResuRing R's for 360 minute
tissues are all well below the 1.8 limit.
3?
NEXT DAY TISSUE DISSOLVED GAS WASHOUT PROCEDURE
(12 HOURS PRIOR TO EVA)
Procedure consists cf:
.^	
-	 Reduce cabin pressure for 12 hours prior to EVA checkout.
-
	
	 Breathe pure 0 for minimum duration to accelerate equilibration of
body tissues Wth reduced pressure cabin atmosphere.
-	 Breathe cabin gas for one hour duration. Perform EVA preparation
and suit donning.
-
	
	 Purge suit with pure 0 and spend 20 minutes performing EVA
checkout prior to dumping the airlock to vacuum.
Cabin	 Pure 02	Resulting R Values
	
Max.	 Min.	 Depressurization	 Washout	 360 Min.	 240 Min.
	
PCab	 PEVA	 Duration	 Duration	 R = PTDG
	 R - PTDG
	
PTU	 77
	psia	 psia	 hours
	
hours
	
14.7	 7.25	 12	 0	 1.60	 1.57
	
13.5	 6.5
	 12	 0.2
	 1.64	 1.59
	
12.0	 5.56	 12	 G.2	 1.66	 1.59
	
10.5	 4.63	 12	 0.3	 1.74	 1.59
	
9.5	 4.0	 12	 0.5	 1.78	 1.60
M
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INTERMEDIATE AIRLOCK PRESSURE
The study also includes the possibility that it may be disadvantageous for
equipment or Orbiter reasons to adjust EVA and/or cabin pressures sufficiently
to eliminate prebreathe altogether. A potential work-around consists of setting
the airlock at an intermediate pressure from which it would be safe to perform
EVA, and to prebreathe before entering the airlock.
Prebreathe would be terminated within the airlock prior to donning the suit.
This work-around allows breathing the airlock atmosphere during suit donning
and eliminates use of the POS and breather hose/mouthpiece during donning.
Relieving this requirement would simplify Eta) donning significantly.
The procedure for using intermediate airlock pressure starts with prebreathing
for a prescribed duration, depending on cabin pressure and EVA pressure, as
shown in the accompanying chart; then completing EVA equipment preparation
before terminating prebreathe, entering the airlock and closing the inner hatch.
The intermediate airlock total pressure requires N partial pressure to be 1.6
times PEVA plus a minimum 0 partial pressure equi&alent to 4k' alveolar. Thus
the airlock pressure to sup^ort 4 psia EVA has 6.4 psi N plus 2.7 psi 0 for a
total of 9.1 psia. To a6hieve this, the airlock is depressurized briefl; to
7.8 psia, followed by repressur , zation with pure 02 . Four psi EVA requires the
greatest amount of 02
 to repressurize the airlock, hence results in the highest
02 percentage in the airlock.
Once the intermediate airlock pressure is achieved, terminate prebreathe.
Don the pressure garment assembly while breathing the airlock atmosphere.
Then purge the suit with pure 02
 and perform EVA checkout for approximately
20 minutes prior to dumping the airlock to vacuum.
The accompanying chart shows prebreathe times and resulting R values for all
cabin and EVA pressures considered in this study, as well as airlock inter-
mediate pressures and 0 percentages. As expected, prebreathe times range from
0 to 3.8 hours dependini on the selected combination of cabin and EVA pressure.
At the lowest EVA pressure, 360 minute tissues determine prebreathe time.
At higher EVA pressures the 240 minute tissues determine prebreathe time. The
chart also shows that using reduced N pressure in the airlock would allow
significant reduction in prebreathe dimes if cabin pressure is lowered several
psi or if EVA pressure is raised from one to two psi.
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INTERMEDIATE AIRLOCK PRESSURE
Procedure consists of:
-	 Establish orbital cabin pressure level.
-	 To support "launch day" EVA prebreathe pure 0 based on 14.7 psi
cabin. For "next day" EVA breathe cabin atmosphere for 12 hours,
then prebreathe pure 02
 based on on-orbit cabin pressure.
-	 Complete EVA preparation, enter airlock, and set airlock inter-
mediate pressure (PPN 2
 - 1.5 PEVA, PP02 - 4k' alveolar).
-	 Terminate prebreathe; don suit.
-	 Purge suit with pure 0 and spend 20 minutes performing EVA
checkout prior to dump?ng the airlock to vacuum.
INTERMEDIATE AIRLOCK PRESSURE
MIN.	 A/L
	
A/L
	 A/L	 A/L
	
MAX
PEV A PN2	 P02 PTOT F'02 PCA•
(PSIA) (PSIA) (PSIA) (PSIA) (%)	 (PSIA)
4.0	 6.4	 2.7	 9.1	 30	 9.5
10.5
12.0
13.5
14.7
4.63	 7.1	 2.7	 9.6	 26	 9.5
10.5
12.0
1 3.5
14.7
5.56	 6.9
	 2.7	 11.6	 23	 10.5
12.0
13.5
14.7
6.5	 10.4	 2.7	 13.1	 21	 13.5
14.7
PREEREATHE RESULTING R
TIME PTDG/PEVA
(HOURS) (240 MIN) (960 MIN)
0.6 1.66 1.60
1.4 1.53 1.60
2.5 1.51 1.60
314 1.51 1.60
3.6 1.51 1.60
0 1.51 1.66
0.3 1.019 1154
1.2 1.91 1.60
2.1 1.97 1.90
2.5 1.94 i-!10
0 1.91 1.94
0.1 1.60 1.71
0.10 1.60 1.72
1.3 1.99 1.74
0 1.56 1.64
0.3 1.60 1.65
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PAYLOADS
A complete discussion of payload issues is contained in the appendix to this
report. The issues were developed with cooperation from people from NASA JSC
EA8, PF, NS2 and SC. The discussion is also based on current NASA flight
assignment planning. Although flight assignment plans change constantly, they
serve to identify issues and suggest solutions to problems.
Payload Sensitivity to Low Cabin Pressures - Economical delivery of payloads
to orbit is the reason for 	 s ex stence. Some payloads exposed to cabin
pressure are pressure sensitive. Information return from these could be im-
paired by reducing cabin pressure to support EVA. All payloads exposed to
cabin pressure must use materials rated acceptable for exposure to 0 concen-
trations up to 25.9%. Payloads exposed to hither 02
 concentrations hay have
material incompatibility problems.
Payloads may be classified into three broad categories: satellites, structures,
and experiments.
-
	
	 Satellites - Satellites will be delivered to low earth orbit by STS.
Satellites  are carried in the Orbiter payload bay, and are not sensitive
to cabin pressure.
Structures - No structure payloads have been booked to date for delivery
to orbit, but structure concepts are being developed. Structures are
expected to consist of several or many individual payloads. Structure pay-
loads are not expected to be sensitive to cabin pressure.
Experiments - Experiments are assigned to payloads which remain with the
'Ur ter while in orbit. Experiments will be carried externally and
internally. Internal experiments will be carried both in Spacelab modules
and in the cabin, hence will be exposed to cabin atmosphere. Some of these
may be pressure sensitive.
The NASA JSC Life Sciences Directorate considers many life science experi-
ments, as exemplified by cardio-pulmonary experiments, to be pressure
sensitive. Even the variation from sea level (14.1 psia) to 5,000 feet
at Denver (12.5 psia) may be significant. Experiments involving hematology
are sensitive to 0 concentration. Control experiments in both areas are
being run at sea level because Spacelab and Orbiter have been designed to
provide a sea-level atmosphere, and compensation for altitude effects may
require more than simple gas ?.aw corrections. Thus, reducing cabin pres-
sure could alter information attained from an experiment and may reduce
the value of control experiments run at sea level.
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Life science experiments may be carried aboard any and all Spacelab module
flights, even though the primary missions for these flights are for purposes
other than life sciences. In addition, cooling provisions for Spacelab
experiments are based on a sea-level atmosphere. Cooling difficulties may be
anticipated at cabin pressures below 12.5 psia (5,000 feet altitude equivalent).
Also, the Spacelab module materials are rated for a maximum 0 2
 concentration
of 23.8%. Hence, this study considers all Spacelab module payloads to be
potentially pressure sensitive.
Carry-on experiments are small payloads packaged into mid-deck lockers or
stored on a mid-deck panel. Only five carry-ons have been identified to date:
plant lignification, blood drawing, OSTA-2 flight deck camera, electrophoresis,
and latex dispersion. The first three of these are currently scheduled to fly
with STS 2, 4, 8 and 14. The last two have not yet been assigned to a flight.
None of these five carry-ons is pressure sensitive. However, approximately
800 carry-on experiments are being considered, many from high schools and
universities. Many of these experiments are expected to have pressure sensi-
tive functions and/or cooling requirements.
The chart overleaf shows the operating envelope for pressure sensitive
payloads.
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EVA PLANNING
STS planning identifies three categories of EVA
Planned - EVA is the baseline mode for accomplishing mission objectives.
'Puss o support equipment is designed for operation by EVA.
-	 ^Backup - EVA is the backup mode for accomplishing mission objectives.
lof s ion support equipment is designed for EVA to back up select nonredundant
features.
-
	 Contingency - EVA is a contingency mode for supporting safe return of the
Orbiter  o Earth. Tile repair and payload bay door closure are examples.
P1anRpd FVA
Current planning calls for demonstration EVA's on STS-2 and -4. No other
planned EVA's have been identified for the 79 flights identified thus far. Space
Telescope is the one payload currently being designed for EVA service. Telescope
service has not yet been assigned to a flight. The telescope launch has been
assigned to STS-16 and scheduled for launch during 1984.
The 25 KW Power System, currently being concepted, will probably use EVA as
baseline. Its launch flight has not been assigned or scheduled to date. Future
structures and satellites are expected to make increasing use of baseline EVA.
Backup EVA
IUS is the only payload element designed for backup EVA. Its erector in the
payload bay is designed for EVA assistance if it fails. PAM-A, a payload in the
planning stage, is expected to use EVA, but flight assignment and schedule have
not been made to date.
Contingency EVA
EMU's are carried on each STS flight to cover the requirement for contingency
EVA. In situations requiring contingency EVA, loss of experimental data,
experimental time, or experimental equipment becomes secondary to returning
the Orbiter safely to Earth. STS flight plans contain provision for con-
tingency EVA on all flights. Hence payload flight assignment is not affected
by the possibility of performing contingency EVA on any particular flight.
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EVA - 3 TYPES
PLANNED - BASELINE FOR P/L's
BACKUP - ALTERNATE FOR P/L's
CONTINGENCY - SAFE RETURN
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EVA Planning (Continued)
The accompanying chart presents a year-by-year summary of planned STS flights
and highlights potential conflicts between flights carrying pressure sensitive
payloads and flights with planned or backup EVA. The following conclusions
can be drawn:
At the present time there is no planned or backup EVA anticipated for
flights with pressure sensitive payloads.
Carry-on experiments represent uncertainty. Because pressure sensitivity
and flight assignmeot for most carry-ons have yet to be determined,
carry-ons represent the major source of potential conflict between EVA
and pressure sensitive payloads out through current flight assignment
planning, which is September, 1986.
Uncertainty about payloads assignment increases in the future. This study is
based on the NASA Flight Assignment Baseline. This document is a moving target,
and is updated quarterly to reflect program impacts and other changes. Payload
integration planning using this document extends out to Spacelab D-1, which is
assigned to STS-25 and scheduled for launch in August, 1984. Beyond that, most,
payloads are firm, i.e., individual payloads identified and grouped into a
single payload for delivery by a single flight to a particular orbit, out to
STS-44, scheduled for launch September, 1985. Other payloads scheduled for
launch out to September, 1986 may be less certain. Many of these are reflights,
payloads of opportunity or others that have not yet been officially booked.
Booked means a payload has been defined, its launch need date established,
and it has been budgeted or its earnest launch money has been deposited.
Looking beyond 1986 reveals still more uncertainty. As already mentioned,
Space Telescope service has not been assigned to a flight. Other payloads
such as 25 KW Power System are still in the planning stage. The correlation
between flight assignments for EVA payloads and pressure sensitive payloads is
undefined in this time period.
r
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YEAR PLAN
1951	 7
1942	 4
1942	 S
1904 1	 17
Ifs$	 ioi
TOTAL 7/
FORESEEABLE
FUTURE
(MIDDLE '60-S
TO EARLY '90'S)
FLIGHTS W/PRESSURE
SENSITIVE PAYLOADS
CARRY-9^
0	 0
0	 TBD
1	 TBD
(STS - 10)
4	 TSD(STS - 20, 22.
25,30)
a	 TBD
(STS - 20, 48.
{V)
FLIGHTS w/EVA
PLAN
 NNED BACKUP
1 0
(STS - 2)
I a
(STS - 4) (STS - a, 7)
0 a(STS- 12, 151
0 a(STS- Is, 19) 
0 a(STS - 29, 341
0 1
(STS - 20)
2 f
TBO TSD(ST SERVICE,
as KW PS)
(SATELLITE SERVICE, SOC)
TSD
(STS - !4.
10V, so)
11	 TBD
TBD	 TBD
IS/L MODULES)
TOO
"TOM
CORRELATION BETWEEN PRESSURE SENSITIVE PAYLOADS AND EVA
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS
NONE
NONE AT PRESENT.
AVOID PSC'S W/PAYLOADS
ASSIGNED TO STS - I • 7.
NONE AT PRESENT.
AVOID PSC'S W/PAYLOADS
ASSIGNED TO STS - i 2 a Is.
NONE AT PRESENT
AVOID PSC'S W/PAYLOADS
ALIGNED TOOTS - 10 • Is.
NONE AT PRESENT.
AVOID PSC' q W/PAYLOADS
ASSIGNED "to STS - 35 & i{.
NONE AT PRESENT.
AVOID FEW S W/PAYLOADS
ASSIGNED TO STS - 56.
AVOID PSC'S ON FLIGHTS
TO SUPPORT ST SERVICE
AND 25 KW PS DEPLOY-
MENT/CONSTRUCTION.
AVOID PSC'S ON FLIGHTS
TO SUPPORT SATELLITE
SERVICE AND SOC DEPLOY-
MENT/CONSTRUCTION.
PSC'S a PRESSURE SENSITIVE CARRY-ON EXPERIMENTS
STS n SPACE TELESCOPE
25 KW PS a POWER SYSTEM
SOC . DACE OPERATIONS CENTER
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APPROACHES FOR AVOIDING CONFLICT
PETWEEN EVA AND PRESSURE-SENSITIVE PAYLOADS
The following approaches are not mutually exclusive. A workable compromise
between conflicting requirements of EVA and pressure sensitive payloads
requires employing all approaches.
Continue present practice of not assigning module payloads to flights
planned or EVA support - This approach retains present module
materials and experiments, and hence has no impact on the payload user
community.
-	 Assi n pressure sensitive carr -ons to non-EVA flights - The preceding
chart Showsthat no conflict exists at present or 1931 flights because
there are no pressure sensitive payloads scheduled for launch in 1981.
In 1982 three out of four flights may use EVA. With no pressure sensitive
payloads identified to date for 1982, it appears likely that several such
carry-ons, if identified, could be assigned to the one non-EVA flight.
By 1983 carry-on traffic is expected to increase. While only two out of
eight flights may use EVA, some difficulty may be found in assigning pres-
sure sensitive carry-ons to the remaining six flights. The most desirable
situation would be to assign any pressure sensitive carry-ons to the
Spacelab 1 flight, which already carries a pressure sensitive module.
Similar situations exist in 1984 and 1985, where it would be desirable to
assign pressure sensitive carry-ons first to module flights and second to
deployment flights for which no baseline or backup EVA is planned. This
approach appears workable for the next few years while carry-on traffic
is light. Scheduling difficulties might be encountered as carry-on
traffic gets heavier. This approach retains present carry-on materials
usage and equipment design, and hence has no adverse impact on the
carry-on user community.
0 rate Orbiter as a two-pressure vehicle - Equip Orbiter with a two-
schedule automatic cabin pressure control system which allows 14.7 psia
operation when carrying pressure sensitive pa loads, but permits reduction
of cabin pressure to support EVA during satellite service and deployment
and structure construction flights.
Raise EVA pressure - This issue is discussed overleaf.
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APPROACHES TO AVOID CONFLICT
BETWEEN EVA AND PRESSURE SENSITIVE P/L's.
(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNMENT OF MODULES AND
Y
DEPLOYMENT-SERVICE-CONSTRUCTION TO
DIFFERENT FLIGHTS.
(2) DO NOT ASSIGN PSC's TO FLIGHTS WITH
PLANNED OR BACKUP EVA.
(3) OPERATE ORBITER AT 2 PRESSURES:
-	 REDUCED PCAB - FLIGHTS WITH
PLANNED OR BACKUP EVA.
-	 14.7 PSIA - OTHER FLIGHTS.
(4) RAISE EVA PRESSURE.
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RAISE EVA PRESSURE
Raising EVA pressure will permit assigning carry-ons to non-Spacelab module
flights with planned or backup EVA. Raising EVA pressure to 5.56 psi will
permit lowering cabin pressure during pre-EVA activities to 11.6 psia. The
accompanying chart shows th&t 11.6 psia permits physiologically safe 0 levels
without exceeding material standards to which carry-oos are being designed.
This removes the materials constraint and allows assigning carry-ons that can
operate at 11.6 psia to flights with planned or backup EVA. EMU modifications
are required to raise EVA pressure to 5.56 psia.
EVA flights are expected to increase significantly in 1986 and beyond to
support projected satellite service and construction activity. This may reduce
scheduling opportunities for carry-ons which do not function at subatmospheric
pressures. Raising EVA pressure to 7.25 psia will permit use of 14.7 psia
cabin pressure even during EVA support. This would lift all constraints and
resolve all conflicts in assigning pressure sensitive payloads to flights with
planned or backup EVA.
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CONSUMABLES
A complete discussion of consumables issues is contained in the applendix to
this report. The issues were developed with cooperation from people at NASA JSC
EC2 and EC3 and MOAC TSC. The discussion is based on current mission planning
and analysis for STS-1, as modified by projected revisions to support opera-
tional flights, and are updated cabin puncture case analysis.
Reference Mission
Analysis of Orbiter ECLSS atmosphere consumables is based on a 4-person, 7-day
mission. Current flight assignment planning shows this mission to combine
longest duration and largest crew with payload deployment. The only flights
currently planned to fly with larger crews are associated with Spacelab, for
which no EVA is planned. Salient points are shown on the accompanying chart.
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I REFERENCE MISSION
Crew Size	 4 people
Mission Duration	 7 days
Cabin Pressure Profile
	
PCAB	 Time
14.7 psia
	 0 - 8 hou-s
Reduced	 8 - 166
14.7	 166 - 168
Cabin leakage
	
8.2 lb/day @ 14.5 psia, PPN2
 = 11.3 psia.
PPO2
 - 3.2 psia
Cabin Volume
	
2,325 ft 
Airlock Volume
	
150 ft 
Metabolic Consumption	 0.0739 lb/man-hour @ 450 Btu/hr
Cabin PPO2	Nominal PPO2 control point is 4,000 feet
alveolar equivalent (+) 0.165 psi
EMU purge during donning	 0.83 lb 02
EMU recharge
	
1.217 lb 02
MMU recharge (2 MMU's)
	
40 lb N2 prior to 2nd payload support EVA
S
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CONSUMABLES USAGE
Cryo 02, GN2 and emergency GOX are the ECLSS consumables considered in this
study.
1
Cryo 02
The ECLSS draws Cryo 0 2 from tanks which are part of the Power Reactant Supply
and Distribution System. Fuel cells account for over 92% of Cryo 02 consump-
tion. For STS-1, 112 pounds of Cryo 02 was allocated for ECLSS use. Projected
Cryo 02 use for the design reference mission is approximately 117 lb at 14.7
psia and 109 lb at 9 psia cabin pressure. The chief contributor to the consump-
tion drop at lower cabin pressures is the cabin puncture contingency which
draws from the emergency GOX supply sooner at 9 psi, relieving some demand on
Cryo stores.
Emergency GOX
GOX is not seriously affected by lowering cabin pressure. Tankage margin
decreases from approximately 30% (10 lbs) to 20% (14 lbs) primarily due to the
cabin puncture contingency.
GN2
Existing N 2
 tankage has a slight negative margin at all cabin pressures. The
negative margin ranges between approximately 0.6% (1.6 lb) and 2.5% (6.6 lb).
The accompanying chart shows the GN 2
 budgets to be slightly negative for all
cabin pressures. Operation with negative margin with present mission rules
defining contingency provisions requirements may call for adding a fifth GN2
tank. These tanks are made of titanium, weight 55 lbs, and hold approximately
67 lbs of GN 2 . They are located in the mid-fuselage area. Space for a fifth
tank is at a premium.
The significant contributors to negative margin are the Flight Requirements
for MMU recharge and cabin repressurization and the Contingency Requirement to
cover cabin puncture. STS-1 mission rules permit minimizing this contingency
provision by considering a cabin puncture contingency to use an available
portion of the Flight Requirement to repressurize the cabin backup to 14.7
psia prior to reentry which would not be used in the event of a cabin puncture.
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CONSUMABLES USAGE ANALYSIS
Analysis of consumables usage leads to the following conclusions:
Consumables usage pis essentially independent of cabin pressure for each
of the three consummables. This is shown on the previous chart.
-	 Total ECLSS gas budgets, consisting of reserves, contingencies and flight
requirements for all three atmosphere consumables added together, increase
approximately only one pound (from 437 lb to 438 lb) as cabin pressure is
lowered from 14.7 to 9 psia nominal. The total net change is composed of
offsetting effects which are significantly sensitive to cabin pressure,
as shown in the accompanying tabulation.
-	 The major contributor to increased consumables use at reduced cabin pres-
sure is the flight requirement to repressurize the cabin to 14.7 psi prior
to reentry (approximately 66 lb from 9 psia).
-	 These increases are partially offset at lower cabin pressures by reductions
in gas quantity required to repressurize the airlock after payload EVAs
(approximately 17 lb), in cabin gas leakage (approximately 21 lb), and in
the net contingency requirement to hold cabin pressure at a minimum of 8 psia
for 160 minutes following a cabin puncture (approximately 27 lb).
-	 Present LiOH budgets appear acceptable for cabin pressures down to 9 psia
nominal.
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Dispersion Allowance
Net Cabin
Puncture Contingency
Net Line Items for Other
CONSUMIABLES USAGE ANALYSIS*
PC AB, psia
	
9.0
	 14.7
	
22.94 lb	 20.05 lb
	
125.72
	 152.4
Net
Change
2.89 1b
-26.68
Worst Case Contingencies
	 1.37
(GN2)
Cabin Leakage	 86.97
A/L Repress
(Flight Req't Only) 	 36.01
Cabin Repressurization	 66.77
339.78 lb
*For Cryo 02 , GOX and GN 2 added together.
5.54
(GOX)
104.68
52.81
0.0
338.48 lb
-4.17
-20.71
-16.8
66.77
1.3 lb
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AIR-COOLED AVIONICS
A complete discussion of the air-cooled #vionics issues is contained in the
appendix to this report. The issues were developed with cooperation from
people from Rockwell International and McDonnell Douglas Technical Services
Company. The investigation is based on identifying cabin environment and
electronic load management conditions that retain the same avionic-box surface
temperature that exists in a sea level cabin. Significant findings are as
follows:
-	
The present requirement is for cooling air exit temperatures not to exceed
130°F.
-	 At reduced cabin pressure, the heat transfer coefficient between the
avionics box and the cooling air degrades as the 0.8 power of the pressure
ratio, requiring the permissible air outlet temperature to be less than
130°F to retain the same box temperature, as shown in the accompanying
chart. Basing the analysis on this consideration insures that electronic
component life is not shortened by overheating at reduced cabin pressure.
-	 Operation at down to 11.6 psia cabin pressure is feasible under the
following conditions, as shown on the following charts.
-	
Cabin thermal environment is nominal solar exposure.
-	 Crew size is 4 or less.
-	 Avionic boxes are designed for nominal wall temperature of 170°F or
less.
-	 One general purpose computer (GPC) load is shifted from Avionics
Bay 1 to Avionics Bay 3.
-	 1 IMU is powered down.
- If the above conditions are exceeded, some power down of flight deck
electronics will be necessary. However, these will not exceed those
planned for STS--1 Priority Power-downs 1 through 3.
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CREW SIZE FOR EVA FLIGHTS
The accompanying table shows most flights planned to date have EVA associated
with crew sizes of 2 and 3 people. No flights with crews in excess of 4 people
have planned or backup EVA. Hence a crew size of 4 is the current maximum for
considering EVA on a regular basis, and becomes a basis for the avionics-
cooling analysis.
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CREW SIZE
Number of Flights
11
Type EVA P1 anned
2 - Planned
6 - Backup
3 - Contingency
Crew Size
2
3
	
19	 3 - Backup
14 - Contingency
2 - TBD
4
	
5	 3 - Contingency
2 - TBD
6
	
16	 16 - Contingency
TBD
	
28	 TBD (DOD Flights)
TOTAL 19
Planned - EVA is the baseline mode for accomplishing mission objectives.
Mission support equipment is designed for operation by EVA.
Backup - EVA is the backup mode for accomplishing mission objectives.
Mission support equipment is designed for EVA to backup select
nonredundant features.
Contingency - EVA is a contingency mode for supporting safe return of the
Orbiter to Earth. Tile repair and payload bay door closure
are examples.
SOURCE: JSC 13000-5 "Flight Assignment Baseline", December, 1980.
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FLIGHT DECK AVIONICS
The accompanying chart shows will a 4 person crew and nominal solar heat lead
the cabin electronics that are normally powered-up while on orbit will be
adequately cooled at 11.6 psis minimum cabin pressure, if the avionics boxes
are designed for 170°F wall temperature at the sea level condition.
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Flight Deck Avionics (Continued)
The accompanying chart shows that sufficient cooling exists at 11.6 psia
minimum cabin pressure under worst case conditions, if cabin electrical loads
are curtailed per STS-1 Priority Power-downs 1 through 3. This chart is
based on a crew size of 7, maximum solar exposure, and minimum performance
of cabin fans and interface heat exchanger. Both cabin fans are running.
STS-1 priority poker downs 1 through 3 turn ofi the following cabin equip-
ment in addition to equipment proposed to be powered down during the orbital
	
phase of	 operational flights:	
si
	
1	 Data Display CRT and Associated Drivers	 417 watts
	
2	 TV Monitors	 40
	
- 2	 Payload Specialist Stations 	 216
	
- 1	 GFF Tape Recorder	 114
	
- 1	 Cabin Floodlights	 1,085
TOTAL
	
1,872 watts
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AVIONICS BAYS 1 AND 2
Planned use of GPC's on orbit calls for operating units 1 and 4 in Avionics
Bay 1 and unit 2 in Bay 2. Unit 5 in Bay 2 and Unit 3 in Bay 3 are shut down.
The accompanying chart shows that with one GPC down in Bays 1 and 2, adequate
cooling exists down to 11.6 psis fer all 4-person and most 7-person cases.
This study recommends operating only one GPC in Bay 1 at reduced cabin pressure,
and shifting the contents of that memory to GPC 3 in Bay 3. Analysis shows
that this does not cause any overheat problem in Bay 3.
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AVIONICS BAY NO. 1/2 ♦ PROPOSED CASE
CONDITIONS: ALL AIRCRAFT AVIONICS OFF AND I CPU, 1 IOP OFF
160 ONE-FAN AT MINIMUM PERFORMANCE
CASE 1: 7 MAN CREW, WORSE CASE FLIGHT DECK AVIONICS
CASE 2: 7 MAN CREW, NOMINAL CASE FLIGHT DECK AVIONICS
ALSO 4 MAN CREW, WORSE CASE FLIGHT DECK AVIONICS
CASE 3: 7 MAN CREW, MINIMUM CASE FLIGHT DECK AVIONICS
ALSO 4 MAN CREW, NOMINAL CASE FLIGHT DECK AVIONICS
CASE 4: 4 MAN CREW, MINIMUM CASE FLIGHT DECK AVIONICS
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IMU' s
The accompanying chart shows the IMU's operating with one IMU fan operating and
one IMU shutdown. This the normal mode for operational flights. The analysis
shows that cooling is adequate down to 11.6 psia at nominal heat levels and four
person crew.
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CAS[ 4: 4 MAN CREW, MINIMUM CASE FLIGHT DECK AVIONICS
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CABIN PRESSURE CONTROL
A complete discussion of cabin pressure control issues is contained in the
appendix to this report. The issues were developed with cooperation from people
from NASA JSC EC3 and NS2, Rockwell International Space Division and Carleton
Controls. The investigation is based on minimizing the cabin PPO control band
using present or available Orbiter equipment. Significant findinis are as
follows:
It appears feasible to control and annunciate cabin PPO within a total
band of 0.33 psi using the existing cabin 02/N controller, the new 1.5%
PPO sensor and new C&W limit proms. These l41 is are developed on
subsequent pages of this report section.
The 0.33 psi PPO control band permits reduction of cabin pressure down to
10.3 psia nominai,while retaining PPO between the minimum physiological
limits and maximum materials compatibility limits deemed acceptable for
STS-1 EVA support (30%). Cabin pressure can be reduced to 11.8 psia
nominal without exceeding the 25.9% 0 deemed acceptable for normal STS-1
operation, or 12.5 psia nominal without exceeding 23.8% 02 , the present
Spacelab upper PP02
 limit.
- Addition of a third mechanical regulator permits operation of the Orbiter
at reduced cabin pressure for EVA flights while retaining 14.7 psia cabin
pressure for Spacelab Module flights.
Cabin Pressure Control - The accompanying chart shows how the combination of
minimum alveolar 
	 and maximum cabin 0 concentration defines a "corner"
which defines the 4ge of allowable cabi; pressures. Minimum EVA pressure,
which simplifies suit mobility issues, seeks the lowest cabin pressure. The
smallest cabin PPO control and annunciation band permits the lowest cabin
pressure consistent with physiological and materials limits.
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Cabin Pressure Control (Continued)
Orbiter cabin pressure control is shown schematically in the accompanying
chart. There are two completely separate systems from tankage to gas inlets
into the cabin. Crew-selectable cross-over valves permit interconnection
modes. In each system cabin total pressure is controlled by a mechanical
regulator located adjacent to middeck panel MOIOW, near the head. Each
system has an 02 partial pressure sensor, located in the aft middeck ventila-
tion circuit duct, which senses 02 concentration. An 02/N2 controller,
located behind panel MOIOW, responds to low 02 concentration by closing the
N2 supply valve that feeds the cabin pressure regulator. Cabin pressure is
thus made u p with 02 until the PPO2 concentration is satisfied. The 02/N2
control then responds by opening the N2 valve, which allows intermediage N2
supply pressure at 200 + 15 psig to supply the cabin pressure regulator.
This intermediate N2 pressure, upstream of the cabin pressure regulator,
causes the intermediate 02 supply regulator, set to 100 + 10 psig, to close,
assuring that only N 2 is supplied to the cabin pressure 7egulator.
For STS-1 total cabin pressure was set at 14.5 + 0.2 psia. PP02 was set at
3.2 + 0.25 psig with nnminal CAW limits at 2.8 and 3.6 psia. This control
band—is too wide to permit significant reduction in cabin pressure to support
EVA without prebreathe. Thus STS-1 baseline procedures call for manual control
of cabin pressure and PiO at lower settings to support EVA. However, NASA JSC
safety requirements diet 	 use of automatic cabin pressure control for EVA
support for operational flights.
The payloads analysis in a previous section of this report identifies advan-
tages of operating the Orbiter as a two-pressure vehicle, namely at 14.7 psia
for Spacelab Module flights and at reduced cabin pressure for payload deploy-
ment flights. This could be accomplished as shown in the accompanying chart by
resetting the cabin pressure control to the PP02 limits shown in the preceding
chart for the reduced cabin pressure selected and by controlling reduced total
cabin pressure by a third mechanical pressure regulator. A manual shut-off
valve on panel M01OW is required upstream of the third regulator to shut off
that regulator when operating on the emergency regulator.
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REDUCED PP0 2
 CONTROL BAND
The accompanying chart shows that the PPO control band can be reduced to 0.33
psi using the existing cabin 0 /N controller with lowered set point plus the
new + 1.5% PPO2 ^sensor, which its ^resently installed. New C&W limits would
o balse requirid. Revised fault detection and annunciation limits can be
inputted via keyboard.
x
	
19
REDUCED PPO2
 CONTROL BAND
Ground Rules
-	 Use the same sensor to drive CAW and 0 /N controller. This allows
elimination of sensor-signal conditionir irror from CAW band and
leaves CAW error of + 0.025 psi (+ 1 bit/250 bits).
-	 Reduce dead bands between CAW 'trip and 0 2/N2 control from 0.41 psi
to 0.01 psi.
-	 Use the new + 1.5% PPO sensors in place of the at 3% sensors
recently repTazed in Oa102. Error band is + 1.5% x 5 psi n 0.15 psi.
-	 Use RMS to calculate PP02 sensor-controller error band.
Sensor	 0.15 psi	 (0.15)2 . 0.0225
Control	 0.15 psi	 10.15)2 n 0.0225
(0.0450) 1/2 . 0.212 psi
Total PP02 Control Band
CAW High Limit 0.05 psi
Dead Band 0.01
Sensor-Controller 0.21
Dead Band 0.01
CAW Low Limit	 + 0.05
0.33 psi
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CABIN MATERIALS
A complete discussion of Orbiter cabin materials issues is contained in the
appendix to this report. The issues were developed with cooperation from
McDonnell Douglas Technical Services Company. The significant findings are
as follows:
-	 Existing Orbiter cabin materials have been rated for 25.9% 0 which
exists for STS-1 nominal operation at 3.2 psia PP02
 in a 14. 95 psis
nominal cabin, as shown in the accompanying chart.
-	 Major use materials (greater than 1.0 lb or 50 in2 ) in the cabin have
been found acceptable for use at 30% 0This condition exists for
STS-1 EVA support, and would exist at 	 10.3 psia cabin with minimum
PP02 at the 4,000 feet alveolar equivalent.
- For cabin pressures below 10.3 psia nominal, a materials evaluation is
rigjired that is comparable to the investigation performed by NASA JSC
ES! to assess 216 major use materials in the Orbiter cabin fnr use at
30% 02.
-	 This study identifies a maxi-tim 0 concentration of 33.4% which occurs
at 2,88 psis PP02 in a 9.3 psia n&ninal cabin.
The list overleaf is a summary of the types and usages of the 216 major use
materials evaluated for acceptability at 30% 0A similar evaluation would
be required to identify changes to Orbiter cabin materials to support a PP02
level of 33.4%.
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SUMMARY
CREW COMPARTMENT - MAJJR USE MATERIALS
F ; -,ce Parts and
Associated Materials Bulk Materials
Cushion Clamps Charcoal
Edge Lit Panels Coatings
Filter Materials Fabrics
Gaskets and Seals Films
Shims (Non-metallic) Foams
Sleeving and Tubing Inks
Acrylic Plexiglass Greeses and Lubes
Kel-F Insulated Wire and Cable
Lexan Insulations
Nylon Laminates
PCB's Sound Insulation
Rulon Sponge
Silicones Velcro
Teflon and TFE Webbing and Strapping
Viton Varnishes
As ;;embly Materials Total:	 216 Major Use Materials
-' in Orbiter Crew Compartment
Adhesives
Cord and Tapes
Lacing Tape
Molding and Potting Compounds
Selants Source:	 Rockwell	 International
Matco Report U719-10-111
10-8-80, updated 3-13-81
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EMU IMPACTS
A complete discussion of EMU impacts is contained in the appendix to this
report. This investigation was performed by Hamilton Standard and ILC-Dover
and consists of assessments of each EMU CEI operating at increased vent loop
pressure. Suit joint samples were rvn at increased pressure to quantify
impacts on mobility.
Overview of Chanties - The EMU and POS consist of 22 contract end items
T	 s , comprising 117 component types and major structural elements. The
accompanying tabulation shows that most EMIT components and all POS components
require no change to support operating the EMU at elevated suit pressure.
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MOST EMU AND POS COMPONENTS
REQUIRE NO CHANGE FOR
INCREASED OVA PRESSURE
Total Number of EMU
and POS Components
Number of Components Requiring
Change to Operate at Higher
EVA Pressure
PEVA, psia
5.25	 6.00	 6.75	 7.50
117	 I	 19	 21	 22	 25
% of Components
Requiring No Change	 84
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SIGNIFICANT LSS IMPACTS
The accompanying table identifies the EMU LSS CEI changes required to support
EVA at higher suit pressures. The SOP, battery and 0 regulators require
significant changes, in that extensive redesign is reiuired and development
evaluation of the redesign is recommended.
SOP - The SOP is sized to provide purge flow sufficient to limit inspiredM to 15 mm Hg for 30 minutes at a metabolic rate of 1,000 BTU/hr. In addition,
it is desirable not to increase the risk of the bends while using the SOP. This
requires raising SOP operating pressure in step with raising EVA pressure
to retain the same ratio of pre-EVA tissue dissolved gas to emergency EVA pres-
sure of 1.9 as the present SOP, which supports emergency EVA at 3.35 psia after
cresmember is exposed to a 9.0 psia cab ; n for 24 hours. The following table
shows the rapid increase in SOP capacity required to keep pace with increasing
EVA pressure.
PEVA, psia
	
5.25	 6.00	 6.75	 7.50
% increase in	 29	 47	 64	 82%
SOP 02
Enlarging the SOP to accommodate additional 0 w ,lll impact the PLSS TMG, the
AAP lower crossmember, the airlock wall, theshelf" on the MMU, and may affect
the ability of a suited crewmembhr to pass through the Orbiter interdeck hatch.
These impacts are significant ana require development evaluation after imple-
mentation. HS recommends that SOP requirements and implementation be reviewed
to identify acceptable approaches for minimizing these impacts.
Battery - Increasing EVA pressure causes the fan motor to draw more power,
nn a ing power demand on the battery. The following tabult , tion shows the
effects on battery power and volume.
PEVA, psia
	
5.25	 6.00	 6.75	 7.50
% increase in	 6	 9	 13	 16.4%
battery power
% increase in	 0	 3	 6	 10%
battery volume
It is expected that up to E psia PEVA the battery can je accommodated within the
existing PLSS structure. Beyord 6 psia structure will likely require enlarge-
ment to accommodate a larger battery. HS recommends that battery requirements
and implementation be reviewed to identify acceptable approaches for minimizing
impacts t) PLSS structure.
0 Regulators - Resetting the PLSS and SOP 0 regulators requires new springs
Tus a detailed evaluation of regulator stroke , flow areas and stability, which
may require additional changes to regulator detail parts. These changes are
expected to be straightforward redesign, but require development evaluation.
The changes are not expected to require external envelope changes.
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'	 SIGNIFICANT IMVCTS TO EMU LSS AND INTERFACING AREAS
F	
{
t	 Item	 Impact
F
SOP	 •	 Increase stored 02 capacity.	 f
•	 Enlarge SOP package.
-
	
	 May prevent passage through Orbiter
interdeck hatch.
-	 Interfere with AAP lower crossbar.
-	 Interfere with MMU "shelf".
Battery	 •	 Increase capacity.
0	 Enlarge battery package.
-	 May require modification to PLSS structure.
AAP	 •	 Relocate lower crossbar. Expected to require
relocation of dovetail mounts in Orbiter airlock
wall. May require strengthening airlock wall.
i
i
PLSS & SOP	 •	 Modify springs to change set points.
02
 Regulators
•	 Resize flow orifices as required.
•	 Evaluate stability.
•
	
	 Modify piece parts as required to meet flow
and stability requirements.
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MINOR LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM IMPACTS
The accompanying table identifies impacts to CEI's which are straightforward
design changes which are not expected to require development evaluation.
These include stiffening flat plate areas exposed to increased differential
pressure loading, resizing certain orifices, and resetting certain relief
valves and regulators.
Raising EVA pressure requires small increases in water and oxygen to cover
small additional cooling and leakage requirements. At 7.5 psia an additional
1.4% water and 2.5% oxygen are required. These increases are too small to
warrant changing PLSS tankage. Consumables useage rules should be modified
slightly to cover these increases.
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MINOR IMPACTS TO EMU LSS CEI'S
CEI
	
Impact
PLSS	 -	 Strengthen sublimator and pitot-actuated valve.
-	 Revise 142, 145, and 146 rel i ef valve settings.
-	 Revise 126 and 141 orifices.
-	 Revise CAW software limits.
DCM
	
-	 Revise pressure gage range.
-	 Revise purge valve flow capacity.
SCU
	
-	 Revise 418 and 419 regulator settings.
CCC
	
-	 Strengthen canister.
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SPACE SUIT ASSEMBLY IMPACTS
Raising EVA pressure has impacts on SSA strength margins, joint performance,
a-W gloves.
Stren th Margins - The following areas require strengthening in proportion
o he increase in EVA pressure: axial restraints in the LTA waist and
brief, and HUT fiberglass, stye gimbals and bearings.
joint Performance - The accompanying table presents the results of an
eva ua ton o present EMU joints tested at EVA pressures up to 7.5 psig. The
negative numbers represent increases in joint torque over present 4 psig values.
Numbers to the right of the broken line represent joints for which new concepts
are required to make practical, working joints. Numbers to the left of broken
line represent joints that can be improved by extending present joint con-
struction technology.
Gloves - The EMU glove loses dexterity rapidly with increasing EVA pressure.
ec nology of the present glove does not appear adequate to support a workable
glove above the range of 5.25 to 6.0 psia. Hence a new techno l ogy initiative
is recommended for developing workable gloves for pressures above 5.25 psia.
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oSSA IMPACTED JOINTS
PEVA	 psia
5.25	 6.00	 , 6.75	 7.50
Shoulder	 -15%	 -30%	 I -50	 -65x
Pr	
Waist	 -20%	 -35%	 I -40%	 -60%
Brief/Hip
	 -10%	 -30X	 -55%	 -70%
Elbow
	 -lOX	 -20X	 -30% , -65%
Knee	 -10%
	
-20%
	
-25%	 I -35%
Ankle
	
-5%
	
-10%	 -15%	 -20%
Glove
Extend 	 - Require
Existing	 New
Concepts	 Concepts
4
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TESTING AND HANDLING
Increasing EVA pressure raises four issues regarding testing and handling:
safety, special test equipment, handling fixtures and integrated testing.
Safety - If pressure garment integrity is lost suddenly (on the order of
one second) at approximately 6 psig or above, lung rupturing may occur which
releases air into the pleural cavity. A first aid in managing the escaped
air is to repressurize the test subject to several atmospheres in a hyperbaric
chamber within 10 to 20 minutes. This procedure helps to control both lung
collapse and air bubbles in the bloodstream (air embolism). NASA safety
standards require access to a hyperbaric chamber when manned testing is con-
ducted at 6 psig or above. Hyperbaric facilities are available at JSC, where
all EMU manned testing at EVA gage pressure has been conducted to date.
Special Test Equipment - Test rigs at Hamilton Standard and NASA JSC are
compatible with increased EVA pressure, with just minor modifications.
Typical changes include recalibration of vent loop instrumentation, resetting
of back pressure controls, and modifying or resetting relief valves. A hardware
safety philosophy has dictated inclusion of relief valves in test rig-test item
interface accessories to preclude advertent isolation of rig-mounted relief
valves. These relief valves require resetting or modifications also.
Handling Fixtures - Enlargement of the SOP may require modification of the
groundhia^n ha dling device, PLSS/SOP bench fixtures, and CEI 199 shipping con-
tainer. This assessment would be made at the time of redesign of the SOP.
Integrated Testing - The United States Manned Space Program has conducted all
EVA at 4—ps a. —There is no widespread U.S. experience with higher EVA pres-
sures. A new technology initiative is recommended to conduct an integrated
unmanned and manned test program at the selected EVA pressure to gain assurance
that issues of higher EVA pressures are well understood and to verify related
procedures.
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PREBREATHE ELIMINATION WADE STUDY
The trade study first uses the issues developed in the course of the
Prebreathe Elimination Study to define a window within physiological limits
that minimizes impacts to Orbiter, payloads, EMU and operations. Secondly,
the trade study locates the best EVA pressure within the window.
The accompanying chart defines the allowable window. It is bounded by the
25.9% 0 limit for cabin materials compatibility, 5.9 psia PEVA corrosponding
tc the i psig maximum sea level suited-test limit for not requiring availability
of a hyperbaric chamber, 2.66 psia PPO?
 corresponding to the 4,000 foot altitude
equivalent alveolar 0 concentration, and 11.6 Asia cabin pressure which
accepts the minimum chin PP0 2 control band between the minimum and maximum
PP02
 limits.
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TRADE STUDY - SELECTION OF OPTIMUM EVA PRESSURE
The allowable window permits EVA pressiAres from 5.66 to 5.9 psis. Selection
of the optimum EVA pressure within the window involves the following conditions:
-	 High PEVA reduces suit mobility.
-	 High PEVA increases SOP impacts.
• 	 Low PEVA requires longer initial N2 washout.
the following tabulation shows the effects of the above considerations at the
extremes of the window. An intermediate value of 5.78 psis represents the
minimum PEVA which permits zero pure 02 use prior to suit donning in suppor`.
of "next day" EVA after 12 hours of exposure to cabin atmosphere at 11.8 psis
nominal. This is consistent with STS-1 planning. This means that POS's are
not required for "next day" EVA, and can be left stowed except for emergency
use.
Nominal PEVA
5.66 5.78 5.90 psia
Estimated Suit
Mobility Loss
Elbow 15 17 29%
Shy ul der 22 24 28
Waist 30 32 34
Hip 19 22 27
Knee 16 17 19
Ankle 8 9 10
SOP Growth 39 41 45%
One-Time Pure 02
 Use
"Next Day" after breathing cabin 0 2/N2 for
12 hours 0.2 0 0 hrs.
16 hours 0 0 0
"Launch Day" 1.2 1.1 1.0 hrs.
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OPTIMUM EVA PRESSURE
J
5.78 ± 0.1 psi a
-	 Eliminates all PGS use in support of
"Next Day" EVA
-	 Reduces POS use in support of "Launch Day"
EVA to 1.1 hours.
-	 Incurs minimal penalties over 5.66 psis PEVA.
2% more SOP 02
 capacity
1-3% more suit joint torque
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SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
The recommended optimum EVA pressure is 5.78 ± 0.1 psia.
Recommended cabin pressure for operational flights with EVA is 11.8 ±
0.2 psia.
The recommended combination of EVA and cabin pressure eliminates pre-
breathe prior to EVA. However, the crewmembers bodies must be in
approximate equilibrati6n with cabin N levels prior to EVA. This
requires a one-time denitrogenaticn, thing 1.1 hours on pure 0 to
support the first EVA within several hours of launch; or reduci;lg
cabin pressure to 11.8 psia for 12 hours prior to the first EVA.
Subsequent EVA's can be performed without additional denitrogenation
frdn an 11.8 psia cabin using existing EMU donning and checkout
procedures verified for STS-1.
The recommended cabin pressure meets existing maximum and minimum 02
levels, based on hypoxia and materials considerations.
The Orbiter vehicle requires automatic cabin pressure control at 11.8
psia. This requires adding one total pressure regulator and shut-off
valve to each of two parallel cabin pressurization subsystems.
Payload flight assignment planning :should continue to avoid inclusion of
experiments that are sensitive to subatmospheric cabin pressure to flights
with either planned EVA or where backup EVA is a possibility..
Approximately 82% of EMU components require no change to support EVA at
5.78 psia.
Significant EMU modifications consist of new gloves, enlarged SOP, re-
worked suit joints, increased battery capacity and reset 0 regulators.
Minor modifications include revising flow restrictors, relief valves, and
C&W set points, and strengthening select structural elements.
The EMU Comparison - Impact Summary Comparison chart (overleaf) shows
cabin conditions approved for OFT only. Modification of the EMU will
permit improving cabin conditions for operational flights.
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STUDY CONCLUSIONS
OPTIMUM PRESSURES
-	 Cabin - 11.8 + 0.2 psia
-	 EVA - 5.78 ± 0.1 psia
ADVANTAGES
-	 Physiologically acceptable.
-	 No hyperbaric facility required.
-	 Cabin materials acceptable.
-	 Avionics OK with load management.
-	 Minimal impact to EMU LSS.
-	 EMU SSA joint concepts extendable.
-	 Minor changes to STE.
IMPACTS
-	 1-Time 1'1 washout required.
1.1 hours with pure 02 for "Launch Day" EVA.
12 hours with cabin 02/N2 for "Next Day" EVA.
-	 Cabin pressure control system modifications required.
3rd regulator and shut-off valve.
Reset 02/N2 controller srt point.
New C&W proms.
-	 Air-cooled avionics load management required.
Shift some loads between avionics bays.
Power down select cabin equipment to meet greater-than nominal
heat loads.
-	 Screen carryon experiments for function at 11.8 psia.
-	 Existing EMU glove marginal
-	 Revised SOP/approach required.
May affect AAP, airlock and MMU.
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EMU CONFIGURATION
IMPACT SUMMARY COMPARISON
EMU Configuration
Use
Acceptable for OPS Flights
PCABIN - Psia
PEVA - Psia
Minimum Cabin PP02 - psia
Maximum Cabin % 02
Cabin Pressure Control
Avionics Power Down - kW
EMU Modifications Required
Present No Prebreathe
OFT w /o OPS Flights
prebreathe
No Yes
19:-01
11.8
4.1 5.75
2.46 2.66
30 25.9
Manual Automatic
^- 4 --2
No Yes
F-1 
Approved For OFT Only
and not acceptable for
operational flights.
PRECEI31yG PAGE BUM, NOT FILMW
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NEW TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES
The following new technology initiates are recommended to facilitate imple-
mentation of a 5.78 psia suit.
Gloves - Tho EMIJ glove loses dexterity rapidly with increasing EVA pressure.
e^Fnology of the present glove does not appear adequate to support a workable
glove at 5.78 psis. Hence a new technology iniative is recommended for develop-
ing gloves that are workablQ at 5.78 psig.
SOP - The SOP 0 capacity requirement is 45% greater than the present SOP 02
capacity to suppo4 normal EVA at 5.78 psia. A study initive is recommended
to identify means for minimizing the impacts of the 02
 capacity increase to
the AAP, airlock and MMU.
Joint Technology - Joint torque increases 9 to 37% at 5.78 psia. A joint
ec no ogy extension initiative is recommended to reduce this impact.
I ntegrated Testing - The United States Manned Space Prograrii has conducted all
EVA stoma.—Ti-iere is no widespread U.S. experience with higher EVA pressures.
A new technology initiative is recow_z:rided to conduct an integrated unmanned
and manned test program at the selected EVA pressure to gain assurance that;
issues of higher EVA pressures are well understood and to verify related
procedures.
-	 103
UNFfRD
TECHHOLOOM
cm
NEW TECHNOLOGY
-	 Glove
-	 SOP Approach
-	 Joint Technology
-	
Integrated EVA Testing
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APPENDIX - DISCUSSION MEMORANDUMS
The appendix consists of discussion memorandums prepared during the course of
the Prebreathe Elimination Stud; to examine specific issues. Issues were
developed with cooperation from cognizant people in relevant disciplines from
NASA JSC and associated contractors. These memorandums comprise the informa-
tion base for this study.
The appendix contains the following discussion memorandums:
ECWS-PBE-01	 Physiological Aspects
ECWS-PBE-02	 Payload Issues
ECWS-PBE-03	 Cabin Pressure and Materials Issues
ECWS-PBE-04	 Consummables Analysis
ECWS-PBE-05	 Air-Cooled Avionics
ECWS-PBE-06	 EMU Impacts
ECWS-PBE-01
PREBREATHE ELIMINATION STUDY - PHYSIOLOGICAL ASPECTS
Ric%&rd C. Wilde
Enpineertng Manager, Advanced EVA Studies
November 1980
Hamilton Standard Division
United Technologies Corporation
Revised: March 1981
Revision B: June 1981
A-1
As*	 REPORT HIGHLIGHTS
Title: PreL • aathe Elimination Study - Physiological Aspects
Object of Memo:
	
	
Identify physiological limits for eliminating prebreathe
with pure 02 prior to EVA and identify broad operational
^.	
procedures for staying within these limits.
Findings and Conclusions!
1. Physiological considerations set the following limits on cabin and EVA
pressures for eliminating prebreathe:
[	 HYp_oxia - Lung alveolar 02 partial pressure must not be less than the 4,000
foot altitude equivalent for normal operation or less than the 8,000 foot
equivalent for emergent? operation.
Ebullism - Total pressure must not be less than 0.91 ps1A.
02 Toxicity - Cabin 02 partial pressure should not exceed 3.6 psia, based
j	 on hematological considerations. EVA 02 pressure should not exceed 8.0 Asia
`	 for 3 EVA's.
Bends-limits - The ratio of cabin M2 partial pressure to EVA total pressure
should not exceed 1.6.
In addition, material flammability limits maximum cabin 02 partial pressure,
especially at lower cabin pressures. 02 partial pressure Is limited to
25.9% on the existing Orbiter. Most materials are acceptable for 30', 02.
The operating envelope for conducting EVA without prebreathe is shown in
Figure A.
2. The minimum prsasure for conducting EVA without any physiological, operational,
or vehicle imFacts is 7.25 psi&.
3. STS-1 pre-EVA checkout procedures include 20 minutes of pure 02 exposure
prior to dumping the airlock to vacuum. This appears adequate to support
EVA down to 6.9 psis.
4. EVA at pressures below 7.25 psia require a one-time denitrogenation to washout
dissolved gas present in body tissues at launch. Dissolved gas washout is
a function of five variables: cabin total pressure, cabin 02 partial pressure,
EVA pressure, duration of exposure to reduced cabin pressure prior to EVA,
and duration of exposure to pure 02 prior to dumping the airlock. Present
pre-EVA procedures fix two of these variables; exposure to reduced cabin
pressure is at least 12 hours, and exposure to pure 02 is approximately 20
minutes.
Figure B shows additional duration of pure 02 exposure required to perform
j
	
	
EVA over the entire range of EVA and cabin pressure shown in Figure A.
Figure B shows that less than one hour of additional exposure to pure 02 is
`	 req fired to support EVA down to 5.9 psi&.
^	
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Nature and Scope of Study:
Investigation is based on current physiology literature and STS OFT procedures.
Procedures for conducting EVA on "launch" day and subsequent days were identified
and evaluated using supersaturation R value p found safe by USAF manned testing.
Advantages of Procedures:
1. All procedures eliminate prebreathe during actual suit dotaing, eliminating
the most cimbersome aspect of present prebreathe procedural.
2. Developed equipment (PO^a and LEH) will support denitrogenation for "launch 	 I A
day" EVA.
3. Minimal equipment use (up to 0.5 hours; is required to support denitrogenation I A
for "next day" EVA.	 f
Disadvantages Caused by Procedures:
1. LEH may require conversion to closed loop operation to support "launch
s'dayEVA.
2. Airlock materials may require certification for 30% 02.	 I A
3. All candidate denitrogenation procedures require verification using human
testing before becoming operational procedures.
4. Other materials and equipment issues require further study..
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DISCUSSION
1. Introduction
Prebreathe Elimination Study examines impacts of changing Orbiter cabin
pressure and EMU EVA pressure-to eliminate prebreathe prior to EVA.
Becausqq crew safety drives STS design and operation, physiological aspects
are exdmined early in the study to define medically acceptable bounds
within which equipment and operational changes can be considered.-
This memo discusses medical and major operational aspects, namely:
e Physiological limits on cabin and EVA 02 level
%	 e For prebreathe elimination
- Cabic, to EVA pressure relationship
- Nitrogen washout times from sea level launch to first EVA
e Intermediate airlock pressure to permit EMU donning without using
the POS .
- Airlock pressure and gas composition
- Prebreathe times prior to EMU donning.
2. Physiological Limits on Cabin 02 Level
Hypoxia sets the lower limits of cabin 02 level. Alveolar 02 level is the
significant physiological parameter in setting hypoxic limits (References
3 and 5). Alveolar 02 level is related to cabin gas composition by the
following equation (References 3 and 5).
(1) PA0 2 - F102 (PCab - PAH2O) - PACO2 [F102 + (1 - FiO2) J
RER
where: PA0 2 - Alveolar oxygen pressure, torn
F102 - Fraction of 02 in breathing gas
PCab - Cabin pressure, torr
PAH2O - Alveolar water vapor pressure
- 47 torr at body temperature
PACO2 - Alveolar carbon dioxide pressure, torr
RER - respiratory exchange ratio. Assumed to be constant at
0.85 ci this study (References 1, 3, and 5). Actual
value varies up to 0.94 at 9 psi (Reference 4). Use
of 0.85 biases F102 values downward approximately
1.3% at 8 psi cabin pressure.
A more useful form of this equation permits plotting F102 as a function of
constant PA02 lines. Solving equation (1) explicitly for F102 yields
equation (2).
(2) F102 - PAS± PACO2 l.85
(PCab - 47)	 (PACO2 .85)(.85 - 1)
A-fi
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The problem with this equation is that it ;%as two unknowns, F102 and PACO2.
The approach taken was to back calculate PACO2 values from available data
sources (References 2, 3, 4, and 5) and to plot them in Figure 1.
The most useful correlation of PACO2 is with PA02 equivalent altitude, as
Figure 1 shows. This plot permits selecting PACO2 val-.es  for pure 02
breathing gas, enriched 02 cabin atmospheres and stand&& atmosphere compo-
sition.
Figure 1 shows scme disagreement in PACO2 between References 2 and 4 for
standard atmosphere and between References 3 and 5 for enriched cabin atmos-
phere. However, a sensitivity analysis shows that PACO2 variation affects
F102 values less than + 0.5%. This study uses the Reference 5 correlation
because it yields the most predictable PACO2 values.
Figure 2 plots altitude equivalent PA02 lines against cabin pressure to
yield 02 partial pressure values. JSC Medical Science Division's position on
hypoxic limits (which appears reasonable) is that PA02 should not fall
below the equivalent of 4,000 feet for normal cabin operations and should
remain above 8,000 feet for contingencies. At 4,000 feet, barely measurable
effects to night vision occur. At 8,000 feet, more general effects on
vision can be measured, and there is a pronounced effect on mental ability
to learn new tasks (Reference 1).
Medical Science Division's position on oxygen toxicity is that 3.8 psis PP02
exposure is safe for long duration exposure (Reference 5). This is a conserv-
ative limit based on hematological considerations. As a practical matter,
material flammability is expected to limit maximum cabin PP02. Present
cabin materials are evaluated for flammability up to 25.9% 02. For cabin
pressures below 14.7 psia , flammability limits may-force maximum cabin PP02
to be less than 3.8 psia.
3. Cabin to EVA Pressure Relationship
The relationship between cabin pressure and EVA pressure to ,;:void the bends
is based on the pressure ratio of total dissolved gas in the tissues to EVA
total pressure. For aviator's bends all dissolved gas contributes to bubble
growth (Reference 9). The critical problem in bends occurs when bubble
growth accelerates past a critical size within thisues that always contain
tiny bubbles (micronuclei). Dissolved gasses within tissues are in equil-
ibrium with inspired gas in amounts determined by both gas solubility
within the tissues and degree of perfusion of tissues with blaod (Reference 1).
Empirical studies of bends-susceptiblity represent total tissue dissolved
gas pressure by inspired N2 pressure (Reference 9), and hence express the
ratio of total dissolved gas in the tissues to EVA total pressure as:
	
R - PIN2
	 PIN2 is the inspired N2 pressure - total pressure (-)
	
PEVA	 02 partial pressure in the breathing gas (3.1 psia
in a normal atmosphere).
PEVA - EVA total pressure.
A-7
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It is generally accepted that safe levels of R depend on the half time of
certain body tissues to release dissolved gasses. Representative tissues
have gas release half times of 240 to 360 minutes. Based on experience
with male flight crews, Medical Science Division considers R - 2.0 to be
the upper acceptable limit of inspired N2 to EVA pressure for people with
demonstrated bends resistance; R - 1.6 is more conservative, and is exPected
to be safe for a larger segment of the population. R - 1.6 will be used in
this study as a bends-limit to set the relationship between cabin pressure
and EVA pressure (Reference 16). This is consistent with current.
USAF experience that rapid decompression from sea level to 18,000 feet is
safe (R - 1.58).
Figure 3 shows a plot of minimum EVA pressure for berds avoidance without
prebreathe as a function of cabin pressure, which is based on R - 1.6 and
PP02 - 3.1 psia (212 02 in a normal atmosphere). This curve considers EVA
down to a minimum of 4 psi&, the present EMU operating pressure. Because
prebreathe elimination is not served by reducing PEVA below present levels,
this study considers PEVA at or above 4 psi&, corresponding to a minimum
cabin pressure of 9.5 psi&. Note that this curve yields slightly lower EVA
pressure for cabin pressures above 9.5 psia than the "traditional" values
below obtained from the approximate relationship:
(4) PEVA - PCab N?.(Nom.) where PCab N2 (Nom.) - PCab tot - 3.0 (for PP02)
1.5
PCab PEVA (Eq. 4) PEVA (Fig. 3)
15 8 7.44
13.5 7 6.50
12 6 5.56
10.5 5 4.63
9.5 4.3 4.00
4'. Dissolved Gas Washout Times
Tissue dissolved gas washout time for breathing 02-N2 cabin gas can be
estimated by plotting the following equation (Reference 3).
(5) PTDG - PIo
 N2 ± [ (PIN2 - PIn N2) (1 - e- kt ) j
where PTDG - tissue dissolved gas pressure, psis
PION 2 - initial inspired N2 pressure, psis
k - .693/tissue half time, hours
t - time, hours
Figure 4 shows profiles of tissue dissolved gas washout while breathing cabin
gas at reduced pressure. The curves are for 240 minute and 360 minute
tissues, and are based on initial tissue dissolved gas pressure of 11.6 Asia,
which occurs at sea level locations such as KSC and WTR. For conservatism
the cabin gas is assumed to contain 02 at the 4,000 foot alveolar 02 level,
which is the acceptable minimum and which yields the maximum PIN2.
The following table, using Figures 3 and 4, shows that for cabin pressures
below 14.7 psia breathing cabin gas alone will never quite achieve safe
tissue dissolved gas levels to support EVA at R - 1.6.
A-8
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Max Min D
PCab tot PIN? PEVA Max PTDG Time
(psi&) (psi&) (psia) (psia) (hours)
14.7 11.60 7.25 11.6 0
13.5 10.86 6.50 10.4 Never A
12 9.34 5.56 8.9 Never
10.5 7.81 4.63 7.4 Never
9.5 6.79 4.00 6.4 Never
The major reason is that equation 5 expresses an exponential decay. The
intended washout uses the differential between PIN2 and PTDG to drive
PTDG toward PIN2. However, PTDG will never reach PIN2,because the driving
potential approaches zero as the differential approaches zero.
Solving this problem requires driving PTDG down to PIN2 prior to first EVA,
and doing it quickly to support mission objectives. Tissues will renitro-
genate to PIN2 levels after the first EVA but will not exceed these levels.
Thus no washout will be required for subsequent EVAs.
The remainder of this section considers candidate procedures for achieving
candidate procedures. Recent USAF human testing has verified that some
initial tissue dissolved gas washout. R values are useful for evaluating
washout procedures are safe, i.e., incur acceptably low incidence of bends.
Analysis of these procedures shows resulting R values of approximately 1.8
Ain 360 minute tissues and between 1.45 and 1.58 in 240 minute tissues
(Reference 14). Hence, this study will consider candidate tissue dissolved
gas washout procedures to be viable if they produce maximum R values of 1.8
in 360 minute tissues and 1.6 in 240 minute tissues. All these procedures
will address initial reduction of PTDG to support EVA at a factor of 1.6
below PIN2 (Reference 16).
A point to be emphasized is that R values are used only to define and
evaluate candidate washout procedures. Viable candidate procedures should
then be verified safe by human testing before they become operational.
Human testing is necessary because individuals vary widely in their suscept-
ibility to bends, owing to such factors as age, physical condition, amount
of body fat, and presence of scar tissue. In addition, temperature, activity
level, and time since last decompression affect a particular individual's
susceptibility to bends (Reference 14). Moreover, published literature
(References 1 and 10) indicates that women may be more bends-prone than men.
The variability of individuals' responses to decompression makes it neces-
sary to verify with human testing that candidate procedures are safe before
committing any procedure to the operational baseline.
Two candidate tissue dissolved gas washout procedures are presented which
appear to be safe for supporting EVA. Both procedures accelerate tissue
dissolved gas washout towards equilibrium with the cabin,so that the suit can
be donned with crewmembers breathing just cabin atmosphere. These procedures
eliminate requirements to breathe pure 02 during donning, thus significantly
simplifying suit donning. The two procedure candidates are as follows and
differ from one another in time to first EVA.
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• To support "launch day" EVA,breathe pure 02 for a prescribed time, during
which the cabin pressure is reduced to a prescribed level. Then don the
suit while breathing cabin gas and purge the suit with pure 02 while
performing final checkout.
• To support "next day" EVA,.reduce the cabin pressure to a prescribed
level. Breathe this atmosphere for a prescribed duration prior to donning
the suit, then don the suit. Purge the suit with pure 02 while performing
final checkout.
The purpose of the "launch day" procedure is to washout tissue dissolved gas
quickly so that EVA can be performed shortly after orbit insertion. The
procedure calls first for breathing pure 02 for a prescribed time to drive
tissue dissolved gas level from sea level toward cabin inspired N2 levels,
the prescribed time being a function of cabin pressure on-orbit. The cAbin
pressure is reduced to on-orbit level during this time. Next, the crewmember
breathes cabin gas for 1 hour while completing pre-EVA activity, preparing
EVA equipment, entering the airlock, and donning the suit. The last step
is to purge the suit with pure 0 2 using the OPA, spending approximately 20
minutes while checking out the suit prior to dumping the airlock to vacuum.
These steps and durations are consistent with STS-1 EVA operations planning
(Reference 12).
The procedure can bt performed two ways, depending on how soon EVA is planned
after initial orbit insertion. If EVA is to occur almost immediately, crew
-memberr, can begin washout during prelaunch and launch usinH the Launch-Entry
Helmet (LEH). If EVA is planned for later in "launch day", crewmembers can
start washout after post-orbit insertion tasks are complete, using the
Portable Oxygen System (POS).
The POS is flight-ready to support tissue dissolved gas washout. The LEH
is expected to require modification for closed loop operation. At present,
the LEH operates open loop to support launch and entry, but could cause
excessive cabin 0 2 enrichment if used by both pilot and mission specialist
for washout, especially at low cabin pressure. Bulkiness of 02 hoses,
required for closed loop operation, could encumber the pilot. These issues
will be studied more fully later in the prebreathe elimination study.
Table 1 contains an analysis of "launch day" EVA procedures in terms of
resulting R values for 360 and 240 minute tissues. The table shows the
following:
• Washout durations range from zero to 3.7 hours, depending upon on-orbit
cabin pressure and associated EVA pressure. 	 I A
• No pure 02 washout is required prior to donning for a sea level cabin
pressure to support EVA down to 7.25 Asia. Twenty minutes in pure 02
prior to dumping the airlock to vacuum appears to provide adequate 	 A
margin to accommodate a slightly N2-rich atmosphere which could result
from controlling PP02 to the minimum (4,000 foot alveolar equivalent).
• 240 minute tissues (R 1.6) set washout duration requirements down to 	 I A
cabin pressures of 12 psis.
• 360 minute tissues (R 	 1.8) set washout, duration at cabin pressures	 I A
between 10.5 and 9.5 psia.	 i
A-10
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It should be noted that body fast tissues will renitrogenste quickly to
PIN2 levels of the reduced pressure cabin during suit donning. ?or this
reason whole body gas washout will not be as complete as if pure 02 were
breathed continously up to suit purge. The 9 and 10.5 psia cases in Table 1
reflect this for 240 minute tissues for which R is approximate:y 1.60.
Without renitrogenation R would be approximately 1.56 and 1.36, respectively.
The purpose of the "next day" procedure is to assist tissue dissolved gas 	
(Awashout by breathing cabin gas at reduced pressure. This minimizes the re-
quirement to use any pre-donning equipment. The procedure calls for reducing
cabin pressure shortly after orbit insertion. The crew then eats, sleeps,
and performs normal IV tasks until the next day. Following EVA equipment
preparation and suit donning, the EVA crevmember purges the suit with pure
02 and spends approximately 20 minutes performing EVA checkout prior to
dumping the airlock to vacuum.
The procedure can be performed two ways, depending on how soon EVA is planned
after reducing cabin pressure. One approach is to reduce cabin pressure
approximately 24 hours prior to EVA. An alternative approach is to shorten
that time to 12 hours, which is consistent with STS-1 mission planning (Ref- 	 A
erence 12), followed by a brief washout usinZ pure 02(up to one half hour) to
accelerate equilibration of body tissues with the cabin atmosphere.
Table 2A shows an analysis of the "next day" procedure performed after 24
hours at reduced cabin pressure. The table shows resulting R values calcul-
ated for 360 and 240 minute tissues. As expected, Table 2A shows resulting
R's for all cabin pressures which are significantly below limiting values of
1.8 for 360 minute tissues. However, resulting R's for 240 minute tissues
slightly exceed 1.6 for cabin pressures below 10.5 psis. JSC Medical's
position is that these resulting R's are expected to be acceptable, per.ding
verification by manned testing (Reference 17). This procedure eliminates
Table 2B shows a similar analysis of the "next day" procedure using 12 hours
of reduced cabin pressure prior to suit purge. Table 2B shows the following:
e A short tissue dissolved gas washout pricr to suit donning using pure 02
is required for cabin pressures below 15.5 psia to support bends-limit 	 A
EVA. Washout durations using pure 02 range up to 0.5 hours, depending on
cabin pressure and associated EVA pressure.
e Zero duration is required to support bends-limit EVA from cabin pressu,,t_
down to 13.5 psia. Spending 20 minutes in pure 02 during EVA checkout
appears to provide adequate protection.
e 240 minute tissues (RA 1.6) set duration of pure 02 purge prior to suit
	 A
donning for cabin pressures below 14.7 psia. Resulting R's for 360 minute
tissues are all well below the 1.8 limit.
Conclusions drawn from considering tissue dissolved gas washout procedures
(Tables 1, 2A, and 2B) are as follows:
e A one-time tissue dissolved gas washout is required prior to first EVA to
support EVA at bends-limit values (per Figure 3) for all cabin pressures
below sea level.
• No washout is required to support subsequent EVA's at bends-limit values.
A-1.1
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e Breathing cabin gas alone is inadequate to support first EVA at sub-
atmospheric cabin pressures. "Lunch day" EVA can be su pported at all
cabin pressures by additional washout using pure 02 prior to suit
	 A
donning. Requirements for pure 02 washout prior to suit donning can be
reduced significantly or eliminated entirely by reducing cabin pressure
and performing EVA on the "next day."
e Candidate procedures have been identified to implement washout prior to
first EVA. Flight-ready or modified equipment is expected to support
	 Apure 02 washout for launch day EVA. Hinimal equipment use is required
to support washout for "next day" EVA.
e All candidate procedures require verification by human testing before
committing to operational baseline.
All candidate procedures have some drawbacks. All require analysis for
effects on non-physiological aspects, e.g., equipment and materials impacts
and operational constraints. These will be considered later in this study.
5. EVA Pressure Limits
In addition to the kends limits shown in Figure 3, other physiological con-
straints on EVA pressure are:
e Ebullism -
Pressure must be kept above 0.91 psi& to prevent body fluids from boiling
at 98.6'F (Reference 5).
e Hypoxia -
02 level must be kept above the 4,000 foot altitude alveolar equivalent
as shown in Figure 5 (Reference 5).
e Oxygen toxicity -
Exposure to pure 0 2 at up to 8 psi is not expected to be a problem for
3 EVA's per mission (Reference 6). However, for more than 3 EVA's per
mission, there is evidence that intermittent exposure to pure 02 at
8 psis may be harmful (Reference 7).
e Bends Protection During EVA Contingency -
Present STS practice requires 3 to 4 hours of pure 02 prebreathing to
protect against effects of decompression from 14.7 psia in the cabin to
4.0 to 4.2 psia pure 02 EVA pressure, which results in a mean R value of 	 IA
approximately 1.6 for 240 minute tissues. The EMU secondary 02 supply
will maintain pure 02 pressure at 3.25 to 3.55 psis for 30 minutes,
resulting in a mean R value of approximately 1.9. If an emergency extends
beyond 15 to 20 minutes, the risk of experiencing bends exists.
In considering EVA pressure up to 7.25 psi& it may be advantageous from 	 JA
equipment or other non-physiological viewpoints to provide pure 02
emergency EVA pressurization at close to hypoxia limit levels as shown
in Figure 5 for 4,000' PA02. This would increase the risk of bends
A-12
-10-
during the last 10 to 15 minutes of an emergency b,
minute tissues to exceed 1.9. The amount by which
increase dramatically as normal EVA pressure rises
follows:
4,000 ft. PA02
PEVA Normal
	 PEVA Emergency	 •PDTG
(psia)	 (psi&)	 (psia)
allowing R for 240
R exceeds 1.9 can
towards 7.25 psi& as
R 240 Min.
(PTDG PEVA Emergency)
CO 3.09 6.48 2.09
4.63 3.01 7.43 2.47 A
5.56 2.90 8.65 3.05
6.5 2.83 10.28 3.63
7.25 2.79 11.39 4.08
This example clearly shows that bends protection should be considered in
establishing acceptable emergency EVA pressure levels as we contemplate
EVA normal pressure levels above 4 psia. This is a new question for
which medical guidance is presently not available. Dave Horrigan has
agreed to think about this question and share his thoughts with me
(Reference 8).
One potential approach is to retain the present risk of bends occurrence
by not exceeding 4 value of R - 1.9. This would produce the following
relationship betwien normal and emergency EVA pressures.
R - 1.9
PEVA Normal
	
*PTDG	 PEVA Emergency
(psia)	 (psia)	 (psia)
	
4.0
	
6.48	 3.4
	
4.63	 7.43	 3.9	 A
	
5.56	 8.85	 4.7
	
6.5
	
10.28	 5.4
	
7.25	 11.39	 6.0
*Max. values for 240 minute tissues resulting from Table 2A procedure.	 A
6. Intermediate Airlock Pressure
At this point in the study we recognize the possibility that it may be dis-
advantageous for equipment or Orbiter reasons to adjust EVA and/or cabin
pressures sufficiently to eliminate prebreathe altogether. A potential
work-around would be to set the airlock at an intermediate pressure from
which it would be safe to perform EVA, and to prebreathe before entering
the airlock.
Prebreathe would then be terminated within the airlock prior to donning the
suit. This work-around allows breathing the airlock atmosphere during suit
donning and eliminates use of the POS and breather hose/mouthpiece during
donning. Relieving this requirement would simplify EMU donning significantly.
This work-around is similar to candidate procedures for "launch day" EVA in
which washout with pure 02 in interrupted by breathing reduced pressure air-
lock atmosphere. The intermediate airlock pressure case confines reduced
pressure to the airlock. The "launch day" procedure candidates use reduced
A-13
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pressure in both cabin and airlock. As in the "launch day" case, fast
tissues will renitrogenace to PIN2 levels present in the airlock atmosphere.
Evaluation of the intermediato airlock pressure work-around uses STS-1
mission planning as follows:
e "Launch day" EVA completes cabin depressurization 8 hours after launch
(Reference 12). EVA should start shortly thereafter or else the day will
get too long. Hence this evaluation considers initial PTDG to be sa
level, regardless of the actual on-orbit cabin pressure level.
e "Next day" EVA checkout occurs approximately 12.75 hours after completion
of cabin pressure reduction (Reference 12). This evaluation allows 12
hours as the maximum time for PTDG to approach PIN2 following cabin
pressure reduction.
e EVA equipment preparation, donning, and checkout take just under 1 hour,
with prep taking 25 minutes (Reference 13). Using 20 minutes for EVA
checkout leaves approximately 10 - 15 minutes to don the pressure garment
in the airlock, breathing airlock gas. This time is long enough to
renitrogenace fast tissues up to airlock PIN 2 levels (Reference 1), but
may not be long enough to continue washout of slow tissues (Reference 9).
Hence this evaluation assumes renitrogenation of fast tissues up to airlock
PIN2, but omits any washout from slow tissues during this time.
The work-around procedure for uainv intermediate airlock pressure is to pre-
breathe :'or a prescribed duration, depending on cabin pressure and EVA
pressure, as shown in figure 6. Complete EVA equipment prep before terminat- 	 A
ing prebreathe, enter the airlock, and close the inner hatch.
The intermediate airlock total pressure requires N2 partial pressure to be
1.6 times PEVA plus a minimum 02 partial pressure equivalent to 4k' alveolar.
Thus the airlock pressure to support 4 psis EVA has 6.4 psi N2 plus 2.7 psi
0 2 for a total of 9.1 psia. To achieve this the airlock is depressurized
briefly to 7.8 psis, f4,11owed by repressurization with pure 02 up to 9.1
psia, a process requiring approximately 1.125 lb of 02. Four psi EVA requires
the greatest amount of 02 to repressurize the airlock, hence results in the
highest 02 percentage in the airlock.
Terminate prebreathe once the intermediate airlock pressure is achieved ' A
Don the pressure garment assembly while breathing the airlock atmosphere. 	
I
Then purge the suit with pure 02 and perform EVA checkout for approximately
20 minutes prior to dumping the airlock to vacuum.
Table 3 shows prebreathe times and resulting R values for all cabin and EVA
pressures considered in this study, as well as airlock intermediate pressures
and 02 percentages. As expected, prebreathe times range from 0 to 3.8 hours 	 A
depending on the selected combination of cabin and EVA pressure. At the
lowest EVA pressure, 360 minute tissues determine prebreathe time. At higher
EVA pressures the 240 minute tissues determine prebreathe time. Table 3 also
shows that using reduced N 2 pressure in the airlock would allow significant
reduction in prebreathe times if cabin pressure is lowered several psi or
if EVA pressure is raised from one to two psi.
Figure 6 is a plot of Table 3 data showing prebreathe durations required
to support the entire range of EVA pressures from all cabin pressures 	 A
considered in this study.
A
A-14
-12-
REFERENCLS
1. "Medical Science Position on Space Cabin and Suit Atmospheres," Position
paper by NASA JSC/SD, May 1980.
y	 2. ARDC Model Atmosphere - 1962, Table published by the Garrett Corporation.
3. "Denitrogenation Curves," Memo to D. J. Horrigan Jr. (SD) from Joseph P. Kerwin
(CB), dated 11-9-79.
4. U.S. Naval Flight Surgeon's Manual, Naval Aerospace Medical Institute, 2nd
edition, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.
5. NASA Reference Publication 1045, "The Physiological Basis for Spacecraft
Environmental Limits," J. M. Waligora, Coordinator, 1978.
6. Conversation with Mr. James Waligora and Mr. David Harrigan at NASA JSC
on 11-3-80.
7. NADC-74241-40, "Physiological Responses to Intermittent Oxygen and Exercise:
Exposures," E. Hendler, NADC, Warminster, PA, 1974.
8. Telecon with Mr. David Horrigan of NASA JSC on 11-24-80.
9. Memo to Mr. Manuel Rodriguez Jr. from Mr. Janes Waligora, NASA JSC/SD3,
"Comments on Hamilton Standard Memo ECWS-PBE-01 (Preliminary)", dated 12-18-80.
10. Bassett, Bruce E. Lt. Col., USAF, Crew Protection Branch, USAF School of
Aerospace Medicine, Brooks AFB, Texas 78235, "Twelve Year Survey of the
Susceptibility of Women to Altitude Decompression Sickness," Preprint of
paper presented at Aerospace Medical Conference, Anaheim, CA, May 1980.
11. Telecon with Mr. David Horrigan of NASA JSC on 1-20-81.
12. STS-1 Flight Data File EVA Operations Book, JSC-16751, Basic, January 2, 1981.
13. STS-1 Flight Data File EVA Checklist, JSC-12813, Preliminary, Revision B,
August 15, 1980.
14. Report of Trip to Brooks AFB and NASA JSC 1-26 to 1-20-81, R. Wilde, Hamilton
Standard, dated February 4, 1981.
15. NASA SP-117, "Space-Cabin Atmospheres, Part III, Physiological Factors of
Inert Gasses," Emanuel M. Roth, M.D., NBSA Office of Technology Utilization,
Washington, DC, 1967.
16. Report of Trip to NASA JSC, 3-23 to 3-28-81, R. Wilde, Hamilton Standard,
April 2, 1981.
A
17. Telecon with Mr. David Horrigan of NASA JSC on 4-10-81.
A-15
i
i Rev. B
TABLE 1
Launch Day Tissue Dissolved Gas Washout Procedure
Procedure consists of: •	 Washout with pure 0 2 for prescribed dura-
tion while reducing PCab to on--orbit level.
•	 Breathe cabin atm. for 1 hour.	 Perform
EVA equipment prep and suit donning.
•	 Purge suit with pure 02 and spend 20
minutes performing EVA checkout prior
to dumping the airlock to vacuum.
4k' Resulting R Values
Max Equiv. Min Pure 02	 360 Min. 240 Min.
PCab PPS.._ PEVA Washout	 R a PTDG R - PTDG
PEVA PEVA
psi& psi& time, hours
14.7 2.63 7.25 0	 1.60 1.57
13.5 2.64 6.5 0.3	 1.65 1.60
12 2.66 5.56 1.2	 1.73 1.60
10.5 2.69 4.63 2.4	 1.80 1.59
9.5 2.71 4.0 a.7	 1.80 1.60
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TABLE 2A
Next Day Tissue Dissol • ed Gas Washout Procedure
(24 hours prior to EVA)
Procedure consists of: a Reduce cabin pressure for 24 hours
prior to EVA checkout.
e	 Breathe cabin gas for 24 hours.
Complete EVA prep ans suit donning.
e	 Purge suit with pure 02 and spend 20
minutes performing EVA checkout prior to
dumping the airlock to vacuum.
4 k'
Max Equiv. Min Cabin Depress.	 Resulting R Values
PCab PP_.2 PFVA Duration	 360 Min.	 240 Min.
R w PTDG	 R • PTDG
paia psia hours	 PEVA	 PEVA
14.7 2.63 7.25 24	 1.60	 1.57
13.5 2.64 6.5 24	 1.62	 1.58
12 2.66 5.56 24	 1.64	 1.59
10.5 2.69 4.63 24	 1.67	 1.60
9.5 2.72 ,0 24	 1.71	 1.62
_,..---
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TABLE 2B
Next Day Tissue Dipsolved Gas Washout Procedure
(12 hours prior to EVA)
Procedure consists of:	 a Reduce cabin pressure for 12 hours prior to
EVA checkout.
e Breathe pure 02 for minimum duration to accelerate
equilibration of body tissues with reduced
pressure cabin atmosphere.
e Breathe cabin gas for 1 hour duration.
Perform EVA prep and suit donning.
e Purge suit with pure 02 and `pend 20 minutes
pertormi;ng EVA checkout prior to dumping the
airlock to vacuum.
Pure 02
Max Min Cabin Depress.	 Washout	 Resulting R Values
PCab PEVA Duration Duration	 360.Min.	 240 Min.
R s PTDG	 R - PTDG
psis psia hours hours	 PEVA	 PEVA
14.7 7.25 12 0	 1.60	 1.57
13.5 6.5 12 0.2	 1.64	 1.59
12 5.56 12 0.2	 1.66	 1.59
10.5 4.63 12 0.3	 1.74	 1.59
9.5 4.0 12 0.5	 1.78	 1.60
y	 A-18
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TABLE 3
Intermediate Airlock Pressure
Procedure consists of: • Establish orbital cabin pressure level.
• To support "launch day" EVA prebreathe pure 02 based
on 14.7 psi cabin.	 For "next day" EVA breathe cabin
atmosphere for 12 hours, then prebreathe pure 02 based
on on-orbit cabin pressure.
• Complete EVA prep, enter airlock, and set airlock
intermediate pressure (PPN2 - 1.5 PEVA, PP02 - 41;.'
alveolar)
• Terminate prebreathe; don suit.
• Purge suit with pure 0 2 and spend 20 minutes performing
EVA checkout prior to dumping the airlock to vacuum.
Min Max Prebreathe Resulting R
PEVA	 PN2 A/L P02 A/L PTOT A/L F102 A/L
	 PCab Time PTDG/PEVA
(psia)
	 (psia) (psia) (psi&) (x)	 (psi&)
_
(hours)	 (240 min) (360 min)
4.0	 6.4 2.7 9.1 30	 9.5 0.6 1.58	 1.80
10.5 1.4 1.53	 1.80
12 2.5 1.51	 1.80
13.5 3.4 1.51	 1.80
14.7 3.8 1.51	 1.80
4.63	 7.1 2.7 9.8 28	 9.5 0 1.51	 1.66
10.5 0.3 1.59	 1.54
12 1.2 1.51	 1.80
13.5 2.1 1.57	 1.80
14.7 2.5 1.54	 1.80
5.56	 8.9 2.7 11.6 23	 10.5 0 1.51	 1.54
12 0.1 1.60	 1.71
13.5 0.9 1.60	 1.72
14.7 1.3 1.59	 1.74
6.5	 10.4 2.7 13.1 21	 13.5 0 1.58	 1.64
14.7 0.3 1.60	 1.65
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MEMO HIGHLIGHTS
Title: Prebreathe Elimination Study - Payload Issues
Object of Memo: Identify conflicting requirements between payloads sensitive
to cabin pressure and payloads using EVA, and identify approaches
to minimize these conflicts.
Nature and Scope of Study:
This investigation is based on current flight assignment planning and payload
integration planning. Specific information was obtained from published liter-
ature and from inturviews with NASA JSC personnel in the Payload Integration
Office, Safety and Life Sciences areas. The investigation defines conflicting
requirements of EVA and pressure -sensitive payloads and identifies approaches for
minimizing the conflicts.
Findings and Conclusions:
1. Conflict between EVA support and payload requirements arises from the desire
to reduce cabin pressure to support EVA without requiring pure 02 Prebreathe.
Reduced cabin pressure may adversely affect certain classes of payloads.
2. Classes of pressure - sensitive payloads are Spacelab manned modules and
carry-on experiments. Individual payloads within these classes may
exhibit two types of pressure sensitivity:
• Material flammability - Cabin payload materials are rated for 25.9% 02
partial pressure maximum. This partial pressu *-_^ may be exceeded at
cabin pressures below 11.5 pzia and could go to 33% at a minimum cabin
pressure of 9.5 psia. Refer to Figure 1.
e Experiment function - Certain experiments, as exemplified by life science
cardio-pulmonary and hematology, are sensitive to total pressure and 02
concentration, respectively. Also, cooling provisions may be inadequate
for some heat-generating experiments.
3. Other payload classes consisting of satellites, st.;uctures, and experiment
palle ts are not sensitive to cabin pressure.
4. The minimum cabin pressure to support EVA without prebreathe is 9.5 psis.
Refer to Figure 2.
5. STS Program planning recognizes three types of EVA:
e Planned - EVA is the baseline mode for meeting payload mission objectives.
Space Telescope is the only such payload so designed to date. Future
payloads, such as Power System and SOC, are expected to use planned EVA.
Further in the future construction and satellite service are expected to
use planned EVA increasingly.
e Backup - EVA is the backup mode for meeting payload objectives. IUS
erector is the only payload so designed to date. PAM-D payload is being
concepted to use backup EVA. Future satellite checkout and deployment
are expected to make inc _ ,!asing use of backup EVA.
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• Contingency - EVA is the contingency mode for supporting safe return of
Orbiter to Earth. Presently planned-for contingencies include the :&pair
and payload-bay door closure. There is no conflict between payloads and
contingency EVA because safe return overrides payload data and equipment
'	 survival considerations.
6. Recent flight assignment planning, consisting of 79 flights through
September 1986, supports reduction of conflict by not combining 11,F	
manned module payload flights with 11 test and deployment flights
'	 using planned backup EVA.
7. However, carry-on experiments increase the likelihood of conflict,
expecially in the future, specifically:
• 1981 - No conflict because there are no pressure-sensitive carry-ons.
• 1982 - No conflict identified to data because no pressure-sensitive
carry-ons have been identified so far. There is one non-EVA
flight available to accommodate any pressure-sensitive carry-ons.
• 1983
to - Conflict potential increases as carry-ons become more numerous.
1985 Approximately 800 carry-ons are currently being considered, and
many will be ready for flight in these years.
• 1986 and beyond - Conflict potential continues to increase because
current flight assignment planning becomes less firm,
and more EVA flights are expected.
8. The following approaches have been identified for avoiding conflict between
EVA and pressure sensitive payload requirements:
a. Continue to assign manned module payloads and deployment-service-construc-
tion payloads to different flights.
b. Avoid assigning pressure sensitive carry-on experiments to flights with
planned or backup EVA.
c. Operate Orbiter as a two-pressure vehicle: 14.7 psia for flights without
EVA and reduced cabin pressure for flights with planned or backup EVA.
d. Raise EVA pressure in several steps: 5.56 psia minimum for 1983, and
7.25 psia for 1986 and beyond.
Advantages of Approaches to Avoid EVA vs. Payload Conflicts:
• Module and carryon experiment payload design is not affected, thus
retaining existing benefits of STS for the payload user community.
6
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Advantages of Approaches (Continued):
• Separating EVA and pressure sensitive carry-one appears workable for
the next few years, while carry-on traffic is light.
• Raising EVA pressure to at. least 5.56 psia in the near future eliminates pay-
load materials problems, permitting assignment of carry-ons to EVA flights
if carry-ons will function at 11.6 pale. This will help relieve carry-on
assignment problems as carry-on traffic increases.
• Raising EVA pressure to 7.25 psia further in the future eliminates the
entire payload pressure sensitivity issue at that time.
STS Impacts:
• Orbiter will require an automatic two-schedule cabin pressure control
system for the next few years. The low pressure schedule will require
revision as EVA pressure is raised.
• Extensive operation of Orbiter at reduced cabin pressure will require
evaluation of the following:
- Cabin materials for use up to 33.4% 02
- Cycle life requirements for cabin negative relief provision
- Power own of select air-cooled avionics and carry-on experiments
- Procedures for eliminating N2-rich gas pockets in the cabin during
repressurization.
• Scheduling pressure sensitive carry-one to non-EVA flights may be
difficult if carry-on traffic becomes heavy.
• EMU will require significant modification to raise EVA pressure.
r
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BACKGROUND
EVA planning for supporting STS flights calls for conducting EVA at 4 .0 psi&
from a 14.7 psia cabin. To preclude "the bends", a painful and potentially
dangerous physiological condition resalting from bubble formation when dissolved
i	 gasses in body tissues are driven out of solution by exposure to reduced ambient
1
	 pressure during EVA, STS crewmembers prebreathe pure 02 for 3 to 4 hours to purge
body tissues of dissolved N2, the prime constituent of bends bubbles. However,
prebreathing has several drawbacks: the crew considers the Portable Oxygen
Jj	 System (POS) to restrict IVA prior to donning the EHU; and denitrogenation can
be significantly reduced inadvertently during EHU donning by taking just one
or two breaths of air, significantly increasing likelihood of bends, unless
F	 specific (and cumbersome) procedures are followed rigorously.
Planning for STS-1 side-stepped prebreathing by requiring reduction of cabin
pressure to 9 psia for approximately 12 hours prior to EVA,which promotrs
sufficient washout of dissolved gasses from tissues to minimize likelihood of
bends. This is not a permanent solution, because it does not addrese many
Orbiter, payload, operational, and EVA issues relevant to operational STS
flights. The objective of the Prebreathe Elimination Study is to define physio-
logically safe EVA and cabin pressure levels while achieving an acceptable
compromise betweer. conflicting Orbiter, payload, operational, and EVA issues.
This memo on payload issues addresses relationships between EVA pressure and
payloads. Other issues are being addressed elsewhere in the Prebreathe Elimin-
ation Study.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Prebreathe Elimination Study examines impacts of changing Orbiter cabin pressure
and EMTJ EVA pressure to eliminate pure 02 prebreathe prior to EVA. Because some
class.:,: of payloads are sensitive to cabin pressure, a blanket reduction of
cabin pressure to support EVA could adversely affect some payload experiment
results and payload materials selection. This could in turn reduce both user
acceptance of STS in general and user acceptance of EVA for payload support.
Hence it is important to assess impacts of EVA pressure on payloads and to
identify approaches for minimizing conflicts between EVA and payloads.
This memo discusses key EVA and payload issues, namely:
• Relationship between EVA pressure and cabin pressure
• Payload sensitivity to reduced cabin pressure
• Correlation of flights with EVA and pressure sensitive payloads
• Future uncertainty about EVA and pressure sensitive payloads
• Approaches for minimizing conflict between EVA and pressure sensitive
payload requirements.
A-32
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PAYLOAD AND EVA ISSUES
1. Relationship Between EVA Pressure and Cabin Pressure (Reference 1)
The relationship between cabin pressure and EVA pressure to avoid the bends
is based on the ratio of total dissolved gas pressure in body tissues to
EVA total pressure. For aviators and astronauts (as opposed to underwater
divers) all dissolved gas, not just N2, contributes to bubble growth.
Empirical studies of bends susceptibility represent total tissue dissolved
gas prer•ure by inspired N2 pressure, and hence express the ratio of total
dissolved gas in the tissues to EVA total pressure as:
	
1, R - P IN2
	 PIN2 is the inspired N2 partial pressure,
taken as total breathing gas pressure
	
P EVA
	 minus 02 partial pressure (3.1 psia in
a normal atmosphere)
PEVA is the EVA total pressure.
NASA JSC Medical Science Division has agreed that R - 1.6 represents a safe
value to minimize the probability of incurring the bends without prebreathing.
Figure 2 shows a plot of cabin pressure to EVA pressure using this value
of R. Because the existing EMU operates at 4 psi, there is no need to use
a lower EVA pressuri in the future. This sets the minimum cabin pressure to
be considered at 9.5 psia, which is 0.5 psi higher than that planned for
STS-1 EVA support.
2. Payload Sensitivity to Low Cabin Pressures
Economical delivery of payloads to orbit is the reason for STS's existence.
Hence factors which reduce payload economy or effectiveness must be examined
closely. Some payloads exposed to cabin pressure are pressure sensitive.
Information return from these couX be impaired by reducing cabin pressure.
Ail payloads exposed to cabin pressure must use materials rated acceptable
for exposure to 02 concentrat:ons up to 25.9%. Payloads exposed to higher
02 concentrations may have material incompatibility problems.
Payloads may be classified into three broad categories: satellites,
structures, and experiments. Boundaries between these classes may become
blurred in the future, but this classification appears adequate for discus-
sion of payloads to be launched during the next few years.
e Satellites -
Satellites will be delivered to low earth orbit by STS. Appendages, such
as solar panels and antennas, will be deployed; then the satellite
will be activated, checked out, and released. A rocket stage may be
attached to the satellite for boosting it to a different orbit. Satellites
are carried in the Orbiter payload bay, and are not sensitive to cabin
pressure.
A-33	 1
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e Structures -
No structure payloads have been booked to date for delivery to orbit, but
structure concepts are being developed. Structures are expected to be
deployed, assembled or fabricated in orbit, and are expected to consist
ultimately of several o- many individual payloads. Structure payloads,
i.e., structural and mechanical elements and bulk materials, are not
expected to be sensitive to cabin pressure.
e Experiments -
Experiments to date are assigned to payloads which remain with the
Orbiter while in orbit. Experiments will be carried externally and
internally. External experiments will be pallet-mounted and carried in
the payload bay or will be mounted to various external surfaces of the
Orbiter. External experiments are not sensitive to cabin pressure.
Internal experiments will be carried both in Spacelab modules and in
the cabin, and hence will be exposed to cabin atmosphere. These are the
classes of payloads of which individual members may be pressure
sensitive.
The NASA JSC Life Sciences Directorate considers many life science
experiments, as exemplified by cardio-pulmonary experiments, to be
pressure sensitive. Even the variation from sea level (14.7 Asia)
to 5000 feet at Denver (12.5 psis) may be significant. Experiments
involving hematology are sensitive to 0 2 concentration. Control
experiments in both areas are being run at sea level because Spacelab
and Orbiter have been designed to provide a sea-level atmosphere
(Reference 3), and .ompensation for altitude effects may require more
than simple gas law corrections. In addition, NASA JSC Medical Science
Division has placed minimum limits on cabin 02 concentration at the
4000 foot alveolar equivalent (Reference 1). Refer to Figure 1.
This requires 02 concentration to increase from sea-level values as
cabin pressure is reduced. Thus reducing cabin pressure could alter
information obtained from an experiment and may reduce the value of
control experiments run at sea level.
Attachment 1 to this memo shows that life science experiments are
currently assigned to the following Spacelab (S /L) module flights
(Reference 2):
S/L - 1 3 4 D1 10 15
STS - 10 20 22 25 48 68
Date 6-83 10-83 5-84 8-84 11-85 9-86
Also, it is considered likely that life science experiments may be carried
aboard other Spacelab module flights, even though the primary missions for
these flights are for purposes other than life sciences (Reference 4).
Attachment 1 shows the following other Spacelab module flight assignments
to date (Reference 2):
S/L -	 6	 8	 11	 13	 Free-Flyer
a sea-level atmosphere. Cooling difficulties may be anticipated at	 A-34
L-1.
STS	 30	 38	 lOV	 54	 6V
Date	 12-84	 5-85	 8-86	 5-85	 12-85
In addition, cooling provisions for Spacelab experiments are based on
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cabin pressures below 12.5 psis (5000 foot altitude equivalent).
Also. the	 Spacelab module materials are rated for a maximum 02 coacen-
fration of 23.8%. This concentration could be exceeded with cabin pres-
Nures below 12.5 psia as shown in Figure 1. NASA is not willing at this
time to consider imposing higher 02 concentration requirements on module
or module experiment materials. For all of these reasons this study c)n-
alders all Spacelab module payloads to be pressure sensitive (Reference 4).
If EVA is necessary cn these flights, present planning calls for trans-
ferring the crew out of the module, isolating the module at 14.5 psia,
and keeping the maximum number of experiments operating to reduce the
loss of payload experiment time. However, this plan reduces informatics
output if experiment tending tin. were lost or reduces validity if the
crewmemborb themselves are tact subjects (Reference 4).
Carry-on experiments are small payloads packaged into mid-deck lockers
or stored on a mid-deck panel. Only five carry-ons have been identified
to date: plant lignification, blood drawing, OSTA-2 flight deck camera,
electrophoresis, and latex dispersion. The first three of these are
scheduled to fly with STS 2, 4, 8, and 14. The last two have not vet
been assigned to a flight (Reference 4). None of these five carry-ons
is pressure sensitive. However, approximately 800 carry-on experiments
are being considered, many from high schools and universities. :ferny of
these experiments are expected to have pressure sensitive function and/or
cooling. In addition, all carry-ons must meet existing safety requirements,
which include materials acceptable for use at up to 25.9% 02 (Reference 4).
Figure 1 shows that experiments would require materials acceptable for
Exposure to 33.4 1. 02 to meet safety requirements of a 9.5 psia cabin
NASA is unwilling to consider imposing such a restriction at this time.
3. Correlation of EVA and Payloads
STS planning identifies three categories of EVA (Reference 4).
• Planned	 - EVA is the baseline mode for accomplishing mission objectives.
Mission support equipment is designed for operation by EVA.
EVA costs are chargeable to the payload user.
• Backup	 EVA is the backup mcde for accomplishing mission objectives.
Mission support equipment is designed for EVA to back up
select non-redundant features. EVA costs are chargeable to
the payload user.
• Contingency - EVA is a contingency mode for supporting safe return of the
Orbiter to Earth. Tile repair and payload bay door closure
are examples. Contingency EVA is a service provided by
Orbiter to payload users.
Planned EVA -
Current planning calls for demonstration EVA's on STS-2 and 4. No other
planned EVA's have been identif ied for the 79 flights ids•^r:;
Pallet payloads planned to date require no planned EVA. There aru 	 ..^i..
packs or experiment canisters to be retrieved. Space Telescope is ti., .:e
payload currently being designed for EVA service. Telescope service has not
yet been assigned to a Flight. The telescope launch has been assigned to
STS-16 and scheduled for laurrch during 1-84.
A-35
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Telescope service flights are not expected before 1985. The 25 KW Power
System, currently being concepted, will probably use EVA as baseline.
Its launch date is not expected before 1986, which is near the end of current
flight assignment planning (Reference 2). Its launch flight has not been
assigned or scheduled to date. Future structures and satellites are expected
to make increasing use of baseline EVA. PAM-.1, a payload adapter module in the
planning stage, is expected to use EVA. PAM-A
 flight assignment and schedule
have not been made to date.
Backup EVA -
IUS 1,: the only payload element designed for backup EVA. Its erector in
the payload bay is designed for EVA assistance if it fails.
	 Attachment 1
e4ows present planning for using IUS to boost the following commercial and
NASA payloads to higher orbit.
°ayload TDRS-A
	
B	 C
	
D	 Galileo Solar-Polar VOIR
STS -	 5
	
7	 12
	
15	 18 b 19	 35 b 36	 59
Date	 9-82
	
12-82 8-83 12-83	 2,3-84
	
3,4-85	 5-86
Contingency EVA -
EMU's are carried on each STS flight to cover the requirement for contingency
EVA. In situations requiring contingency EVA, loss of experimentat data,
experimental time, or experiment equipment becomes secondary to returning
the Orbiter safely to Earth. STS flight plans contain provision for
contingency EVA on all flights (Reference 5). Hence payload flight assign-
ment is not affected by the possibility of performing contingency EVA on any
particular flight.
Table 1 presents a year-by-year summary of planned STS flights and highlightb
potential conflicts between flights carrying pressure sensitive payloads and
flights with planned or backup EVA. The following conclusions can be drawn
from Table 1.
• At the present time there is no planned or backup EVA anticipated for
flights with pressure sensitive payloads.
• Carry-on experiments represent uncertainty. Because pressure sensitivity
and flight assignment for most carry-ons have yet to be determined, carry-
ons represent the major source of potential conflict between EVA and
pressure sensitive payloads cut through current flight assignment planning,
which is September, 1986.
4. Future Uncertainty About EVA and Pressure Sensitive Payloads
Uncertainty about payloads assignment increases in the future. This
study is based on the NASA Flight Assignment Baseline (Reference 2).
hir document is a moving target, and is updated quarterly to reflect
program impacts and other changes. Payload integration planning using
this document extends out to Spacelab D-1, which is assigned to STS-25
and scheduled for launch in August, 1984. Beyond that, most payloads
are firm, i.e., individual payloads identified and grouped into a single
payload for delivery by a single flight to a particular orbit, out to
STS-44, scheduled for launch September, 1985. 	 Other payloads	 .
A-36
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scheduled for launch out to September 1966 may be less certain. Many of
these are ref lights, payloads of opportunity or others that have not yet
been officially booked. Booked means a payload has been defined and its
launch need date established, and it has been budgeted or its earnest
launch money has been deposited (Reference 2). Looking beyond 1986 reveals
still more uncertainty. As already mentioned, Space Telescope service has
not been assigned to a flight. Other payloads such as 25 KW Power System
and PAM-D are still in the planning stage, and Space Operations Center is
still being concepted. The correlation between flight assignments for EVA
payloads and pressure sensitive payloads is undefined in this time period.
5. Approaches for Minimizing Conflict Between EVA and
Pressure Sensitive Payloads
e Continue present practice of not assigning module payloads to flights
planned for EVA support - Attachment 1 shows that current planning
dedicates separate flights for module payloads, thus separating them
from deployment payloads which may use EVA. This approach retains
present module materials and experiments, and hence has no impact on
the payload user community.
e Asslpn pressure sensitive carry-ons to non-EVA flights - Table 1 shows
that no conflict.exists at present for 1981 flights because there are no
pressur e sensitive payloads scheduled for launch in 1981.
In 1982 three out of four flights may use EVA. With no pressure sensi-
tive payloads identified to date for 1982, it appears likely that several
such carry-ons, if identified, could be assigned to the one non-EVA flight.
By 1983 carry-on traffic is expected to increase. While only two out of
eight flights may use EVA, some difficulty may be found in assigning
pressure sensitive carry-ons to the remaining six flights. The most
desirable situation would be to assign any pressure sensitive carry-ons
to the Spacelab 1 flight, which already carries a pressure sensitive
module. Similar situations exist in 1984 and 1985, where it would be
desirable to assign pressure sensitive carry-ons tirst to module flights
and second to deployment flights for which no baseline or backup EVA is
planned. This approach appears workable for the next few years while
carry-on traffic is light. Scheduling difficulties might be encountered
as carry-on traffic gets heavier. This approach retains present carry-on
materials usage and equipment design, and hence has no adverse impact
on the carry-on user community.
e Operate Orbiter as a two-pressure vehicle - Equip Orbiter with a two-
schedule automatic cabin pressure control system which allows 14.7 psis
operation when carrying pressure sensitive payloads but permits reduction
of cabin pressure to support EVA during satellite service and deployment
r
	
	and stricture construction flights. This approach requires retaining
procedures similar to those available for STS-1 for cabin pressure reduc-
tion, power-down of air-cooled avionics, and elimination of N2-rich
pockets in the cabin during repressurization. Continuing cabin depres-
surization into the operational flight phases also requires examining
Orbiter cabin materials, cycle life requirements on the cabin negative
pressure relief provisions, and effects on water and waste management
subsystems.
A-37
-12-
e Raise EVA Pressure - Raising EVA pressure will permit assigning carry-ons
to n%n-Spacelab module flights with planned or backup EVA. Figure 2 showr
that raising EVA pressure to 5.56 psi will permit raising cabin pressure
during pre-EVA activities to 11.6 psia. Figure 1 shows that 11.6 psis
permits physiologically safe 02 levels without exceeding material standards
to which carry-ons are being designed. This removes the materials con-
straint and allows assigning carry-ons that can operate at 11.6 psia to
flights with planned or backup EVA. EMU modifications are reuqired to
raise EVA pressure to 5.56 psia, but availability in 3983 appears feasible.
EVA flights are expected to increase significantly in 1986 and beyond to
support projected satellite service and construction activity. This may
reduce scheduling opportunities for carry-ons which do not function at
subatmospheric pressures. Figure 2 shows that raising EVA pressure to
7.25 psip will permit use of 14.7 psia cabin pressure even during EVA
support. This would .lift all constraints and resolve all conflicts in
assigning pressure sensitive payloads to flights with planned or backup
EVA.
These approaches are not mutually exclusive. A workable compromise
between conflicting requirements of EVA and pressure sensitive payloads
is expected to employ all approaches in the time period from the present
until EVA pressure is raised to 7.25 psia.
A-38
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e Raise EVA pressure - Raising EVA pressure will permit assigning carry-ons
to flights with planned or backup EVA. Figure 2 shows that raising EVA
^ressure to •5.S6 psi will permit raising cabin pressure during pre-EVA
activities to 11.6 psi&. Figure 1 shows that 11.6 psi& permits physio-
logically safe 0 2
 levels without exceeding material standards to which
carry-ons are being designed. This removes the materials constraint and
Allows assigning carry-ons that can operate at 11.6 psi& to flights with
planned or backup EVA. EMU modifications are required to raise EVA
pressure to 5.M psis, but availability in 1983 appears feasible.
EVA flights are expected to increase significantly in 1986 and beyond to
support projected sara llite service and construction activity. This may
reduce scheduling opportunities for carry-ons which do not function at
subatmospheric pressures. j'igure 2 shows that raising EVA pressure to
7.25 psi& will permit use of 14.7 psi& cabin pressure even during EVA
support. This would lift all ccastraints and resolve all conflicts in
assigning pressure sensitive payloads to flights with planned or backup
EVA.
Thes p
 approaches are not mutually exclusive. A workable compromise
between conflicting requirements of EVA and pressure sensitive payloads
is expected to employ all approaches in the time period from the present
until EVA pressure is raised to 7.25 psia.
r.
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TABLE 1
Potential Conflicts Between Pressure
Sensitive Payloads and EVA
Flights w/Pressure
Flights v/EVA	 Sensitive Payloads
Planned	 Backup	 Module	 Carry-on
1	 0	 0	 0
(STS-2)
1	 2	 1	 0	 TBD
Year	 Flights
Planned
1981	 3
1982	 4
1983	 8
1984	 17
95	 24
1986	 23
Total	 79
Foreseeable
Future
(Middle '80's
to early 190's)
(STS-4) (STS-5,7)
0 2
(STS-12,15
0 2
(STS-18,1:
0 2
(STS-35,3!
0 1
(STS-59)
2 9
TBD TBD
(ST Service, (PAM-4)
25 KW PS)
(Satellite Service, SOC)
1 TBD
(STS-10)
4 TBD
(STS-20,22,
25,30)
3 TBD
(STS-38,48,
6V)
3 TBD
(STS-54,
lOV,6B)
11 TBD
TBD TBD
(S/L, Modulee)
TBD
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Potential Conflicts
None
None at present.
Avoid PSCs w/payloads
assigned to STS-567.
None at present.
Avoid PSCs w/payloads
assigned to STS-12615.
None at present.
Avoid PSCs w/payloads
assigned to STS- 18619.
None at present.
Avoid PSCs w/payloads
assigned to STS-35636.
None at present.
Avoid PSCs w/payloads
assigned to STS-59.
Avoid PSCs on flights
to support ST service
and 25 KW PS deploy-
ment/construction.
Avoid PSCs on flights
to support Satellite
service and SOC deploy-
ment/construction.
P'Cs - Pressure Sensitive Carry-on Experiments
- Space Telescope
25 KW PS - Power System
SOC - Space Operations Center
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PREBREATHE ELIMINATION STUDY - CABIN PRESSURE AND MATERIALS ISSUES
Richard C. Wilde
Engineering Manager, Advanced EVA Studies
.Tula 1981
Hamilton Standard Division
United Technologies Corporation
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ML40 HIGHLIGHTS
Title: Prebreathe Elimination Study - Cabin Pressure and Materials Issues
Object of Memo:
Identify cabin pressures that are consistent with physiological and materials
02
 partial pressure limits and that are achievable using Orbiter cabin pressure
control equipment. Identify scope of materials investigation effort required
to support high cabin 02 concentration required at low cabin total pressure.
Nature and Scope of Study:
This investigation is based upon minimizing the cabin PP02 control band using
present or available Orbiter equipment. The investigation also uses material
evaluations performed to date as the basis for defining the scope of additional
materials 02 compatibility studies.
Findings And Conclusions:
1. It appears feasible to control and annunciate cabin PP02 within a total band
of 0.33 psi using the existing cabin 02/N2 controller, the new 1.5% PP02
sensor and new C&W limit proms. These limits are shown in Figure 1.
2. The 0.33 psi PP02 control band permits reduction of cabin pressure down to
10.3 psia nominal while retaining PP02 between the minimum physiological
limits and maximum materials compatibility limits deemed acceptable for STS-1
EVA support (30X). Cabin pressure can be reduced to 11.8 psis nominal
without exceeding 25.9% 02 deemed acceptable for normal STS-1 operation or
12.5 psis nominal without exceeding 23.8% 02, the present Spacelab upper PP02
limit.
3. For cabin pressures below 10.3 psis nominal, a materials evaluation is
required that is comparable to the investigation performed by NASA JSC ES5
to assess 216 major use materials in the Orbiter cabin for use at 30% 02.
Total cost of that effort was approximately $150 K.
4. Addition of a third mechanical regulator permits operation of the Orbiter
at reduced cabin pressure for EVA flights while retaining 14.7 psia cabin
pressure for Spacelab Module flights.
Advantages of Findings and Conclusions:
• Use of present equipment supports significant reduction in the PP02 control
band. The significant contributor to the reduction is the + 1.5% PP02
sensor, which was recently installed in OV102.
• The resulting PP0 2 control band supports a significant reduction in cabin
pressure, which in turn will support EVA without prebreathe in t11
vicinity of 6 psis without impacting cabin or Spacelab materials.
Disadvantages of Findings and Conclusions:
• Resetting C&W limits to within the 0.33 psi band requires replacing
C&q proms and reselling 02/N2 controller, The cost is $120 K.
• 02 compatibility of cabin materials requires conbideration at cabin
pressures below 10.3 psis nominal. Assessment will cost approximatel y $150 K.r
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Disadvantages of Findings and Conclusions: (Continued)
e Space is limited in the vicinity of middeck panel M01OW for installation
of additional cabin pressure regulators. Estimated cost is approximately
$250 X.	 .
BACKGROUND
EVA planning for supporting STS flights calls for conducting EVA at 4.0 psi&
from a 14.7 psia cabin. To preclude "the bends", a painful and potentially
dangerous physiological condition resulting from bubble formation when dissolved
gasses in body tissues are driven out of solution by exposure to reduced ambient
pressure during EVA. STS crewmembers prebreathe pure 02 for 3 to 4 hours to purge
body tissues of dissolved N2, the prime constituent of bends bubbles. However,
prebreathing has several drawbacks: the crew conxiders the Portable Oxygen
System (POS) to restrict IVA prior to donning the EMU, and denitrogenation can
be significantly reduced inadvertently during EMU donning by taking just one
or two breaths of air, significantly increasing likelihood of bends, unless
specific (and cumbersome) procedures are followed rigorously.
Planning for STS-1 side-steps prebreathing by requiring reduction of cabin
pressure to 9 psis for approximately 12 hours prior to EVA, which promotes
sufficient washout of dissolved gasses from tissues to minimize likelihood of
bends. This is not a permanent solution, because it does not address many
Orbiter, payload, operational, and EVA issues relevant to operational STS
flights. The objective of the Prebreathe Elimination Study is to define physio-
logically safe EVA and cabin pressure levels while achieving an acceptable
compromise between conflicting Orbiter, payload, operational, and EVA issues.
This memo addresses issues involving cabin pressure and cabin materials. Other
issues are being addressed elsewhere in the Prebreathe Elimination Study.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Prebreathe Elimination Study examines impacts of changing Orbiter cabin pressure
and EMU EVA pressure to eliminate pure 02 prebreathe prior to EVA. Because
physiological requirements set minimum levels of cabin oxygen partial pressure,
reduction of cabin total pressure raises cabin oxygen concentration. Cabin
material flammability is sensitive to oxygen concentration. Maximum oxygen
concentration limits for significant numbers of cabin materials can be exceeded
within the range of reduced cabin pressures under consideration in this study.
Hence it is important to assess the relationships between cabin pressure and
cabin oxygen concentration and identify impacts of selecting low cabin pressures.
This memo discusses key cabin pressure and materials issues, namely:
e Relationship between EVA pressure and cabin pressure
e Cabin pressure control
e Relationship of cabin pressure to cabin oxygen concentration
e Impacts of high cabin oxygen concentration on cabin materials.
e Implementation of two-pressure control.
k A-48
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CABIN PRESSURE AND MATERIALS ISSUES
1. Relationship Between EVA Pressure and Cabin Pressure (Reference 1)
The relationship between cabin pressure and EVA pressure to avoid the bends
is t+zaed on the ratio of total dissolved gas pressure in body tissues to
EVA total pressure. For aviators and astronauts all dissolved gas contributes
to bubble growth. Empirical studies of bends susceptibility represent total
tissue dissolved gas pressure by inspired N2 pressure, and hence express the
ratio of total dissolved gas in the tissues to EVA total pressure as:
	
1. R - P IN2	 PIN2 is the inspired N2 partial pressure,
	
P EVA
	
taken as total breathing gas pressure
minus 02 sprtia3 pressure (3.1 psi& in
a normal atmosphere).
PEVA is the EVA total pressure.
NASA JSC Medical Science Division has agreed that R - 1.6 represents a safe
value to minimize the ?robability of incurring the bends without prebreathing.
Figure 2 shows a plot of cabin pressure to EVA pressure using this value of
R. Because the existing EMU operates at 4.1 psi nominal, there is no need
to use a lower EVA pressure in the future. This sets the minimum nominal
cabin pressure to be considered at 9.3 Asia, which is 0.2 psi higher than
that planned for STS-1 EVA support.
2. Cabin Pressure Control
Figure 1 shows how the combination of minimum alveolar PP02 and maximum cabin
02 concentration defines a "corner" which defines the range of allowable
cabin pressures. Minimum EVA pressure, which simplifies suit mobility issues,
seeks the lowest cabin pressure. The smallest cabin PP0 2
 control and annunci-
ation band permits the lowest cabin pressure consistent with physiological
and materials limits.
Orbiter cabin pressure control (Reference 5) is shown schematically in Figure 3
There are two completely separate systems from tankage to gas inlets into the
cabin. Crew-selectable cross-over valves permit interconnection modes. In
each system cabin tot,41 pressure is controlled by a mechanical regulator
located adjacent to middeck panel MOlOW, near the head. Each system has an
02 partial pressure sensor, located in the aft middeck ventilation circuit
duct which senses 02 concentration. An 0 2 /N2 controller, located behind panel
MOIOW, responds to low 02 concentration by closing the N2 supply valve that
feeds the cabin pressure regulator. Cabin pressure is thus made up with 02
until the PP0 2 concentration is satisfied. The 02/N 2 control then responds by
opening the N2 valve, which allows intermediate N2 supply pressure at 200 + 15
psig to supply the cabin pressure regulator. This intermediate N2 pressure,
upstream of the cabin pressure regulator, causes the intermediate 02 supply
regulator, set to 100 + 10 psig, to close, assuring that only N2 is supplied
to the cabin pressure regulator.
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For STS-1 total cabin pressure was set at 14.5 + 0.2 psis. PP02 was set
at 3.2 + .25 psig with nominal C&W limits at 2.1 and 3.6 psis, as shown in
Figure 1. This control band is too wide to permit significant reduction in
cabin pressure to support EVA without prebreathe. Thus STS-1 baseline pro-
cedures call for manual control of cabin pressure and PP02 at lower settings
to support EVA. However, safety requirements dictate use of automatic cabin
pressure control for EVA support for operational flights (Reference 8).
Attachment 1 shows that the PP0 2 control band c; i be reduced to 0.33 psi
using the existing cabin 02/N2 controller with lowered set point plus the
new + 1.5% PP02 sensor which is presently installed. New C i W limits would
also be required. Estimated cost is $120 K (Reference 3). Revised fault
detection and annunciation limits can be inputted via keyboard.
3. Relationship of Cabin Pressure to Cabin Oxygen Concentration
The following table, derived in Figure 1, shows representative achievable
cabin pressures. These are based on 0.33 psi PP0 2 control and CSW band,
and are consistent with prescribed materials and physiological PP02 limits.
PCAB Nom. 4k' PP02 Max 02 PEVA Comments
+ 0.2 psis psia % + 0.1 psia Cabin total pressure and EVA
pressure are the minimum...
9.3 2.71 33.4 4.1 ...required for consideration
in this study.
10.3 2.69 29.9 4.73 ...at max 02 % for STS-1 EVA support
11.7 2.655 25.:' 5.62 ...at max 02 % for STS-1
normal operation
12.4 2.66 24.5 10.03 ...at max 02 % projected for
Spacelab (Reference 6)
12.7 2.65 23.8 6.14 ...at max 02% for
Spacelab (Reference 4)
14.7 2.63 20.7 7.48 ...without changing projected
STS cabin pressure
4. .Max PP02 to Materials Issues
Attachment 2 shows what steps were taken to make the Orbiter acceptable for
a maximum cabin 02 concentration of 25.92. Attachment 2 also shows the
results of an assessment for operation of the Orbiter cabin at 30% 02 at
9 psia in support of STS-1 EVA. This evaluation required testing of 216
"major use" materials (usages over 1.0 lb and/or over 50 in 2 ). Eighty
materials failed, but were subsequently accepted on the basis configuration
and use as contributing to a slight but acceptable increase in flammability
risk. This evaluation cost approximately $150 K, and was aided by having
some material samples, piece parts and black boxes available for test.
A-52
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This study ident ifies the potential for EVA support from a cabin at 9.1 psi&
minimum with PP02 at 3.04 psi&, per Figure 1. This yields a maximum 02
concentration of 33 . 4%. An evaluation similar to that of Attachment 2 would
be required to identify changes to Orbiter cabin materials to support a
PP02 level of 33 . 4%. The evaluation may be somewhat more costly if there
is less material test data available at 9 p =ia 33% 02 than at 30% 02, and
if some material samples and black boxes have already been used up. A
summary of the types of major use materials required in a 9 psi 33% 02
evaluation is contained in Attachment 3.
While an analysis of JSC-13000-5, "Flight Assignment Baseline," 12-15-80
(Reference 7) shows that there are no planned or backup EVA's on Spacelab
module flights to date, it is expedient to consiJer supporting contingency
EVA without conflicting with Spacelab material requirements. Present 02
concentration limit for Spacelab is 23.8% (Reference 4), with a projected
increase to 24.5% (Reference 6). Minimum nominal cabin pressures for
these C2 concenprations, shown to Figure 1, are 12.7 and 12.4 psi& respect-
ively. The table in the previous section shows that these cabin pressures
support EVA at 6.14 and 6.03 psi& nominal respectively.
5. Implementation of Two-Pressure Control
The analysis of payloads (Reference 7) identifies advantages of operating the
Orbiter as a two-pressure vehicle, namely at 14.7 psia for Spacelab Module
flights and at reduced cabin pressure for payload deployment flights. This
could be accomplished as shown in Figure 3 by resetting the cabin pressure
control to the PP02 limits shown in Figure 1 for the reduced cabin pressure
selected and by controlling total cabin pressure by a third mechanical
pressure regulator. A manual abut-off valve on panel M01OW is required
upstream of the third regulator to shut off that regulator when operating
on the emergency regulator. Cost of installing a pair of regulators and
shut-off valves in the vicinity of middeck panel M01OW is estimated to be
approximately $250 K in OV 102 and 85 K Subsequently.
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ATTACHMENT 1
REDUCED PP02 CONTROL BAND
1. Ground Rules (Reference 4)
s Use the same sensor to drive C&W and 02/N2 controller (Reference 3).
This allows elimination of sensor-signal conditioner error from C&W
band and leaves C&W error of + 0.025 pal L+ 1 bit/250 bits).
e Reduce dead bands between C&W trip and 02/N2 control from 0.41 psi
to 0.01 psi. (Reference 3).
e Use the new + 1.52 PP02 sensors in place of the at 32 sensors
recently replaced in OV102 (Reference 3). Error band is + 1.5% x
5 psi 0 0.15 psi.
s Use RMS to calculate PP02 sensor-controller error band (Reference 4)
Sensor	 .15 psi	 (.15)2 - .0225
Control
	
.15 psi	 (.15)2	 0225
(.0! 450)1 /2 0.212 psi
2. Total PP02 Control Band (Reference 4)
C&W high limit	 0.05 psi
Dead band	 0.01
Sensor-controller	 0.21
Dead band	 0.01
C&W low limit	 + 0.05
0.33 psi
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ATTACHMENT 3
Summary - Crew Compartment
Major Use Materials
Piece Parts and
Associated Materials Bulk Materials
Cushion Clamps Charcoal
Edge Lit Panels Coatings
Filter Materials Fabrics
Gaskets and Seals Films
Shims (Non-metallic) Foams
Sleeving and Tubing Inks
Acrylic Plexiglass Greases and Lubes
Del-F insulated Wire and Cable
Lexan Insulations
Nylon Laminates
PCB's Sound Insulation
Rulon Sponge
Silicones Velcro
Teflon and TFE Webbing and Strapping
Viton Varnishes
Assembly Materials	 Totaa 216 Major Use Materials
in Orbiter Crew Compartment
Adhesives
Cord and Tapes
Lacing Tape
Molding and Potting Compounds
Selants	 Source: Rockwell International
Matco Report U719-10-111
10-8-80, updated 3-13-81
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ECWS-PBE-04
PREBREATHE ELIMINATION STUDY - ORBITER ECLSS-CONSUMABLES
Richard C. Wilde
Engineering Manager, Advanced EVA Studies
June 1981
Hamilton Standard Division
United Technologies Corporation
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MEMO HIGHLIGHTS
Title: Prebreathe Elimination Study - Orbiter ECLSS Consumables Analysis
Object of Memo:
Identify Orbiter ECLSS consumables that are sensitive to cabin pressure
and to assess the resulting weight impact on the Orbiter.
Nature and Scope of Study:
This analysis is based on the STS-1 ECLSS gas budgets generated by NASA JSC
Mission. Planning and Analysis Division, as updated by computer modelling of the
cabin puncture contingency performed by NASA JSC Crew Systems Division. This
analysis is based on a 4-person 7-day payload deployment reference mission,
with 2 payload support EVA's using MMU's.
Findings and Conclusions:
1. w;.yo 02, GN2, and emergency COX are the ECLSS consumables considered in
this study.
2. Total ECLSS budgets, consisting of reserves, contingencies and flight require-
ments for all three atmosphere consumables, increase approximately one 11) (from
437 lb to 438 lb) as cabin pressure is lowered from 14.7 to 9.3 psia nominal.
Refer to Figure 1.
3. The major contributor to increased consumables use at Lower cabin pressure is
the flight requirement to repressurize the cabin to 14-,7 psi prior to reentry
(approximately 66 lb from 9.3 psia).
4. These increases are partially offset at lower cabin pressures by -.eductions
in gas quantity required to repressurize the airlock after payload EVAs
(approximately 17 lb at 9.3 psis), in cabin gas leakage (approximately 21 lb
at 9.3 psia), and in the net contingency requirement to hold cabin pressure
at a minimum of 8 psis foi 160 minutes fallowing a cabin puncture (approxi-
mately 27 lb).
5. Existing tankage for emergency GOX is sufficient to support operation down
to 9.3 psia nominal cabin pressure.
Existing N2
 tankage has a slight negative margin at all cabin pressures.
The negative margin ranges between approximately 0.6% (1.6 lb) and 2.5%
(6.6 lb).
Cryo 02 is allotted from the Power Reactant Supply and Distribution system.
One hundred twelve pounds was allocated for STS-1. Expected Cryo 02 usage
ranges from approximately 109 lb at 9.3 psia cabin to 117 lb at 14.7 psia.
6. Present UGH budgets appear acceptable for cabin pressures down to 9.3 psis
nominal.
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Advantages of Findings and Conclusions:
• Assuming that tanks are filled completely prior to each flight, there is
no significant increase due to ECLSS gas consumables down to 9 psi& cabin
pressure.
Disadvantages of Findings and Conclusions:
• Margins for ECLSS GOX and GN are reduced slightly as cabin pressure is lowered.
leaving less consumables available to support additional contingency require-
ments.
• Adherence to present mission rules may require addition of a fifth N2 tank.
These tanks are titanium and weigh 55 lb each. Space for a fifth tank in the
mid-fuselage area may be a problem.
BAC%^•ROUND
EVA planning for supporting STS flights calls for conducting EVA at 4.0 psia
from a 14.7 psis cabin. To preclude "the bends", a painful and potentially
dangerous physiological condition resulting from bubble formation when dissolved
gasses in body tissues are driven out of solution by exposure to reduced ambient
pressure during EVA, STS crewmembers prebreathe pure 02 for 3 to 4 hours to purge
body tissues of dissolved N2, the prime constituent of bends bubbles. However,
prebreathing has several drawbacks: the crew considers the Portable Oxygen
System (POS) to restrict IVA prior to donning the EMU, and denitrogenation can
be significantly reduced inadvertently during EMU donning by taking just one
or two breaths of air, significantly increasing likelihood of bends, unless
specific (and cumbersome)procedures are followed rigorously.
Planning for STS-1 side-steps prebreathing by requiring reduction of cabin
pressure to 9 psia for approximately 12 hours prior to EVA, which promotes
sufficient washout of dissolved gasses from tissues to minimize likelihood of
bends. This is not a permanent solution, because it does not address many
Orbiter, payload, operational, and EVA issues relevant to operational STS
flights. The objective of the Prebreathe Elimination Study is to define physio-
logically safe EVA and cabin pressure levels while achieving an acceptable
compromise between conflicting Orbiter, payload, operational, and EVA issues.
This memo addresses issues involving Orbiter ECLSS consumables as a function of
cabin pressure. Other issues are being addressed elsewhere in the Prebreathe
Elimination Study.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Prebreathe Elimination Study examines impacts of changing Orbiter cabin pressure
and EMU EVA pressure to eliminate pure 02 prebreathe prior to EVA. Because
changing cabin pressure affects ECLSS atmosphere consumables usage, it is
important to assess the budgets for these consumables and to determine adequacy
of existing tankage.
This memo discusses key issues in atmosphere consumables budgeting, namely:
• Reference mission
• Budget analysis
A-63
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ORBITER ECLSS CONSUMABLES ISSUES
1. Reference Mission
Analysis of Orbiter ECLSS atmosphere consumables is based on a 4-person
7-day mission. Current flight assignment planning (Reference 6) shows this
mission to combine longest duration and largest crew with payload deployment.
The only flights currently planned to fly with larger crews are associated
with Spacelab, for which no EVA is planned (Reference 7). A breakdown of
planned flights is shown in Attachment 1.
The design reference mission draws information from STS-1 EVA planning
(Reference 8), 9 psia cabin EVA support planning (Reference 1) and projected
usage (Reference 5). Salient features are:
1. Crew Size
2. Mission Duration
3. Cabin Pressure Profile
4 people
7 days
PCAB	 Time
14.7 psia	 0 - 8 hours
Reduced	 8 - 166
14.7	 166 - 168
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
2. Bud
Cabin Leakage
Cabin Volume
Airlock Volume
Metabolic Consumption
Cabin PP02
EMU purge during donning
EMU recharge
MMU recharge (2 MMU's)
,get Analysis
8.2 lb/day @ 14.5 Asia, PPN2 - 11.3 psis,
PP02 - 3.2 psis
2325 ft3
150 ft3
0.0739 lb/man-hour @ 450 Btu/hr
Nominal PP02 control point is 4000 ft
alveolar equivalent (4) 0.165 psi
0.83 lb 02
1.217 lb 02
40 lb N2 prior to 2nd payload support EVA
The ECLSS gas budgets are shown in Tables 1 - 5. The table formats are
based on NASA JSC MPAD% evaluation of the 9 spia cabin for STS-1 EVA
support (References 1 and 2). The tables present budgets for Cryo 02,
emergency GOX and GN2 at cabin pressures from 9.0 to 14.7 psia.
The ECLSS draws Cryo 02 from tanks which are part of the Power Reactant Supply
and Distribution System. Fuel cells account for over 92% of Cryo 02 consump-
tion. Hence Cryo tankage measurements and residuals are part of the PRDS
budgeting, and are not chargeable to the ECLSS. For STS-1, 112 lb of Cryo 02
was allocated for ECLSS use. Projected Cryo 02 use for the design reference
mission is approximately 117 lb at 14.7 psia and 109 lb at 9 psia cabin
pressure. The chief contributor to the consumption drop at lower cabin
pressures is the cabin puncture contingency which draws from the emergency
GOX supply sooner at 9 psi, relieving some demand on Cryo stores.
Tables 1 - 5 use a special computer run to calculate consumables splits
during the cabin puncture contingency evaluation (Reference 3). This run was
tailored to the design reference mission, and shows the increase in GOX
and GN2 consumption required to hold cabin pressure at 8 psi& as initial cabin
pressure is lowered.
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{Emergency GOX is not seriously affected by lowering cabin pressure. Tankage
margin decreases from approximately 302 (20 lbs) to 202 (14 lbs) primarily due
to the cabin puncture contingency.
Tables 1 - 5 show the GN2 budgets to be slightly negative for all cabin
pressures. Operation with negative margin with present mission rules
defining contingency provision requirements may call for adding a fifth GN2
tank. These tanks are made of titanium, weight 55 lbs, and hold approximately
67 lbs of GN2. They are located in the mid-fuselage area. Space for a fifth
tank is at a premium (Reference 4).
The significant contributors to negative margin are the Flight Requirements
for MHU recharge and cabin repressurization and the Contingency Requirement
to cover cabin puncture. STS-1 mission rules permit minimizing the conting-
ency budget by considering a cabin puncture contingency to use that portion
of the Flight Requirement to repressurize the cabin backup to 14.7 psia prior
to reentry. Thus the contingency budgets of GN2 are net budgets for the cabin
pressure cases (10.5, 12.0, and 13.5 psia) where net cabin puncture usage is
the largest line item in the GN2 contingency budget.
Different situations exist at 9.0 and 14.7 psia cabins. The GN2 contingency
budget at 9.0 psia consists of the repress line item from 8 to 14.7 psia,
because that line item (66.7 lb) exceeds the net cabin puncture line item
(133.1 - 66.7 - 66.33 lb). The 14.7 psia GN2 contingency is not a net
budget, because the flight repressurization allowance is zero.
Figure 1 snows plots of Cryo 02, GOX, and GN2. The plots for all three
ECLSS consumables are essentially independent of cabin pressure. The figure
also shows the weight total for the three consumables. The total net change
is composed of offsetting effects which are significantly sensitive to cabin
pressure, as shown in the following tabulation.
PCAB,psia	 9.0
Dispersion allowance
Net cabin puncture contingency
Net line items for other worst
case contingencies
Cabin leakage
A/L repress (flight req't only)
Cabin repress
22.94 lb
125.72
1.37
(GN2)
86.97
36.01
66.77
339.78 lb
14.7
20.05 lb
152.4
5.54
(GOX)
104.68
52.81
0
338.48 lb
Net Change
2.89 lb
-26.68
-4.17
-20.71
-16.8
66.77
1.3 lb
Test evaluation of UGH performance at JSC indicates no significant loss of
performance at cabin pressures down to 9.0 psia (Reference 9). Thus UGH
impacts need not be considered further in this study.
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N/A
7.94
7.94
5.0
0
16.0
0
8.85
21.65
0
0
8.76
21.65
0
0
37.74
31.44
10.49
0
37.74
0
	
0
61.87
	
0
17.53
	
0
0
	
0
	
79.40
	
0
	108.99
	
53.74
N/A	 13.86
TABLE 1
ECLSS Atmosphere Gas Budget, 9.0 Pala Cabin
Cryo 021
	Aux 02 GOX
• Total Loaded, Lb Nom. (Ref. 4) 	 N/A	 67.6
c
• Unusables: Residual	 N/A	 11.0
• Reserves	 (Ref . 1)
Measurement Error
Dispersion Allowance (10% Flt. Req't)
SUBTOTAL
• Contingency
MMU Recharge (2 MMU's) (Ref. 5)
1-Day Extension at 14.7 psi&
Cabin Puncture	 (Ref. 3)
Single Cabin Repress to 8 psia
Single Cabin Repress 8 - 14.7 psia
1 x 2-person EVA @ PCAB
SUBTOTAL 2
GN2
268.6
26.0
16.2
15.0
57.2
40.0
6.52
133.10
I
64.25
67.70
9.24
A	 67.70
• Flight Requirement
MMU Recharge (2 MMU's)
Leakage and Metabolic
2 x 2-person EVAs @ PCAB
Cabin Repress PCAB - 14.7 psis
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL CONSUMABLE USE
• Margin, Lb Nom.
40.0
25.10
18.48
66.77
150.35
275.25
(-) 6.65
1 Allotted from PSRD Budget 2 Consists of Worst Contingency
Only, i.e., single Cabin Repress
8 to 14.7 psia, which exceeds
Cabin Puncture (-) Repress
from 9.0 to 14.7 psis.
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TABLE 2
ECLSS Atmosphere Gas Budget, 10.5 Psia Cabin
Cryo 021	Aux 02 GOE
• Total Loaded, Lb Now. (Ref. 4)	 N/A	 67.6
• Unuaables: Residual	 N/A	 11.0
• Reserves	 (Ref. 1)
Measurement Error
	
N/A
	
5.0
Dispersion Allowance (10% Flt. Req't)
	
7.89
	
0
SUBTOTAL
	
7.89
	
16.0
• Contingency
MMU Recharge (2 MMU's) (Ref. 5)
	
0
	
0
1-Dry Extension at 14.7 psia
	 8.85
	
0
Cabin Puncture	 (Ref. 3)
	
24.89
	
34.16
Single Cabin Repress tc 8 psia
	 0
	
31.44
Single Cabin Repress 8 - 14.7 psia
	
0
	
10.49
1 x 2-person EVA @ PCAB
	
0
SUBTOTAL 2
	
24.89
	
34.16
GN2
268.6
26.0
16.2
14.3
56.5
40.0
6.52
120.20
64.25
67.70
71.32 Net
40.0
30.92
23.10
48.88
142.90
270.72
(-) 2.12
• Flight Requirement
MMU Recharge (2 MMU's)
Leakage and Metabolic
2 x 2-person EVAs @ PCAB
Cabin Repress PCAB - 14.7 psia
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL CONSUMABLE USE
• Margin, Lb Nom.
0
	
0
61.63
	
0
17.31
	
0
0
	
0
	
78.94
	
0
	111.72
	
50.16
N/A
	
17.44
1 Unuseables and Measurement Errors	 2 Consists of Worst Contingency Only, i.e.,
in PRSD Budget
	
	
Cabin Puncture (-) Repress from 10.5 to
14.7 psi&
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061.54
14.25
0
78.79
114.02
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
47.44
20.16
TABLE.3
ECLSS Atmosphere Gas Budget, 12.0 Pole Cabin
Cryo 021
	Aux 02 GOX
• Total Loaded, Lb Nan. (Ref. 4) 	 N/A	 67.6
• Unusables: Residual
	
N/A	 11.0
• Reserves
Measurement Error
	
N/A	 5.0
I
Dispersion Allowance (10% Flt. Req't) 	 7.68	 0
SUBTOTAL
	
7.88
	
16.0
• Contingency
MM Recharge (2 MMU's) (Ref. 5)
	
0
	
0
1-Day Extension at 14.7 psia	 8.85
	
0
Cabin Puncture	 (Ref. 3)
	
27.35
	
30.00
Single Cabin Repress to 8 psia 	 0
	
31.44
Single Cabin Repress 8 - 14.7 psia 	 0
	
10.49
1 x 2-person EVA @ PCAB
	
8.62
	
0
SUBTOTAL 2
	
27.35
	
31.44
I
f
GN2
266.6
26.0
16.2
13.5
55.7
40.0
6.52
110.44
64.25
67.70
13.80
79.0 Net
40.0
36.40
27.60
31.44
135.44
270.14
(-) 1.54
• Flight Requirement
MM Recharge (2 MMU's)
Leakage and Metabolic
2 x 2-person EVAs @ PCAB
Cabin Repress PCAB - 14.7 psi&
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL CONSUMABLE USE
• Margin, Lb Nom.
1 Unusables and Measurement Errors 	 2 Consists of Worst Contingency Only, i.e.,
in PRSD Budget	 Cabin Puncture (-) Repress from 12.0 to
14.7 psis
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TABLE 4
ECLSS Atsosphere Gas Budget. 13.5 Pala Cabin
Cryo 021
	Aux 02 GOX
• Total Loaded. Lb Nos. (Ref. 4) 	 N/A	 67.6
• Unusables: Residual	 N/A	 11.0
• Reserves	 (Raf. . 1)
Measurement Error
	
N/A
	
5.0
Dispersion Allowance (10% Flt. Regt.)
	
7.87
	
0
SUBTOTAL
	
7.87
	
16.0
• Contingency
MMU Recharge (2 MMU's) (Ref. 5)
	
0
	
0
1-Day Extension at 14.7 psi&	 8.85
	
0
Cabin Puncture	 (Ref. 3)
	
29.50
	
26.33
Single Cabin Repress to 8 psi& 	 0
	
31.44
Single Cabin Repress 8 - 14.7 psi& 	 0
	
10.49
1 x 2-person EVA @ PCAB
	
8.85
	
0
SUBTOTAL 2
	
29.50
	
31.44
GN2
268.6
26.0
16.2
12.8
55.0
40.0
6.52
101.75
64.25
67.70
16.05
87.73 Net
40.0
41.89
32.10
14.00
127.99
270.74
(-) 2.14
• Flight Requirement
MMU Recharge (2 MMU's)
Leakage and Metabolic
2 x 2-person EVAs @ PCAB
Cabin Repress PCAB - 14.7 psi&
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL CONSUMABLE USE
• Margin, Lb Nom.
0
	
0
61.46
	
0
17.19
	
0
0
	
0
	
78.65
	
0
	116.02
	
47.44
N/A
	
20.16
1 Unusables and Measurement Errors
	
2 Consists of Worst Contingency Only, i.e.,
in PRSD Budget
	
Cabin Puncture
(-) Repress from 13.5 to 14.7 psi&
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08.85
31.00
0
0
8.55
31.00
0
0
25.90
31.44
i
10.49
0
31.44
40.0
6.52
95.50
64.25
67.70
17.85
95.50
0
61.38
17.11
0
78.49
117.34
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
47.44
I
20.16
40.0
46.30
35.70
0
122.00
271.9
(•) 3.3
TABLE 5
• Contingency
MMU Recharge (2 M!U's) (Ref. 5)
1-Day Extension at 14.7 Pala
Cabin Puncture	 (Ref. 3)
Single Cabin Repress to 8 psis.
Single Cabin Repress 8 - 14.7 Asia
1 x 2-person EVA @ "AB
SUBTOTAL 2
• Flight Requirement
MMU Recharge (2 MMU's)
Leakage and Metabolic
2 x 2-person EVA& @ PCAB
Cabin Repress PCAB - 14.7 psi&
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL CONSUMABLE USE
• Margin. Lb Nom.
1 Unusables and Measurement Errors
In PRSD Budget
ECLSS Atmosphere Gas Mget. 14.7 Pala Cabin
1
Cryo 02	 Aux 02 COX
	
GN2
• Total Loaded, Lb Non. (Ref. 4) 	 N/A
	 67.6
	
268.6
o Unusables: Residual	 N/A	 11.0
	
26.0
• Reserves	 (Rat. 1)
	 it
Measursisent Error	 N/A
	
5.0
	
16.2
i
Dispersion Allowance (lOZ Flt. Raq't)
	
7.as	
I 
0
	
12.2
SUBTOTAL
	
7.es
	
16.0
	
54.4
2 Includes Worst Contingency Only
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ATTACHMZNT 1
Breakdown of Planned STS Flights
(Reference 6)
Flights identified to date
Flights without duration and crew size information
V
- DOD	 18
- Reflights and payloads of opportunity	 10
Flights with available crew size and duration information
Crew
Size
Duration - Days
1	 2	 3	 5 7
2 4	 3	 1	 1 2 j	 1.
3 -	 -	 6	 9 4 19
4 -	 -	 -	 - 5 5
6 -	 -	 -	 - 16 1 1	 16
51 Total
1 - All Spacelab module flights plus S/L D 4. No Planned EVA.
-28
51
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MEMO HIGHLIGHTS
Title: Prebreathe Elimination Study - Air-Cooled Avionics
Objective of Study: Evaluate the adequacy of the Orbiter Atmo-
spheric Revitalization Subsystem (ARS) to
provide cooling of air-cooled avionic
equipment under reduced cabin pressure.
Findings and Conclusions:
1.	 Operation of the cabin at 11.6 psia is feasible if the follow-
ing air-cooled avaionics load management is implemented.
• Some load redistritution is required between avionics bays
1 and 3.
• Operation at reduced cabin pressures requires that one out of
the three IMU be powered down.
2 ,.	 Powering down of select flight deck avionics and running 2
cabin fans may be required if:
• the crew size exceeds 4 people
• solar exposure exceeds nominal
• avionic box as-designed wall temperature exceeds 170°F.
3.	 Power-down requirements do not exceed those planned for STS-1
priority power-downs 1 - 3.
Nature and Scope of Study:
Adequate cooling will be provided if air temperature leaving the
avionics is below 130 °F at 14.7 psia. Analysis was performed to
determine air exit temperatures of avionic equipment located in
the cabin and in the three avionic bays as a function of crew size,
cabin pressure, ARS performance, solar orientation and electrical
equipment operation.
Advantage of Findings:
Reconfiguration of air-cooled avionics loads does not have any
meaningful impact on Orbiter on-orbit capability.
Disadvantage of Findings:
Operating 2 fans on a regular basis may require more frequent fan
change-out.
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BACKGROUND
EVA-planning--for supporting-
 STS flights calls for- conducting EVA
at 4.0 psia from a 14.7 ^sia cabin. To preclude "the bends", a
painful and potentially dangerous physiological condition resulting
from bubble formation when dissolved gasses in body tissues are
driven out of solution by exposure to reduced ambient pressure
during EVA, STS crewmembers prebreathe pure 0 2
 for 3 to 4 hours to
purge body tissues of dissolved N , the prime constituent of bends
bumbles. However, prebreathing hd^s several drawbacks: the crew
coisiders the Portable Oxygen System (POS) to restrict IVA prior
to donning the EMU; and denitrogenation can be significantly re-
dt,ced inadvertently during EMU donning by taking just one or two
breaths of air, significantly increasing likelhood of bends, unless
specific (and cumbersome) procedures are followed rigorously.
Planning for STS-1 side-stepped prebreathing by requ.eing reduc-
tion of cabin pressure to 9 psia for approximately 12 hours prior
to EVA, which promotes sufficient washout of dissolved gasses from
tissues to minimize likelihood of bends. This is not a permanent
solution, because it does not address many Orbiter, payload, oper-
ational, and EVA issues relevant to operational STS flights. The
objective of the Prereathe Elimination Study is to define physio-
logically safe EVA and cabin pressure levels while achieving an
acceptable compromise between conflicting Orbiter, payload, oper-
ational and EVA issues. This analysis was conducted to evaluate
the adequacy of the ARS to cool the avionics at reduced cabin
pressures.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Prebreathe Elimination Study examines impacts of changing Orbiter
cabin pressure and EMU EVA pressure to eliminate pure 0 prebreathe
prior to EVA. However, reducing cabin pressure to supp8rt EVA
impacts the air-cooled avionics in two ways. One, it reduces the
total mass flow and thus the cooling capacity of the air. Two,
it reduces the ability to transfer heat between the avionics and
the air. This analysis establishes the cooling capacity of the
air as a function of cabin pressure and identifies and evaluates
air-cooled avionics load management approaches to permit cabin
pressure reduction.
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SYSTEM DEFINITION
The ARS comprises a water loop and five air loops (Figure 1).
The air loops provide cooling for personnel and equipment and
transport heat to the water loop via heat exchangers. The forced
air-cooled avionics are manifolded in parallel (Reference 4) to
draw cool avionics bay or cabin air through each device. The
amount of air flow for each device is set by orifice to produce
a uniform temperature rise. Under normal conditions the temper-
ature rise is 35 0 , 30 0 , and 17°F for devices located in the cabin
(both Flight Deck Avionics and IMU), Avionics Bays 1 and 2, and
Avionics Bay 3, respectively. The water loop provides cold plate
cooling and transports this heat plus heat from the air loop heat
exchangers to the Interchanger Heat Exchanger (I/C HEX). The
I/C HEX transfers the heat to the Freon Coolant Loop. System
operating conditions are itemized below and are as specified by
Reference 1, except where noted.
Water Loop
'• No water bypass (chosen for ,naximum cooling configuration)
• Water Pump Flow; 1250 pph (Reference 2)
• Water Pump Heat Load; 1160 Btu/hr. (Reference 7)
• Avionics Bay Water Flow; (Reference 2)
a. Bay One; 302 pph
b. Bay Two; 300 pph
c. Bay Three A; 591 pph
d. Bay Three B; 57 pph
• I/C HEX Effectiveness; .745 (minimum)/.76 (nominal)
• I/C HEX Freon Inlet Temperature; 40 0 F (maximum)/38°F (nominal)
Flight Deck
• No air bypass (chosen for maximum cooling configuration)
• Fan Flow;
a. Minimum; 305 CFM (one fan)/336 CFM (two fans)
b. Nominal; 340 CFM (one fan)/375 CFM (two fans)
• Fan Heat Load; 1665 Btu/hr/fan (Reference 8)
• Condenser UA; 0.558 x (effective air flow in pph) + 125.0
IMU
• Fan Flow; 34 CFM
• Fan Heat road; 167 Btu/hr (Reference 8)
• IMU HEX effectiveness; 1.053 - .00^4 x (air flow in pph)
A-76
^i
.r
i
Avionics Bays
__ _,_ • . Fan Heat Load; 584 Btu/hr/fan (Reference . 8)
• Fan Flow Bay 1; 195 CFM (one fan)/206 CFM (two fans)
• Fan Flow Bay 2; 196 CFM (one fan)/209 CFM (two fans)
• Fan Flow Bay 3; 172 CFM (one fan)/175 CFM (two fans)
• HEX Air Exit Temperature; (Reference 7)
T - Water Inlet Temperature + (constant 11)x(air flow in pph) +
constant #2
where: constant 11 - .0035(Bay 1)/.0025(Bay 2)/
.00075(Bay 3 nominal)/.0028(Bay 3)
constant 12 - 11.8(Bay 1)/6.0(Bay 2)/0.4(Bay 3 nominal)/	 y• 4
1.75(Bay 3)
Heat Loads
• Metabolic (assumes 65°F cabin for calculating sensible/latent
spli ).
a. Sensible; 2639 Btu/hr (7 mer,)/1509 Btu/hr (4 men)
b. Latent; 1524 Btu/hr (7 men)/575 Btu/hr (4 men)
• Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH)
a. Sensible; 714 Btu/hr (7 men)/ 357 Btu/hr (4 men)
b. Latent; 347 Btu/hr (7 men)/174 Btu/hr (4 men)
• Heat Leaks
a. Wail to Cabin; 1723 Btu/hr (maximum)/44 Btu/hr (nominal)
b. Bays to Cabin; 297 Btu/hr (maximum)/186 Btu/hr (nominal)
c. Wall to Water Loop; 867 Btu/hr (maximum)/-356 Btu/hr
(nominal)
• Cabin Electrical (Reference Appendix I - Table I)
a. Maximum; 4312 Btu/hr
b. Minmum; 609 Btu/hr (Power down)
• Flight Deck Avionics (Reference Appendix I - Table I)
a. Maximum; 8530 Btu/hr (7 men)/6711 Btu/hr (4 men)
b. Minimum; 2896 Btu/hr (Power down)
• IMU (Reference Appendix I - Table II)
a. Nominal; 1290 Btu/hr (3 units)
b. Proposed; 860 Btu/hr (2 units)
• Avionics Bay 1 (Reference Appendix I - Tables III and VI)
a. Air-Cooled Avionics; 5128 Btu/hr(max)/2636 Btu/hr(proposed)
b. Cold Plate Avionics; 5640 Stu/hr
• Avionics Bay 2 (Reference Appendix I - Tables IV and VI)
a. Air-cooled Avionics; 2616 Btu/hr (nominal)
b. Cold Plate Avionics; 6051 Btu/hr
• Avionics Bay 3 (Reference Appendix I - Tables V and VI)
a. MDM; 177 Btu/hr
b. Air-Cooled Avionics; 2741 Btu/hr(proposed)/250 Btu/hr(min)
c. Bay 3A Cold Plates; 8277 Btu/hr
d. Bay 3B Cold Plates; 990 Btu/hr
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ANALYSIS
Crew Size
Reference 5 indicates that all the planned and backup EVA flights
have crews of 2 and 3, and nearly all (708) of the known flights
have crews of 4 or less (Table U. Since the crew size has a big
impact on the cabin r nnerature and subsequently on the Flight
Deck Avionics, this a^..Alysis considers the ARS cooling capac3.l.y
for both a 7-man crew and a 4-man crew.
Cooling Requirement
The avionics equipment is designed to operate satisfactorily as
long as the cooling air exit temperature is maintained below 130°F
at 14.7 psia (Reference 4). By reworking the expression for heat
transfer and the coefficient of forced convection, a relationship
for the maximum allowable air temperature as a function of cabin
pressure, air velocity and avionic wall temperature was developed
(Appendix II). The exact wall temperature used in designing the
cooling system is unknown. However, a maximum component temperature
of 150°C (302°F) was used during vacuum (no cooling) tests. Current
commercial practice establishes a minimum temperature difference
between a component and its heat sink of 80°F (220°F wall temper-
ature). This is a maximum wall temperature, and in practice a
wall temperature somewhere between this and the air temperature of
130°F is expected.
For reference purposes, a wall temperature of 170°F has been
assumed in addition to the 220°F. The 170°F is significant because
at 11.6 psia it is consistent with the 7-man cooling require-
ment (Figure 5). The 11.6 psia pressure level has been previously
determined to be the minimum permissible pressure level (Reference
9). The effect of wall temperature and pressure on the maximum
air temperature is presented on Figure 2.
Based on the specified maximum and minimum values for cabin and
avionic bay fans given in Reference 1, it appears that the air
velocity within the cabin avionics can vary + 108 and within the
avionics bays, 58. The -108 results from a single cabin fan per-
formance of 305 CFM and the +108 results from a two-fan performance
of 375 CFM. The -58 results from a single avionics bay performance
of 195 CFM. The impact of air velocity and pressure on the maximum
air temperature is presented on Figure 3.
Air Exit Temperature
Reference 1 specifies the operating conditions which would result
in the maximum impact of external and internal heat loads. These
conditions are minimum	 effectiveness, maximum	 HEX
Freon inlet temperature, minimum cabin fan flow and maximum heat
leaks. For this configuration the effects on flight deck avionic
air exit temperatures were determined for both 4- and 7•-man expected
heat loads. The results are presented on Figure 4. This curve shows
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that there is no margin to handle the maximum impact of heat loads
at less than 14.7 psis, the Orbiter cabin design point. Figure 5
shows the cooling margin that can be created by powering down select
flight deck heat loads to accommodate the maximum impacts of heat
loads at reduced cabin pressures. Figures 6 and 6A show the cooling
margin that exists with nominal impact of external and internal
heat loads at reduced ca i6 npressures, operating one and two cabin
fans. Figures 7 - 11 show similar margins for the IMU's and air-
cooled equipment in Avionics Bays 1 - 3.
Several approaches to improve cooling margin were analyzed. They
included powering down one IMU ( Figure 8), operating two fans in
Avionics Bay 1 ( Figure 11A), and shifting operation from one of
the two General Purpose Computers ( GPC) being used in Bay 1 to
the GPC in Bay 3 ( Figures 11 and 12).
RESULTS
Crew Size
Current planning indicates that the crew size on planned and
backup EVA flights will be 2 or 3 ( Table I). Hence analysis based
, on 4 crew members is conservative. Current planning for flights
with contingency EVA indicates that the crew size will not exceed 6.
Hence anlaysis based on 7 crew members is also conservative.
Cooling Requirements
The allowable maximum air temperature is a function of both cabin
pressure and avionic box wall temperature ( Figure 2).
Fan Performance
Increasing air velocity through the avionic boxes by operating
additional fans will increase the allowable maximum air exit temper-
ature. Conversely, degraded fan performance will reduce the
allowable air exit temperature ( Figure 3).
Minimum Cooling Margin
With the ARS operating at conditions designed to maximize the
effect of heat loads, i . e., minimum air flow, maximum Freon cool-
ant temperature and minimum I/C HEX effectiveness, and with maxi-
mum expec ted heat 'loads ( 7-man crew, maximum solar orientation and
maximum amount of avionics operating), *here is no excess cooling
capability at 14 . 7 psia ( Figure 4). This confirms the validity
of the ARS sizing for worst case sea level cabin conditions.
sL
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IMaximum Cool inj Margin
^ Additional"cooling ma'rg`in to support operation et reduced cabin
pressures can be obtained at the above conditions by partial
power-down of some Flight Deck Avionics and operating both cabin
fans (Figure 5). This is approximately the same margin provided
by the ARS operating at nominal conditions (nominal air flow,
Freon coolant temperature and I/C HEX effectiveness) and nominal
heat loads asociated with a 4-man crew (Figure 6) or if two cabin
fans are operating with a 7-man crew (Figure 6A).
IMU Cooling Margin
IMU cooling margin is less than the 7-man partial power-down
flight deck case (Figure 7). The cooling margin can be made to
approximate that of flight deck by powering down one of the IMU's
(Figure 8).
Avionics Bay Cooling Margin
Under the present distribution of air-cooled avionics Loads,
Avionics Bay One has less and Bay Three has more cooling margin
than the Flight Deck (Figures 9 and 10). By operating one GPC in
each bay (total of 3) instead of two in Bay One and one ?n Bay
Two (total of 3), the cooling margin of each bay can be equalized
with that of Flight Deck (Figures 11 and 12). If both computers
in Bay One must be operated, the cooling margin can still be made
approximately equal to the Flight Deck be operating two fans
(Figure 11A).
Conclusion
Assuming that the sea level avionic wall temperature as designed
is 170°F or less and with use of select procedures, adequate
avionics cooling can be obtained down to a cabin pressure of 11.8
psia nominal/11.6 psia minimum.
Recommendation
Flights with planned or backup EVA's should be limited to 4 or
less crewmen. The will permit full avionics operaton under
nominal system conditions with nominal external heat loads.
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'	 CREW SIZE
i	 2
i
a
3
4
6
TBD
TABLE I
CREW SIZE
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS TYPE EVA PLANNED
11 2 - PLANNED
6 - BACKUP
3 - CONTINGENCY
19 3 - BACKUP
14 - CONTINGENCY
2 - TBD
5 3 - CONTINGENCY
2 - TBD
16 16 - CONTINGENCY
28 TBD
TOTAL 79
Planned	 - EVA is the baseline mode for accanplishing mission objectives.
Mission support equipment is designed for operation by EVA.
Backup	 - EVA is the backup mode for accomplishing mission objectives.
Mission support equipment is designed for EVA to backup
select non-redundant features.
Contingency - EVA is a contingency mode for supporting safe return of the
Orbitor to Earth. Tile repair and pyaloa3 bay door closure
are examples.
SOURCE: JSC 13000-5 "Flight Assignment Baseline", December, 1980.
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Appendix I
OOLDPLATE COALED EQUIPMUR CORM. =D LCAM
i
WATTS BAY 1 BAY 2 BAY 3A BAY 3B CABLE
SYSTEM & PACKAGE EACH WATTS WATTS WATTS WATtS WhTTS
Flight Control
a 
i
r	 RJDF 1 & 2 21..: 21.2 21.2
Camunicat ions
j cctw 40 40
CCIMSEJC 1 & 2 25 50
EWVATC 150 - 150
-
KU/B A 1 & 2 123.9
- -
123.9 123.9 -
KU/B B 1 & 2 47 - - 47 - -
KU/B SP 135
_
_ - 135
N/W SP 1 & 2 35 70
P/L IMG 1 & 2 30 - 60 - - -
P/LSP1& 2 17 - 34 - - -
RA 1 & 2 23 23 23 - - -
S/B PRE A 25 - - 25 - -
S/B PA 335 - - 335 - -
S/B XMM 1 & 2 110 - - 220 - -
S/B )TNDR 1 & 2 65 - - 130 - -
Oper Flight Inst
Look RCDR 1 & 2 60 - 120 - - -•
MTU 31 - - - 31 -
MSS PCM RCDR 73 73 - - - -
PCM MAST 1 & 2 55 55 55 - - -
P/L Data MM 50 50 - - - -
SC 1, 2 & 3 - 15 27 16 - -
Elec. Pwr. Dist. & Cont.
EVLSS P/S-B/C 213 213 - - - -
GCILU	 .	 . 30 - - 30 - -
INV 1 thru 9 224 672 672 672 - -
LCA 1, 2 & 3 90 90 90 90 - -
MCA 1, 2 & 3 27/30 27 30 27 - -
PCA 1, 2 & 3 325.2 326.2 326.2 326.2 -
Data Proc.
MDM FF 1, 2, 3 & 4 62.4 62.4 124.8 62.4 - -
MDM OFI 1, 2, 3 & 4 51.9 51.9 51.9 51.9 - 51.9
MDM PF 1 & 2 59.9 59.9 59.9 - - -
MDM LF 58.6 58.6 - - - -
MM 1 & 2 78 78 78 - - -
Water Rmp - - - - - 340
7ML IN WATTS 1916.2 1773.1 2425.4 289.9 391.9
TOTAL IN BTU/HR	 23198.5
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PREBREATHE ELIMINATION STUDY - EMU IMPACTS
Richard C. Wilde
Engineering Manager, Advanced EVA Studies
July 1981
Hamilton Standard Division
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MEMO NIGNLICTITS
Title: Prebreathe -limir.ation Study - EMU Impacts
Object of Memo: Identify impacts to EMU life support subsystem and space
suit assembly due to increasing EVA pressure.
Findings and Conclusions:
EVA pressure increases to between 5.25 and 7.50 psi& incur the following
impacts:
1. Changes to only approximately 15 to 20% of the EMU components would be
required. Conversely, approximately 80 to 85% of EMU components would
remain unaffected, depending on the EVA pressure selected.
2. Significant impacts to the EMU (those requiring development evaluation) are:
SOP - 02 capacity requirement rises proportionally with EVA pressure,
increasing by 82% at 7.5 Asia. Resulting SOP volume increase may drive
revision to AAP lower cross bar, in turn affecting the location and stress
levels of the Orbiter airlock lower dovetail mounts. SOP volume increase
may also affect both `MU "shelf" configuration and ability of suited crew-
member to pass through Orbiter interlock hatch. Study is recommended to
minimize these impacts.
Battery - Motor power demand increases with EVA pressure, requiring more
battery power. Battery volume increases upwards of 10% at 7.5 psis, but the
volume increase is negligible up to approximately 6 psia. PLSS primary
structure would require modification to accommodate a larger battery for
EVA pressures above approximately 6 psis. Study is recommended to minimize
this impact.
02 Regulators - Set points of primary and secondary 02 regulators and flow
of secondary 0 2 regulator require change to control revised normal and
emergency EVA pressure. Primary changes involve springs and strokes.
Stability may be affected and requires evaluation.
Suit Joints - Torque requirements increase with EVA pressure. Refinement
of present joint concepts is expected to minimize the increase up to 6.0 -
6.75 psia EVA pressure. New joint concepts are required for EVA pressures
up to 7.5 psia.
Gloves - Dextpr ty diminishes rapidly with increasing EVA pressure. New
glove technology is expected for EVA pressures above 5.25 - 6.0 psia.
A-110
i
-2-
Findings and Conclusions (Continued):
3. Minor impacts to the EMU (those requiring just straightforward design
changes) are:
Strength Marpins - Exterual walls of the sublimator, CCC, HUT HTS fiber-
glass, and PLSS pitot-actuated valve require analytical evaluation. Strength-
ening in some areas is expected to be required in proportion to the increase
in EVA pressure. LTA axial restraints in the waist and hip as well as HUT
scYe bearings and gimbals require similar analysis. Strengthening is
expected to be required in all areas, especially at higher EVA pressures.
Flow Restrictors - Flow capability of purge valves and other restrictors
requires resetting to accommodate higher EVA pressure.
Relief Valve Settings - Vent loop relief valves require resetting to
accommodate higher EVA pressure.
Other - C & W software and DCM pressure gage require revision to reflect
higher EVA pressure.
4. Testing and Handlings - Test rig interface accessories at HS and JSC
require only minor _odification to support testing at higher EVA pressure.
Modifications are typified by gage recalibration and relief valve resetting
or installation of nerd springs. Bench fixtures, ground handling device, and
shipping containers may require modification to accommodate a significant
increase in SOP volume.
5. Safety - A firft aid requirement for explosive decompression from 6 psig
or greater during 1 g manned testing Is rec:omp.•ession in a hyperbaric
facility. Testing at over 6 psis requires that manned testing be conducted
only where a hyperbaric facility is available within minutes.
6. New Technology - Two new technology areas have been identified: gloves,to
develop improved dexterity at increased EVA pressure; and integrated testing
at increased EVA pressure, to insure that all issues are well understood and
procedures are verified.
Advantages of Findings:
1. Raising EVA pressure is feasible. Eighty percent or more of EMU items do
not require change.
2. Development risks to the LSS are minimal. Most changes do not require
development evaluation, and those that do are straightforward engineering
problems.
3. Impacts to testing are minimal. Test equipment modifications are minor.
Hyperbaric facilities, if required, exist at JSC.
i
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Disadvantages of Findings:
1. Increase in SOP volume may drive changes in 2"."SU and Orbiter airlock wall.
2. Some increase in joint torque is expected. Devc1opment is required to
minimize the increase.
3. Glove dexterity will be reduced. New technology will be required to
offset this loss.
BACKGROUND
EVA planning for supporting STS flights calls for conducting EVA at 4.0 psia
from a 14.7 psia cabin. To preclude "the bends", a painful and potentially
dangerous physiological condition resulting from bubble formation when dissolved
gasses in body tissues are driven out of solution by exposure to reduced ambient
pressure during EVA, STS crewmembers prebreathe pure 02 for 3 to 4 hours to
purge body tissues of dissolved N2, the prime constituent of bends bubbles.
However, prebreathing has several drawbacks: the crew considers the Portable
Oxygen System (POS) to restrict IVA prig to donning the DIU, ae►c denitrogenation
can be significantly reduced inadvertently during EMU donning by taking just one
or two breaths of air, significantly increasing likelihood of bends, unless
specific (and cumbersome) procedures are followed rigorously.
Planning for STS-1 side-steps prebreathing by requiring reduction of cabin
pressure to 9 psis for approximately 12 hours prior to EVA, which promotes
sufficient washout of dissolved gasses from tissues to minimize likelihood of
bends. This is not a permanent solution, beceuse it does not address many
Orbiter, payload, operational, arJ IVA issues relevant to operational STS
flights. The objective of the Prebreathe Elimination Study is to define physio-
logically safe EVA and cabin pressure levels while achieving an acceptable
compromise between conflicting Orbiter, payload, operational, and EVA issues.
This memo addresses impacts to EMU resulting from raising EVA pressure. Other
issues are being addressed elsewhere in the Prebreathe Elimination Study.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Prebreathe Elimination Study examines impacts of changing Orbiter cabin pressure
and EMU EVA pressure to eliminate pure 02 prebreathe prior to EVA.
Raising EVA pressure increases structural loading of EMU suit and life support
elements, increases power requirements, and changes leakage and flow requirements.
These impacts crust be identified and evaluated for significance in order to define
EMU changes required for operation at higher suit pressure.
This memo discusses key EMU life support system and space suit assembly issues
as follows:
• Overview of changes required
• Significant LSS impacts
---- --_ _ r--Minor -LSS impacts- .._._ _.- - -	 - - - — -- --	 - ---- - -- - ---
• SSA impacts
• Testing and handling.
a
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1. Overview of Changes
The EMU and .POS consist of. 22 contract and items (CEI's), which are in turn
composed of 117 component types and major structural elements. The following
tabulation, drawn from Attachment 1, shows that most EMU components and all
POS components require no change to support operating the EMU at alevated
suit pressure.
Total Number of EDT	 Number of components requiring
and POS Components	 change to operate at higher EVA
pressure
FEVA, psis
5.25
	 6.00
	 6.75
	 7.50
L 7	 ; 19
	 21	 22	 25
% of components
	
requiring no changer 84 	 82	 81	 79
2. Significant Life Support Subsystem Impacts
Attachment 2 lists each POS and EMU LSS CEI and identifies the changes
required to support EVA at higher suit pressures. The SOP, battery, and
02
 regulators require significant changes, in that extensive redesign is
required and development evaluation of the redesign is recommended. These
changes also drive additional changes as shown in Table 1.
SOP - The SOP is sized to provide purge flow sufficient to limit inepIred
CO2 to 15 mm Hg for 30 minutes at a metabolic rate of 1,000 Btu/hr
(Reference 2). In addition, it is desirable not to increase the risk of the
bends while using the SOP (Reference 3). This requires raising SOP operating
pressure in step with rising EVA pressure as shown in Figure 2. This
curve retains the same bends risk, i.e., ratio of pre-EVA tissue dissolved
gas to emergency EVA pressure of 1.9 as the present SOP, which supports
emergency EVA at 3.35 psi& after the crewmember is exposed to a. 9.0 psia
cabin for 12 hours. Figure 1 shows the increase in SOP 02 capacity required
to retain present bends risk and CO2 levels as normal EVA presst+;,a rises.
The following table, drawn from Figure 1, shows the rapid increase in SOP
capacity required to keep pace with increasing EVA pressure.
PEVA, psia	 5.25	 6.00
	 6.75	 7.50
% increase in
	 29	 47	 64	 82%
SOP 02
Enlarging the SOP to accommodate additional 0g will impact the PLSS TMC, the
AAP lower crossmember, the airlock wall, the 'shelf" on the MMU, and may
affect the ability of a suited crewmember to pass through the Orbiter
interdeck hatch. these impacts are significant and require development
evaluation after implementation. HS recommends that SOP requirements and
implementation be reviewed to identify acceptable approaches for minimizing
these impacts.
A-113
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Battery - Increasing EVA pressure causes the fan motor to draw more poorer,
Inc=easing power demand on the battery. The following tabulation, drawn
from Attachment 2 and Figure l,shows the effects on battery power and volume
?EVA, psia
	
0. 5.25	 6.00	 6.75	 7.50
2 increase in
battery power	 6	 9	 13	 16.4%
% increase in
battery volume	 0	 3	 6	 10%
It it expected that up to 6 psis PEVA the battery can be accommodated within
the existing PLSS structure. Payond 6 psia structure will likely require
enlargement to accommodate a lLrger battery. HS recommends that battery
requirements and implementation be reviewed to identify acceptable approaches
for minimizing impacts to PLSS structure.
02 Regulators - Resetting the PLSS and SOP 02 regulator requirei new sprirgs
plus a detailed evaluation of regulator strokes,flow areas and stability
which may require additional changes to regulator detail parts. These
changes are expected to be straightforward redesign, but require development
evaluation. The changes are not expected to require external envelope changes.
3. Minor Life Support Subsystem Impacts
Attachment 2 identifies impacts to CEI's which are straightforward design
changes which are not expected to require development evaluation. These
include stiffening flat plate areas exposed to increased differential
pressure loading, resizing certain orifices, and resetting certain relict
valves and regulators. Table 2, drawn from Attachment 2, summarizes the
minor LSS impacts.
Raising EVA pressure requires small increases in water and oxygen to cover
small additional cooling and leakage requirements. At 7.5 psis en additional
1.4% water and 2.5% oxygen are required. These increases are too small to
warrant changing PLSS tankage. Consumable$ useage rules should be modif.a,d
slightly to cover these increases.
4. Space Suit Assembly impacts
Raising EVA pressure has impacts on SSA strength margins, ,joint performance,
and gloves.
Strength Margins - The following areas require strengthening in proportion
to the increase in EVA pressure: axial restraints in the LTA waist and
brief, and HUT fiberg;.ass, seye gimbals and bearings.
Joint Performance - Table 3 presents the results of an evaluation of present
EHU joints tested at EVA pressures up to 7.5 psig. The negative numbers
represent increases in joint torque over present 4 psig values. Numbers to
the right of the broken line represent points for which new concepts are
required to make practical, working joints. Numbers to the left of broken
line rc,Vresent joints that can be improved by extending present joint
construction technology.
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Gloves - The EMU glove loses dexterity rapidly with increasing EVA pressure.
Technology of the p resent glove does not appear adequate to support a
workable glove above the range of 5.25 - 6.0 psia. Hence a new technology
initiative is recc::.:Lended for developing workable gloves for pressures
above 5.25 Asia.
5. Testing and Handling
Increasing EVA pressure raises four issues regarding testing and handling:
safety, special test equipment, handling fixtures, and integrated testing.
Safety (Reference 4) - If pressure garment integrity is lost suddenly (on
the order of one second) at approximately 6 paig or above, lung rupturing
may occur which releases air into the pleural cavity. A first aid in manag-
ing the escaped air is to repressurize the test subject to several atmospheres
in a hyperbaric chamber within 10 to 20 minutes. This procedure helps to
control both lung collapse and air bubbles in the bloodstream (air embolism).
NASA safety standards require access to a hyperbaric chamber when manned
testing is conducted at 6 psig or above. Hyperbaric facilities are available
at JSC, where all DIU manned testing at EVA gage pressure has been conducted
to date.
SEecial Test Equipment - Test rigs at Hamilton Standard and NASA JSC are
compatible with increased EVA pressure, with just minor modifications.
Typical changes include recalibration of vent loop instrumentation, resetting
of back pressure controls, and modifying or resetting relief valves. A
hardware safety philosophy has dictated inclusion of relief valves in
test rig-test item interface accessories to preclude inadvertent isolation
of rig-mounted relief valves. These relief valves require resetting or
modifications also.
Handling Fixtures - Enlargement of the SOP may require modification of the
Wound handling device, PLSS/SOP bench fixtures, and CEI 199 shipping
container. This assessment would be made at the time of redesign of the SOP.
Integrated Testing - The United States Manned Space Program has conducted all
EVA at 4 psis. There is no widespread U.S. experience with higher EVA
pressures. A new technology initiative is recommended to conduct ai inte-
grated unmanned and manned test program at the selected EVA pressure to
gain assurance that issues of higher EVA pressures :ire well understood and
to verify related procedures.
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OF POOR QUALITY
TABLE 1
Significant Impacts to EMU LSS and Interfacing Areas
Item	 Impact
SOP	 • Tncrea`c Ftcred 1) z cprec! ty
• Enlarge SOP package
- May prevent passage taroul
interdeck hatch.
- Interfere with AAP lower
- Interfere with MMU "shelf'
Battery	 • Increase capacity
• Enlarge battery package
- May require mr^dification
AAP	 • Relocate lower crossbar. Expected to require
relocation of dovetail mounts in Orbiter
airlock wall.
PLSS 6 SOP	 • Modify springs to change set points.
02 Regulators
• Resize flow orifices as required.
• Modify piece parts as required to meet
flow requirements
• Evaluate stability.
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TABLE 2
Minor Impacts to EMU LSS CEI's
CEI	 Impact
PLSS • Strengthen sublimator and pitot-actuated valve.
• Revise 142, 145, and 146 relief valve settings.
• Revise 126 and 141 orifices.
• Revise C & W software limits.
DCM	 • Revise pressure gage range.
• Revise purge valve flow capacity.
SCU	 • Revise 418 and 419 regualtor settings.
CCC
	
• Strengthen canister.
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TABLE 3
SSA Impacted Joints
A-121
_.j
PEVA	 5.25 psis	 6.00 6.75 750
-15% —30% ' -50% -65%
-20% -35% I	 -40% -60%
-10% -30% 55X -70%
-10% -20% -30% -65X.
-10% -20% -25%	 I -35X
-5X -10% -15%	 ; -20%
I
Extend Require
Existing New
Concepts Concepts
Shoulder
Waist
Brief/Hip
Elbow
Knee
AnLie
Glove
ATTACi'.`:C yT 1
Summary of EMU & POS Component Changes
CEI & Name No. of Components No. of Changed Components
(Reference 1) 5.25 6.00	 6.75	 7.50 psis
100 PLSS 42 w/struct. 7 8	 9	 10
200 SOP 4 w/struct. 2 2	 2	 2
300 DCM• 16 2 2	 2	 2
400 SCU 10 0 0	 0	 2
440 EEH 1 0 0	 0	 0
470 AAP 1 1 1	 1	 1
480 CCC 1 1 1	 1	 1
490 Battery 1 0 1	 1	 1
101 CCA 1 0 0	 0	 0
102 HUT 2 2 2	 2	 2
103 Arms 1 1 1	 1	 1
104 LTA 1 1 1	 1	 1
105 Helmet 2 1 1	 1	 1
106 Gloves 1 1 1	 1	 1
107 LCVG 1 0 0	 0	 0
108 EVVA 1 0 0	 0	 0
109 UCD 1 0 0	 0	 0
110 IDB 1 0 0	 0	 0
112 OPA 1 0 0	 0	 0
CEI & Name No. of Components No. of Changed Components
11.5 12.7	 13.9	 15.1 psis
510 RBA 27 0 0	 0	 0
580 BH/M 1 0 0	 0	 0
590 RK 1 0 0	 0	 0
22	 117	 19	 21	 22	 25
% Change d	 16	 18	 19	 21
% Unchanged	 84	 82	 81	 79
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ATTACHMENT 2
Assessment of Increased PEVA on
EMU LSS and POS CEI's
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OF THE SHUTTLE SPACESUIT ASSEMBLY
AT ELEVATED PRESSURES
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This study assesses the impact to the Shuttle Spacesuit Assembly (SSA) of
operating at elevated pressures (5.25, 6.0, 6.75, 7.5 psia). The study also
projects the design changes for each pressure necessary to bring the struc-
tural capacity to a minimum safety factor of 2.0 and to bring performance
and life to current levels. Only design changes within the scope of the
existing concepts of the SSA are considered. This study projects the
anticipated cost.to bring the suit up to current structural. performance
d	 and life levels.
INTRODUCTION
The Arms, lower Torsc, and Gloves consist of softgoods restraints both, axial
lines and bladder restraint. The joints are flat pattern joints. The Upper
Torso is a hard shell and is not addressed here. The hardware usage in the
suit is limited to bearings, disconnects, and restraint attachment brackets.
The latter are the means by which the restraint lines attach to the bearings and
disconnects.
DISCUSSION
Information for'this study was collected by two methods - calculation and test.
The structural requirements at each pressure were calculated including manned
loading then compared to the current capacities as determined by previous test
to determine the resultant safety factor. The results of this comparison are
shown in Table 1.
in;i torque and range of the current suit at the elevated pressures was arrived
at th, •ough unmanned testing using the Cycle Certification Test Suit.
-I-
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This was dome witr, the Thermal Micromileoroid Garment (TMG) un;nstalied
as it was unavailable at the time. The torque measurements at th y± elevated
pressures are shown in graph form in Appendix A. The torque and range at
4.4 psi was done at an earlier time as part of certification testing and
was done with the TMG installed. The results of both efforts is shown in
Table 2. It should be noted that this suit saw more cycling than the required
life due to recertifications and general test support for various itemF.
RESULTS
The results of this study are shown in Table 3. The results are listed by
CEI at each pressure, in each of four categories:
1. Modifications required to upgrade the suit to current
performance and life levels and the respective structural
requirements.
2. The cost associated with the changes prujec:ed in Category 1
under two headings: Non-recurring and Recurring
3. Effects on performance and life if only structural changes
required for each pressure are made.
4. Amount of original performance and life that would be
reclaimed by incorporating design changes from Category 1.
The design changes noted in Category 1 are based on maintaining the current
concepts of the suit, therefore, the lack of entries in some areas indicates
the current design concepts would be deficient in accomplishing the requirements.
Even current design concepts are not capable of meeting the current performance
and life requirements at some pressures but can come relatively close.
-2-
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Thus the purpose of the last category - the amount of the original perfor-
mance and life that would be reclaimed by the design changes contemplated
!	 in Category 1. The second category shcws the cost projections for those
pressures for which design changes are possible. The figures listed are
for the whole suit rather than CEI's. The non-recurring costs cover design
and development, design verification, and certification testing. The re-
.curring costs cover the cost to rraintaic and support production. The
recurring cost would vary depending 6n the quantity and frequency of de-
liveries. The third category addresses torque and life as it was found
that the range of the joints does not change with pressure. The life
portion of the third category uses the current levels listed in the
specifications as a measure of the Cycle Life. These levels are: SAD
maximum cycles, Flight - design limit, and Mission - the cycles corres-
ponding to one flight of the Orbiter.
The decision to Frcject the need for design changes at a given pressure in
Category 1 is the result of reviewing the safety factors and torque levels
and considering the question of cycle life. Therefore, design changes are
called for at a lower pressure than any one factor may indicate; this pri-
marily occurs in borderline situations. As a conservative groundrule it
was assumed that current torque levels are at or near the limits desired
due to suit subject endurance. It is not known whether high torque levels
are undesirable or there is some margin before endurance is shortened.
The entries in the last two categories are judgement. Category 3 is a
projection based on the torque levels shown in Table 2 keeping in mind
the lack of a TMG in place. The entries in Category 4 are engineering
projections of the potential of the concepts cu. • rently used in the
r
n
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CONCLUSIONS
Generally speaking the Shuttle Spacesuit world not perfor.,  well above 6.0
p;ia unless different design concepts were used. The driver of this con-
clusion is the performance and life. The suit cauA be strengthened to
meet the higher loads of each pressure but they Cycle Life and Torques will
diminish the suit's usefulness significantly.
I
1
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TABLE 1
SSA
.	 SAFETY FACTOR OF CURRENT
RESTRAINT LINE DESIGN
AT VARIOUS PRESSURES
RESTRAINT LINE 4.0 psi 5.25 6.0 6.75 7.5
Glove 3.47 3.39 3.35 3.29 3.25
Upper Arm 4.16 3.89 3.75 3.62 3.48
Lower Arm 4.66 4.C8 4.36 4.27 4.18
Waist 2.31 1.96 1.79 1.66 1.54
Brief	 Front 2.00 1.69 1.52 1.42 1.27
Side 2.19 1.96 1.83 1.72 1.62
Thigh	 Inside 2.33 2.14 2.03 1.94 1.86
Outside 2.48 2.26 2.14 2.03 1.93
Lower Leg	 Inside 4.03 3.91 3.82 3.73 3.65
Outside 4.66 4.44 4.33 4.20 4.10
Boot	 Inside 3.18 3.08 3.01 2.95 2.89
Outside 3.65 3.50 3.42 3.35 3.27
TABLE 2
TORQUE LEVELS AT
MOBILITY LIMITS
AT VARIOUS PRESSURES
JOINT
RANGE
LIMIT 4.3 5.25 6.0 6.75 7.5
Shoulder 1400 126 149 151 163 183
Elbow 950 50 66 71 90 104
Waist 600 600 456 579 612 139
Nip 500 270 225 348 ?=:
Knee 1000 131 132 156 170
}	
1
Ankle 800 71 43 48 50 58
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